



Ministry of Housing,
Communities &
Local Government

Annex: Electoral Integrity Programme Evaluation: Year 2

IFF Research for MHCLG





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Annex 1: Research questions

Voter identification process research questions

OVERARCHING PROCESS

1. Were all aspects of the voter identification measures delivered as set out in the Elections Act 2022 legislation?
2. How did local authorities approach the implementation of the voter identification and VAC measures?
3. What barriers or challenges did local authorities face in implementing voter identification and VAC measures?
4. What enablers helped local authorities to implement voter identification and VAC measures?
5. How, and to who, have local authorities communicated voter identification and VAC to the electorate?
6. To what extent do electoral services staff in local authorities feel confident in delivering the voter identification and VAC measures?

VOTER IDENTIFICATION PROCESS IN POLLING STATIONS

7. What challenges did polling station staff face in implementing the voter identification measures?
8. What enablers helped polling station staff to implement the voter identification measures?
9. To what extent do polling station staff feel confident in delivering the new process?
10. What training was provided to polling station staff on voter identification?

VAC SPECIFIC PROCESS QUESTIONS

11. What training was provided to electoral services teams on VAC?
12. How well did the new online service and digital process for processing VACs work?

Voter identification impact research questions

IMPACTS ON THE ELECTORAL SECTOR

1. How have the voter identification and VAC measures affected the work of electoral services teams?
2. How have the voter identification and VAC measures affected the work of polling station staff?
3. To what extent have the introduction of the voter identification measures affected trust and confidence in the security of elections among staff running registration and elections?
4. What impact has the implementation of the voter identification and VAC measures had on the cost of registration and elections?

IMPACTS ON ELECTORS

5. Are electors aware of the changes?
6. To what extent does the VAC remove any potential barriers to voting for electors who do not have accepted photographic identification?
7. To what extent do the newly available provisions in polling stations remove any potential barriers to voting for electors who do not wish to have their identification checked in public?
8. To what extent have the voter identification measures affected the voting experience in polling stations for electors?
9. To what extent have the voter identification measures affected electors' preferred method of voting and propensity to vote?
10. To what extent have the voter identification measures affected electors' trust and confidence in the security of elections?
11. To what extent have the voter identification measures affected electors' satisfaction with voting in polling stations?

IMPACTS ON ELECTORAL FRAUD

12. To what extent have the voter identification measures made it easier to detect cases of personation in polling stations?
13. To what extent have the voter identification measures deterred attempts at electoral fraud in polling stations?
14. To what extent have the voter identification measures impacted opportunities for electoral fraud arising in any part of the system?

15. Did the implementation of the voter identification measures at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election have any unintended outcomes?

Accessibility process research questions

1. Were all aspects of the measure delivered as set out in the legislation?
2. How did local authorities approach the implementation of the accessibility measures?
3. What barriers or challenges did local authorities face in implementing the accessibility measures?
4. What enablers helped local authorities to implement the accessibility measures?
5. What training was provided to polling station staff on the accessibility measures?
6. To what extent have local authorities been able to provide the accessibility equipment and support in line with the Electoral Commission's guidance?
7. How and to who have local authorities communicated the accessibility changes?
8. What has been learnt so far from implementing the accessibility measures at local elections
9. What are the next steps for local authorities in implementing the accessibility measures at the next UK Parliamentary General Election?

Accessibility impact research questions

IMPACTS ON ELECTORS WITH A DISABILITY

1. Are people with accessibility needs, their carers and disability Civil Society organisations aware of the changes and how they affect disabled voters?
2. To what extent do the changes remove barriers to voting in person at a polling station for electors with disabilities?
3. To what extent have the changes affected the voting experience of voters with disabilities?
4. To what extent have the changes affected the voting behaviour of electors with disabilities, both in terms of method of voting and propensity to vote?
5. To what extent do the changes impact perceptions on the accessibility of elections among disabled electors?
6. To what extent do the changes impact disabled electors' confidence in the process and accuracy of voting in person?

7. To what extent do the changes impact disabled electors' satisfaction in the process of voting in person?

IMPACTS ON THE ELECTORAL SECTOR

8. How have the changes affected the work of elections staff in local authorities?
9. What impact has the implementation of the accessibility measures has on elections costs?
10. How have the accessibility measures affected the work of polling station staff?
11. Did the implementation of the accessibility measures at the May 2024 local elections and General Election have any unintended outcomes?

Absent voting (postal and proxy) process research questions

OVERARCHING PROCESS QUESTIONS:

1. Were all aspects of the revised absent voting measure delivered as set out in the legislation?
2. How did local authorities and the Electoral Registration Officers approach the implementation of the revised absent voting measures?
3. What barriers or challenges did local authorities face in implementing the revised absent voting measures?
4. What enablers helped local authorities to implement the revised absent voting measures?
5. What training was provided to local authorities on the revised absent voting measures?
6. How, and to who, have the revised absent voting requirements been communicated?
7. To what extent do local authorities feel confident in delivering the revised absent voting requirements?
8. How well did the new online service and digital process for processing absent voting application work?

POSTAL VOTING PROCESS IN POLLING STATIONS

1. What challenges did local authorities and polling station staff face on how to deliver the revised postal voting requirements?
2. What enablers helped local authorities and polling station staff deliver the revised postal voting requirements?

3. To what extent do local authorities and polling station staff feel confident in delivering the revised absent voting process?
4. What training was provided to local authorities and polling station staff on postal voting?

Absent voting (postal and proxy) impact research questions

IMPACTS ON ELECTORAL SECTOR

1. How have the new absent voting measures affected the workload and costs of local authorities?
2. To what extent has the introduction of the revised absent voting measures affected polling station staff and electoral administrators' confidence in the integrity of postal and proxy voting?

IMPACT ON ELECTORS

3. Are electors aware of the absent voting changes?
4. Do electors who want to vote by post find the process more convenient as a result of the revised application process?
5. To what extent do the changes result in people changing who they select as a proxy?
6. Does the addition of online applications make it easy for electors to apply for and manage their absent votes?
7. To what extent has the revised absent voting measure affected electors' preferred method of voting and number of electors that want to vote by post?
8. To what extent has the revised absent voting measure affected electors' trust and confidence in the integrity and security of absent voting?

IMPACTS ON ELECTORAL FRAUD

9. Do the revised absent voting measures reduce allegations of electoral fraud via postal and proxy voting?
10. To what extent is it easier to identify attempts at electoral fraud through absent voting?
11. Do the new measures reduce allegations of postal vote harvesting?

Overseas electors process research questions

PROCESS – UNDERSTANDING THE NEW MEASURES

1. What training and guidance did the local authorities receive on the new measures?
2. To what extent do the local authorities feel confident in applying new measures?
3. How effectively have the changes to eligibility and new processes been communicated to overseas electors?
 - a. Are overseas electors aware of the changes? How did they become aware?
 - b. What part did communications campaigns play in this?
 - c. Do overseas electors understand who is now eligible and how they can apply?

PROCESS – DELIVERING THE NEW MEASURES

4. Were all aspects of the measure delivered as set out in the legislation?
5. What barriers or challenges did local authorities face in managing the expansion of the overseas electors' franchise?
6. What barriers or challenges did local authorities face in managing the extended registration period?
7. What enablers helped local authorities to manage the expansion of the overseas electors' franchise?
8. What enablers did local authorities face in managing the extended registration period?

Overseas electors impact research questions:

IMPACT ON OVERSEAS ELECTORS

1. Have the measures seen an increase in the number of overseas electors registering to vote and how many of these are newly franchised?
2. Who/which groups of OEs have been affected by the change and how? e.g. in-group differences such as age, location etc.
3. What barriers or challenges did OEs face in registering to vote?
4. What enablers helped OEs register to vote?
5. Have the new measures affected perceptions of connectedness to the UK among overseas electors?
6. How have the measures improved the user experience for overseas electors when registering to vote?

IMPACT ON SECURITY

8. Are the new measures seen as a threat to the security and integrity of the electoral system, for example by local authorities, domestic electors and overseas electors themselves?
9. Are levels of public trust and satisfaction with the running of elections maintained post-implementation of these measures, and how does this compare with levels of trust following the wider EIP changes?
10. Are electors registering via the correct route and in the correct constituency?

IMPACT ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

11. To what extent has the changing franchise and (including any change to OE registration numbers) affected the workload of local authorities and administrators?
12. To what extent have changes to the administrative process for OEs affected the workload of local authorities and administrators?
13. How have the new requirements, including digital improvements, and new documentary evidence route impacted the ability of local authorities to register overseas electors in time?
14. Do overseas electors apply for an absent vote at the same time as they register to vote?

Digital imprints process research questions

PROCESS – UNDERSTANDING THE MEASURES

1. What training did the EC, police, courts and prosecution services receive on the digital imprint requirement?
2. To what extent do campaigners understand what they must do to meet the requirement to include a digital imprint on digital political materials?
3. How effectively have the new requirements been communicated to campaigners?
 - a. Are campaigners aware of the changes? How did they become aware?
 - b. What part did communications campaigns play in this?

PROCESS – DELIVERING THE REQUIREMENTS

4. Were all aspects of the measure delivered as set out in the legislation?
5. What processes have been put in place to monitor and report non-compliance?
6. To what extent do the EC, police, courts and prosecution services feel confident in applying the digital imprint requirements?

7. To what extent do the EC and police investigate non-compliant digital political materials?
8. How do the EC and police enforce non-compliant digital political materials?
9. What barriers or challenges did the EC, police and courts face in enforcing the digital imprint requirement?
10. What enablers helped the EC, police and courts to enforce the digital imprint requirement?
11. What barriers or challenges did campaigners face in meeting the digital imprint requirement?
12. What enablers helped campaigners meet the digital imprint requirement?
13. How do the EC and police become aware of potentially non-compliant digital political materials?
14. To what extent do members of the public know how to report missing imprints?
15. To what extent are missing digital imprints reported and investigated?

Digital imprints impact research questions

IMPACT – INTEGRITY

1. Do digital campaigning materials include the digital imprint where required?
2. Are the public aware of who is promoting digital campaigning materials?
3. To what extent does the public trust digital political materials they see online, and how do digital imprints affect this?
4. Has the introduction of digital imprints improved transparency of digital political material at elections?

IMPACT – CAMPAIGNING SECTOR

5. Are 'false' (i.e. copied or plagiarised) digital imprints included on any digital political materials?
6. Have any campaigners, parties or candidates been disproportionately affected by the digital imprint requirement?
7. Are campaigners in any way deterred from campaigning as a result of the digital imprint requirement?

IMPACT – LAW & ENFORCEMENT SECTOR

8. Are the Electoral Commission better able to identify campaigners who may need to register and submit a spending return after an election/referendum?
9. What is the impact of investigating and enforcing sanctions relating to digital imprints on courts, police and Electoral Commission resources?

Annex 2: Contribution analysis process

Scoping and theory of change development (Stages 1 and 2)

The theory of change models were initially developed by MHCLG and then reviewed and developed further by the IFF evaluation team. Then a first set of contribution claims were developed by the IFF evaluation team in partnership with MHCLG.

Contribution workshop (Stage 3)

The contribution claims and evidence were validated at a contribution workshop. Each claim was critically assessed to identify whether links between inputs and activities to outputs, outcomes and impacts were strong or weak, and for its overall credibility.

Collect available evidence (Stage 4)

The IFF evaluation team, along with Ipsos, conducted qualitative research with a wide range of audiences and conducted analysis of quantitative data sources (see Annex 4). The evaluation evidence was then mapped against the contribution claims.

Seek additional evidence (Stage 5)

Contribution analysis works best when there is time to be iterative allowing the claims to evolve, along with the theory of change models, to take account of available evidence and to seek additional evidence, where possible. However, due to the timeframe for the evaluation, this was not possible, but an iterative approach was applied as far as possible. For example, this included adjusting topic guides based on emerging findings from interviews, or target quotas to ensure policy areas were explored in detail.

Synthesis (Stage 6)

Finally, all the evaluation evidence was mapped against the contribution claims to present a coherent set of findings.

The mapping of evidence against each claim formed the basis of the analysis. It is important to note that each of the claims differed in the type and amount of evidence available.

Once the evidence for each of the components of the claim was synthesised, IFF assessed whether the claims had been achieved. There was no simple rule on which to base the assessment. It relied on critical review from the IFF evaluation team. On the basis of the assessment, it was concluded whether a claim was 'met', 'partially met', 'not met', or 'inconclusive', with the general approach as follows:

- Claim met: When evidence is strong and consistent across a variety of sources confirming that the claim has been met;
- Claim not met: When evidence is strong and consistent across a variety of sources confirming that the claim has not been met;

- Claim partially met: When there is evidence that some elements of the claim have been met, and evidence that other aspects of the claim have not been met; or when evidence is positive but weak;
- Inconclusive: When there is insufficient evidence to draw a confident conclusion.

There are several elements that influenced the assessment. The most important considerations were the strength of the evidence base and the degree of consistency across multiple sources of evidence. Confidence in the assessment was highest when there were two or more sources congruent to the theory of change that showed consistent findings. Confidence in the assessment was rated lower when i) the assessment was based on a single data source; ii) the evidence congruence with the underlying theory was low, or iii) when evidence from multiple sources was contradictory.

Annex 3: Methodology: Qualitative research

IFF undertook qualitative research on the impact and implementation of the voter identification, accessibility, absent voting, overseas elector and digital imprints measures. Electoral services teams in local authorities, polling station staff, Electoral Commission officials, police officers, and key groups of electors were included in the qualitative research. This annex outlines the methodological approach taken for this strand of the evaluation.

OVERVIEW OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Table A.3.1 summarises each strand of the qualitative research, including an overarching description of the different groups recruited, the number of respondents, the number and type of interviews, and when fieldwork took place.

For each audience a separate topic guide was developed, which MHCLG reviewed and signed off. The topic guides were informed by the research questions and known gaps in the evidence.

All interviews and focus groups took place over videocall, excluding one focus group with disabled electors which was conducted in person. Individual depth interviews lasted up to 60 minutes, while paired interviews and focus groups lasted up to 90 minutes.

More detail on recruitment approaches, respondent characteristics and topics covered in interviews can be found below.

Table A.3.1 Summary of qualitative research strands

Strand of qualitative research	Respondent description	Number recruited	Fieldwork period
Interviews with electoral administrators	Chief Executive Officers, Electoral Registration Officers, Returning Officers, Electoral Services Managers	31 interviews (mix of individual and paired)	19 th August - 31 st October 2024
Focus groups with polling station staff	Presiding Officers or Poll Clerks One group per case study area	12 groups, a total of 85 polling station staff (38 Presiding Officers, 47 Poll Clerks)	2 nd – 23 rd October 2024
Focus groups with in person voters	Electors who voted in person at the July 2024 General Election	9 groups, a total of 50 electors	30 th October – 18 th November 2024
Focus groups with absent voters	Electors who voted via postal or proxy vote at the July 2024 General Election	2 groups, a total of 14 electors	7 th – 11 th November 2024
Focus groups with disabled electors	Electors with a disability, who had attempted to vote in person, or voted via postal or proxy vote	2 groups, a total of 13 electors	12 th – 14 th November 2024
Depth interviews with electors about the voter identification measures	Electors with characteristics relevant to the voter identification measures	18 electors	1 st – 28 th November 2024
Depth interviews with disabled voters	Electors who voted in person, and had a physical or mental disability	1 paired interview, 3 individual interviews, a total of 5 electors	27 th November – 6 th December 2024
Depth interviews with postal and proxy voters	Electors who voted via postal or proxy vote	15 electors	31 st October – 2 nd December 2024

Strand of qualitative research	Respondent description	Number recruited	Fieldwork period
Depth interviews with overseas electors	Electors who had lived outside of the UK for over 15 years who were therefore newly enfranchised	14 electors	3 rd October – 28 th November 2024
Interviews with Electoral Commission officials	Electoral Commission officials who had responsibility for digital imprints or other campaigning related measures	3 paired interviews, a total of 6 Electoral Commission officials	30 th September – 4 th October 2024
Interviews with police officers	Police Single Points of Contact (SPOCs) and one police officer from the National Police Coordination Centre who had involvement in the digital imprints measures	9 police officers	14 th – 28 th November 2024

SELECTION OF AN INITIAL 24 LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND VALUATION JOINT BOARDS (VJBS)

MHCLG provided an initial long list of 33 potential local authorities and VJBs to include in the research. This longlist was developed based on local authority/VJB, engagement with MHCLG elections teams, and to ensure a regional and urban/rural spread. The aim of this longlist was to capture a broad range of experiences. The characteristics of these local authorities/VJBs were assessed and, with input from MHCLG, an initial shortlist of 23 local authorities and VJBs was selected (with the Electoral Office for Northern Ireland acting as the 24th local authority). The shortlist sought to achieve a mix by region, deprivation levels, population age, area classification, population density, and previous voting behaviour (i.e. political make-up of the council).

Tables A.3.2 to A.3.6 below present the breakdown of the selected 23 case studies by these characteristics, and how this compares to the wider cohort of local authorities.

Table A.3.2 Overview of 23 selected local authorities/VJBs by voting behaviour, compared to all local authorities

Voting behaviour	Breakdown for 23 selected local authorities/VJBs (%)	Breakdown for all local authorities participating in July 2024 General Election (%)
Labour	39%	29%
Conservatives	13%	18%
Lib Dems	9%	10%
No party majority	39%	39%
SNP/ Plaid/ Others	0%	4%

Table A.3.3 Overview of 20 selected local authorities by deprivation index, compared to all local authorities (excluding Scotland)

Deprivation index	Breakdown for 20 selected local authorities	Breakdown for all local authorities participating in July 2024 General Election
Deprivation - highest	40	No combined data available
Deprivation - lowest	8.4	No combined data available

Deprivation index	Breakdown for 20 selected local authorities	Breakdown for all local authorities participating in July 2024 General Election
Deprivation - average	22.2	No combined data available

Table A.3.4 Overview of 23 selected local authorities/VJBs by population age, compared to all local authorities

Population age	Breakdown for 23 selected local authorities/ VJBs	Breakdown for all local authorities participating in July 2024 General Election
Median age – highest	51	54.3
Median age – lowest	30.1	28.9
Median age - average	41	42.2

Table A.3.5 Overview of 23 selected local authorities/VJBs by area classification, compared to all local authorities

Area classification	Breakdown for 23 selected local authorities/VJBs (%)	Breakdown for all local authorities participating in July 2024 General Election (%)
Affluent England	4%	13%
Business, Education and Heritage Centres	22%	9%
Countryside Living	35%	21%
Ethnically Diverse Metropolitan Living	4%	5%
London Cosmopolitan	9%	3%
Services and Industrial Legacy	9%	15%
Town and Country Living	9%	20%
Urban Settlements	9%	14%

Table A.3.6 Overview of 23 selected local authorities/VJBs by area classification, compared to all local authorities

Population density	Breakdown for 23 selected local authorities/ VJBs	Breakdown for all local authorities participating in July 2024 General Election
Density - highest	12,393	16,427
Density - lowest	26	25
Density - average	2,461	1,811

Participation in the Year 1 Electoral Integrity Programme Evaluation was also considered when selecting case study areas. The sample included some local authorities who had participated in the first year of the evaluation, as well as some who had not. This had the benefit of allowing exploration of how implementation of the new requirements had progressed compared to the local elections.

INTERVIEWS WITH ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATORS IN THE INITIAL 23 LOCAL AUTHORITIES/VJBs AND THE ELECTORAL OFFICE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (EONI)

Within each local authority/VJB (including Northern Ireland), interviews were conducted with staff responsible for delivering elections. For a strategic perspective, Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers were interviewed. For the more operational perspective on the day-to-day preparation, delivery and running of elections, Electoral Services Managers were interviewed.

In some instances, the same individual held the role of Chief Executive Officer and Returning Officer or Electoral Registration Officer. All discussions were allowed to be carried out as a paired interview, if preferred. All other interviews within an area were carried out on an individual basis, to avoid the potential for imbalances in seniority affecting responses.

Due to the fact that roles relating to delivery of elections differ in Scotland compared to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, separate topic guides were developed for interviews with VJB staff in Scotland. A separate topic guide was also developed for Northern Ireland, since not all of the new measures apply. Broadly, topics covered:

- Background / context: including key characteristics about the local area, and the individual's job role in relation to elections and the new measures;
- Preparing for the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election & Electoral Integrity Programme measures: including recruitment and staffing, and the wider electoral landscape, particularly following boundary changes;

- Questions specific to the measures (voter identification, accessibility, absent voting and overseas electors) covering implementation and impacts from the perspective of interviewees. For example:
 - Process questions: exploring implementation and delivery of the new requirements, staff training and confidence, approaches taken to raise awareness of the requirements, what worked well and what challenges/areas for improvement arose, perceived elector awareness of the new measures, processes for delivery;
 - Impact questions: exploring perceived impacts on security / integrity of elections, elector engagement, voting experiences, staff workload and costs, and any wider or unintended outcomes.

SELECTION OF 12 CASE STUDY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Following the first few weeks of interviewing electoral administrators, IFF Research and MHCLG agreed 12 local authorities/VJBs to focus on as case study areas. Within these areas, focus groups with polling station staff and electors, and in-depth interviews with electors were also conducted.

Learnings from the first interviews with electoral administrators were used to inform the selection of the 12 areas, both in terms of selecting areas with characteristics of interest and those that were willing to support with the next stages of the evaluation.

‘Characteristics of interest’ included areas with relatively higher proportions of groups of interest for the evaluation. For example, older (65+) age groups were of interest as they presented different views/experiences in the Ipsos Public Opinion Survey, compared to the overall population of voting age adults.

Other population groups of interest included: ethnic minority groups, younger (18-29) age groups, those with low education levels, social renters, absent voters and those with low-income levels.

FOCUS GROUPS WITH POLLING STATION STAFF

Polling station staff were recruited on the basis of expression of interest. Electoral administrators who had agreed to help with recruitment during their interviews arranged for a survey to be circulated amongst those who worked at polling stations at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election. Polling station staff who were interested in taking part in a focus group provided their contact details via the survey.

Broadly, topics covered:

- Background / context: including roles and responsibilities and previous experience in relation to elections;
- Preparing for the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election & Electoral Integrity Programme measures: including how they first heard about the new

measures, training they received on them, and any previous experiences of the new measures at other elections;

- Questions specific to the measures (voter identification, accessibility, absent voting) covering implementation and impacts from the perspective of interviewees. For example:
 - Process questions: exploring implementation and delivery of the new requirements, what worked well and what challenges / areas for improvement arose on polling day, perceived elector awareness for the new measures;
 - Impact questions: exploring perceived impacts on security / integrity of elections, elector engagement, voting experience, staff workload, and any wider or unintended outcomes.

FOCUS GROUPS WITH ELECTORS

Twelve focus groups were conducted with electors, one in each case study area, and one additional focus group was held with disabled electors (one of the case study area focus groups was also with disabled electors). Group participants shared a local authority, and the method they had used to vote in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election. The groups covered a mix of in person voters, absent voters, and electors with disabilities (though some included questions on multiple measures).

In person voting focus groups

Nine of the focus groups were with electors who had voted in person at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election. As well as sharing a voting method, each group shared a characteristic of interest identified for their local authority. These included the following characteristics of interest: two lower socioeconomic status groups, two ethnic minority groups, two younger (18-29) groups, two older (65+) groups, and a group in South Ayrshire due to its low population and rurality.

Participants were recruited through an external agency using a panel approach. Electors were recruited on the basis of fulfilling the characteristics of interest listed above, as well as the by local authority. Participants also had to have attempted to vote in person at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election.

The focus group mainly covered topics related to the voter identification measures, including: first awareness of the new measures, VAC application process (if applicable), impact of the measures on their desire and ability to vote in person, voting experience, and perceptions of the security and integrity of elections. Electors were also asked about their views and experiences with digital imprints, including awareness and understanding of digital imprints, and impact of digital imprints on the transparency and legitimacy of digital campaigning materials. If any participants had

a disability, or accompanied someone with a disability to vote in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election, they were asked some questions about the accessibility measures as relevant, including: first awareness of new measures, experiences of using provided accessibility equipment, impact of the measures on satisfaction with voting, and voting experience and ability to vote.

Absent voting focus groups

Two of the focus groups were with electors who had voted via postal or proxy vote at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election (a third focus group was conducted with disabled electors who had voted via postal or proxy vote).

The focus group mainly covered topics related to the absent voting measures, including: first awareness of the new measures, experiences with application processes, and handling of postal / proxy votes, impact of requirements on desire and ability to vote by post / proxy, voting experience, and perceptions of security and integrity of elections. Electors were also asked about their views and experiences with digital imprints, including awareness and understanding of digital imprints, and impact of digital imprints on transparency and legitimacy of digital campaigning materials. If any group participants had a disability or accompanied someone with a disability to vote in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election, then they were asked some questions about the accessibility measures as relevant, including: first awareness of new measures, experiences of using provided accessibility equipment, impact of the measures on satisfaction with voting, and voting experience and ability to vote.

Participants were recruited through an external agency using a panel approach. To participate in a focus group, an individual had to have registered for a postal or proxy vote. For two of the focus groups, participants were also recruited based on the local authority they lived in. For the third focus group, electors could only take part if they had a physical or mental health condition or illness that affects them in one or more of the following areas: vision, hearing, mobility or socially or behaviourally (for example associated with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)).

Focus groups with disabled electors

Two focus groups were conducted with electors with a disability. One of the focus groups with disabled electors included disabled electors who had voted via postal or proxy vote (outlined above, covering the same topics as the absent voting focus groups). The other focus group was conducted with disabled electors who had attempted to vote in person in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election.

The focus group with disabled electors who voted in person mainly covered topics related to the accessibility measures, including: awareness of the new accessibility measures, experiences of voting in the general election, requests for equipment at

the polling stations, support needed to vote, accessibility equipment provided at the polling station, whether a companion was used, awareness of voter identification measures, impact of voter identification measures, satisfaction with voting

This focus group took place in person in a city in Yorkshire and the Humber. A local charity recruited participants to the focus group through their network on behalf of IFF. Participants had to have attempted to vote in person in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election and have a physical or mental health condition or illness that affects them in one of the following areas: vision, hearing, mobility or socially or behaviourally (for example associated with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)). The focus group with disabled voters who voted via postal or proxy vote took place via videocall.

DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH ELECTORS

Fifty-one one to one depth interviews were conducted with electors, split across four categories relating to the main policy areas, outlined below.

Voter identification

Eighteen interviews were conducted with electors about the voter identification requirements, with characteristics specifically relevant to the new voter identification measures. These included whether they owned an accepted form of identification, whether they were aware of the voter identification requirement, whether they had applied for a VAC, and whether the voter identification requirement impacted their ability or decision to vote.

Thirteen interviews were conducted by IFF research. Participants were recruited using a panel approach through an external agency. Recruiting participants who did not have an accepted form of identification (including VACs) was difficult. Of a target of eight, only three participants without identification took part in the research.

The remaining five interviews were conducted by Ipsos, with electors who had expressed interest in participating in depth interviews when completing the Public Opinion Survey 2024.

The interviews covered topics similar to those in the voter identification focus groups (excluding questions on digital imprints).

Accessibility

Four interviews (three individual interviews and one paired interview) were conducted with disabled electors. Two participants had a mobility impairment, one participant had a vision impairment, one participant had a hearing impairment, and one participant had a mobility impairment and was neurodiverse.

The original aim was to gather 18-20 responses from disabled electors who voted in person through mini focus groups and individual interviews. Despite trying multiple recruitment avenues, only 13 participants could be recruited in total, including

participants from one focus group, detailed in the previous section, and these four interviews (not including the focus group with disabled electors who had voted via postal or proxy vote). The different recruitment strategies tried included: through MHCLG networks, through a post on the Disability Rights UK website, through the Disability Rights UK newsletter, via Facebook groups, directly through electoral services teams and finally via peer recruitment. Participants had to have attempted to vote in person in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election and have a physical or mental health condition or illness that affects them in one of the following areas: vision, hearing, mobility or socially or behaviourally (for example associated with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)).

The interviews covered the same topics as the in person accessibility focus group.

Postal and proxy voters

Fifteen interviews were conducted with electors who voted or attempted to vote by proxy or post. Four interviews with electors who voted by proxy and one interview with an elector who voted by post were conducted by IFF Research. These electors were recruited with help from an external agency using a panel approach to recruitment. Participants were recruited on the basis of whether they were registered to vote by post or via a proxy. The remaining 10 interviews were conducted by Ipsos, with electors who had expressed interest in participating in interviews when completing the Public Opinion Survey 2024.

The sample covered a mix of: electors who were already registered to vote by post; electors who applied to vote by post ahead of the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election and successfully returned a vote; electors who applied to vote by post ahead of the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election but did not successfully return a vote; electors who were already registered to vote by proxy; electors who applied to vote by proxy ahead of the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election.

The interviews covered topics similar to those in the absent voting focus groups (excluding questions on digital imprints and accessibility). Electors were also asked about their awareness of the voter identification measures and its impact on their choice of voting method.

Overseas electors

Fourteen interviews were conducted with overseas electors who had lived outside of the UK for over 15 years who were therefore newly enfranchised. The sample covered a mix of overseas electors who had and had not successfully voted in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election. Five of the overseas electors interviewed had successfully voted in the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election.

MHCLG provided IFF with a list of 200 individuals who had applied to register as overseas elector online and given their consent for their details to be passed on to participate in the research. IFF reached out to a selection of these contacts (selecting those with the earliest application dates first) to invite them to participate in an interview.

The interviews covered awareness of the changes to eligibility for overseas electors, experience of the registration and application processes, and the impact on satisfaction with voting, perceptions of security and integrity of elections, and any unintended impacts.

INTERVIEWS WITH ELECTORAL COMMISSION OFFICIALS

Three paired interviews were conducted with Electoral Commission officials that had responsibility for digital imprints or other campaigning related measures.

These individuals were identified by MHCLG who passed their contact details to IFF Research, who then got in touch to arrange an interview.

Broadly, topics covered in the interviews included the implementation and impact of the digital imprints measures and other campaigning measures.

INTERVIEWS WITH POLICE OFFICERS

Eight interviews were also conducted with Police Single Points of Contact (SPOCs) and one interview with a police officer from the National Police Coordination Centre that had involvement in the digital imprints requirements.

Broadly, topics covered in the interviews included the implementation and impact of the digital imprints measures and other campaigning measures. These interviews also covered the implementation and impact of measures relating to other electoral offences, including voter identification and absent voting measures.

These individuals were recruited based on their knowledge and involvement with the aforementioned measures. Different geographical areas and size of police force were also taken into consideration when recruiting.

ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

To support the most thorough and systematic approach to the qualitative analysis, IFF Research securely (and with participants' permission) recorded and transcribed all of the interviews.

IFF Research then organised and coded this textual data using the Framework analysis approach, working with Quirkos software. Quirkos enables recurrent patterns in the data to be highlighted, ensuring that the analysis is firmly grounded in participants' views and experiences.

CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR THE IFF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Purposive sampling: the qualitative research used a purposive rather than representative sampling. This was to ensure that the evaluation was successful in meeting its goals (both to meet the required timelines, and to ensure coverage of certain groups of interest). Although the selection sought to achieve a mix of demographic and political characteristics, the purposive approach, and qualitative research by its nature, means the findings are not representative of the wider group of local authorities, electors or other participant groups.

Difficulties with recruiting niche groups: the incidence of some of the specific groups of interest (namely those with no accepted photographic identification, and electors with certain disabilities) was extremely low, making these groups very difficult to recruit. Recruitment of disabled electors who voted in person was also difficult. This means views and experiences included for these groups in the main report are based on a very limited number of interviews and should be treated with caution.

Social desirability bias: meaning that individuals, particularly those responsible for delivering the programme, might be inclined to answer in a 'positive' way. The approach taken for the wider evaluation (where evidence from multiple sources and perspectives is taken together to conclude a finding) somewhat mitigates the impact of this risk.

Annex 4: Methodology: Quantitative data sources

SAMPLE

Table A.4.1 provides a summary of the sample that each survey draws on.

Table A.4.1 Overview of sample sizes for each survey

Data source	Sample summary
Public Opinion Survey Wave 3 July 2024 (Ipsos)	England (n=7,003 electors), Scotland (n=1,406 electors), Wales (n=518 electors), Northern Ireland (n=489 electors). The sample consisted of both longitudinal participants (those who participated in the previous Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys) and fresh participants (those that had not participated before).
Post-General Election Survey of Electoral Administrators (Implementation Surveys, MHCLG) (July 2024 for Great Britain and August 2024 for EONI)	250 responses from Local Authorities (LAs) and Valuation Joint Boards (VJBs) in Great Britain (sent to 387 LAs and 10 VJBs). 1 response was received from the Electoral Office of Northern Ireland (EONI). EONI received a slightly different survey to Great Britain, adjusted to reflect measures that were applicable in Northern Ireland.
Electoral Commission's Polling Staff Survey	14,418 polling station staff (completed responses)

CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR THE QUANTITATIVE DATA SOURCES

This annex highlights some of the key considerations and limitations for the quantitative data sources and analysis, as identified by the organisations who conducted the data collection.

Across all sources, the following considerations and limitations apply:

Data errors: local authorities may have made errors when reporting statistics. There is also the potential for survey respondents to misunderstand questions and provide inaccurate or irrelevant information;

Survey bias: response bias is inherent to survey methods. Respondents may respond inaccurately or falsely to questions, or feel they have to respond in a certain way.

Public Opinion Survey (Ipsos)

The following should be considered when interpreting the Public Opinion Survey findings:

Social desirability bias: this occurs when respondents provide answers they believe are socially acceptable. For instance, voting is often viewed as a socially desirable behaviour, which can lead to reported voting rates being higher than actual voter turnout;

Inadvertent response errors;

Publication date compared to data collection date: This survey data was collected in 2024 following the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election, and it is referenced as 'Public Opinion Survey 2024' throughout for clarity, but it was published in February 2025.

Post-General Election Survey of Electoral Administrators (Implementation Surveys, MHCLG)

The following limitations apply to the survey overall:

The sample does not represent all LAs or VJBs - 250 responses were received from the 387 LAs and 10 VJBs who were sent the survey. This gives a response rate of 63%. One response was received from EONI;

Selection bias: the LAs and VJBs who did not respond may hold different views than those who responded;

Comparisons between waves: where possible, comparisons have been made between findings from different survey waves, however in some cases question wording or format had changed over time. In these cases, comparisons were not made or were included with appropriate caveats.

Inadvertent response errors;

The following additional limitation applies to the survey sent to EONI:

Comparisons: where appropriate, comparisons have been made with the GB Post-General Election Survey of Electoral Administrators. Only one response was received from EONI, compared to 250 responses from GB more widely. Some measures also apply differently in Northern Ireland (or do not apply), so the scope of the survey was different.

Monitoring data on Voter Authority Certificates (VACs)

The following should be considered when interpreting the monitoring data on VACs:

Data collection: Applications for a VAC submitted digitally were automatically uploaded to the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) Portal, where Electoral Registration Officers processed the application. Applications not submitted via the digital route had to be manually entered into the ERO Portal by the Electoral

Registration Officer, and there is a risk of error in this process (note that this applies to all data that is manually entered into the ERO Portal). Data was collected between the service go live date (15/01/2023) and the deadline for VAC applications for the July 2024 General Election (26/06/2024). Data analysed in relation to VAC applications was extracted from the ERO Portal and includes digital and paper applications.

Rounding: In the report, numbers of VAC applications are reported to the nearest 100.

Monitoring data from the Voter Identification Evaluation Form (VIDEF)

The data on the number of electors turned away and those returning was collected in polling stations on the 'voter identification evaluation form' (VIDEF). Individuals were recorded in these forms if they were eligible electors on the register for that polling station, but were not issued with a ballot paper for one of these reasons:

1. The elector produced a document that was not an accepted identification document;
2. The elector was unable to produce any form of identification;
3. The Presiding Officer was not satisfied that the identification was of who the elector claimed to be;
4. The Presiding Officer believed the document was a forgery; or
5. The voter failed to answer a statutory question as required.

An elector is recorded as 'returned' when they return and are issued with a ballot paper. Electors may return multiple times, however if someone returns but is turned away for the same reason, this is not recorded.

The following limitations apply to the data collected on polling station electors turned away:

Presence of greeters: greeters were present in many polling stations to remind people about the photographic identification requirements. It is expected that fewer electors were turned away at the desk in polling stations with greeters, thus leading to an underestimation of the numbers of electors who were impacted by the requirements. However, even polling stations without greeters likely had signage outside reminding people of the identification requirements, in addition to other signs that may have been seen while arriving to the polling station. Furthermore, greeters may not have been present during the entire day;

Recording turned away electors at polling station desks: the numbers presented in this report on the numbers of electors turned away only include people who are on the register and eligible to vote (at the specific election being recorded on the VIDEF). Thus, people who turned away due to greeters reminding them about the need for identification (see limitation above), signs outside the polling station, or never attempted to go to the polling station are not recorded using this method. However, there is no methodology that would record this in a complete manner. In addition, the methodology employed ensures that only electors are recorded, rather than people whose eligibility to vote is unknown, and tracks their return (as the elector's number on the register is recorded). Other methodologies (such as surveys) are better placed to capture those people who did not try to vote at polling stations;

Missing data: many of the reported statistics from polling stations are very small numbers as they report few instances of electors being turned away. Therefore, it is difficult in some cases to distinguish whether a datum is missing, or it was supposed to be zero;

Incomplete data: in addition to the above, in some cases local authorities reported not having been able to collect a certain statistic across all polling stations;

Data errors: some local authorities made errors in the reporting of these statistics. Although these have been largely fixed, it does raise concerns about the quality of the data as a whole.

Monitoring Data on Online Absent Vote Applications (OAVA)

The following should be considered when interpreting the monitoring data on OAVA:

Applications for postal and proxy votes: applications submitted digitally were automatically uploaded to the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) Portal, where Electoral Registration Officers processed the application. Applications not submitted via the digital route had to be manually entered into the ERO Portal by the Electoral Registration Officer. Data analysed in relation to OAVAs was extracted from the ERO Portal and relates to applications made online, by post, or in person;

Postal vote handling and secrecy: at the July 2024 General Election, the Electoral Commission collected data from all 632 constituencies in Great Britain on the number of postal votes handed in at polling stations or council offices, and the total number of these which were rejected.

Inaccuracies: this data was provided by Returning Officers and Electoral Registration Officers. Inaccuracies have been corrected where possible, although some inconsistencies with the data may be due to issues in generating the data from Electoral Management Software.

Monitoring data on Applications from Overseas Electors

The following should be considered when interpreting the monitoring data on overseas electors:

Data collection: applications from overseas electors submitted digitally were automatically uploaded to the ERO Portal, where Electoral Registration Officers processed the applications. Applications not submitted via the digital route had to be manually entered into the ERO Portal by the Electoral Registration Officer. Data analysed in relation to applications from overseas electors is extracted from the ERO Portal and relates to applications made online, by post, or in person.

Electorate base: the electorate figures are based on ONS's most recent electoral statistics publication.

Estimates for Newly Enfranchised Overseas Electors

An elector who is newly enfranchised as a result of the new measures is defined as either an application through the residency route, or through the register route, but were previously recorded on the register more than 15 years ago. This is not a perfect definition for the available data, so the figures that follow are estimates of applications from this newly enfranchised cohort, rather than exact figures.

There were **36,833** register type applications from overseas electors who were last registered in the UK more than 15 years since the online service for overseas electors go-live date. This is calculated as the year of the application minus the year the applicant specified that they were last registered in the UK. This means it is not possible to estimate the exact amount of time since the applicant was last registered; in some cases it could be slightly less than 15 years. It is also possible that some electors could have been last registered less than 15 years ago, but left the UK more than 15 years ago. In this case they would not be counted as a newly enfranchised overseas elector. These limitations mean that the estimated number of applications from newly enfranchised applicants could be an underestimate.

There were **15,557** residency type applications since service go-live date. The residency route is for those who were previously resident in the UK but not registered. Under the previous rules, this group was ineligible regardless of when they had left the UK. All applications through this route are therefore considered to be newly enfranchised.

Applicants who left the UK under the age of 18 can register through either route. It is not possible to work out if these applicants are part of the new franchise or not, and so they are therefore excluded from the analysis. This is another reason that the estimated figure for total newly enfranchised electors could be an underestimate.

Combining the number of applications through the two routes, it is estimated that **52,390** applications from overseas electors were from newly enfranchised applicants since service go-live. This was **30.50%** of all overseas elector applications to register to vote received.

Annex 5: Methodology: Economic Evaluation of the Electoral Integrity Programme

INTRODUCTION

As part of this second report, an economic evaluation has been conducted to assess the costs and benefits of the Electoral Integrity Programme (EIP), allowing readers to determine if the programme has delivered value for money (VfM). Whilst the economic evaluation does not provide a traditional VfM assessment, it ensures full transparency by outlining the actual costs of the programme alongside its associated benefits. This appendix details the analytical approach used in the economic evaluation.

APPROACH

The default tool for assessing costs and benefits for economic appraisal is Cost Benefit Analysis, as detailed in HM Treasury's Green Book. However, in the case of the EIP, the costs are clear and monetised, whereas the benefits are intangible and not monetised, such as the integrity of elections. Extensive theoretical and practical consideration ruled out the possibility of monetising the benefits of the EIP, such as monetising the value of the vote.

As a result, Cost Consequence Analysis (CCA) was used. This approach presents a range of metrics on costs and consequences without requiring them to be converted into a single unit. Moreover, it allows the quantitative costs of the EIP to be presented alongside the largely qualitative benefits. By utilising this approach, any assessment of VfM relies on subjective judgment rather than a more traditional VfM judgment. This enables readers of the report to judge for themselves if the benefits presented are worth the costs incurred.

DATA

This evaluation report considers delivery of EIP measures at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election. There are some costs to delivering the EIP, such as additional poll clerks, which are simple to attribute to individual elections. However, there are also one-off costs which have an impact which endures beyond individual elections, such as privacy screens. Hence, all the election-specific costs for the July 2024 UK General Election, and all the one-off costs since the introduction of EIP, have been included to ensure that no costs which were essential in delivering the impacts of EIP at the July 2024 General Election are missed in the economic evaluation. Costs from November 2022 to November 2024 are therefore presented in the economic evaluation.

MHCLG has provided the funding data for all costs involved in the delivery of the EIP (noting that grant funding was unringfenced, so funding allocated should not be mistaken for money spent by LAs). The costs are MHCLG-paid funding to local authorities (LAs) in the form of New Burdens funding which consists of grant funding and, where this was insufficient, LAs were able to submit justification led bids (JLBs) to cover additional costs. Funding for JLBs was provided for specific justified cost lines as the bids were based on evidence of spend, so it was not unringfenced. As a result, data for JLBs represents the actual costs incurred by LAs, unlike the grant funding provided. All cost data has been aggregated across the country, funding or spending related to specific LAs will not be published.

For costs relating to the conduct of the July 2024 General Election, funding is provided by HM Treasury via the Consolidated Fund.

The Electoral Commission has also provided data on their expenditure to support the implementation of the EIP, which has been included in the report.

MHCLG staffing costs, MHCLG digital costs and Voter Authority Certificate production costs have not been included in the evaluation due to their commercially sensitive nature.

MAPPING COSTS AND BENEFITS

The economic evaluation takes the costs incurred by EIP and maps these costs onto the benefits delivered. This is achieved using contribution claims (subsets of the theory of change model that isolate relevant inputs, activities, and outputs related to specific outcomes and impacts) which provide the structure for the wider evaluation.

For each policy being evaluated (voter identification, accessibility, absent voting, overseas electors, digital imprints) the economic evaluation maps the activities which generate costs for government/public bodies to the resulting policy impacts. The costs have been cross-referenced with the activities in the theories of change and the overall costs of the programme.

Costs are presented in the report alongside the evaluation of the contribution claims, to enable both benefits and disbenefits to be identified. Eligible electors being turned away from voting because they do not have an accepted photographic identification are an example of disbenefits.

PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

The relevant costs are outlined and explained at the end of the sub-section labelled *claim summary* for each contribution claim with costs associated to it.

As some contribution claims involve no direct costs, or rely on other contribution claims holding true, they rely indirectly on the costs involved in other contribution claims. Where costs may sit across multiple contribution claims, this has been highlighted in the report.

Data on monetised costs was gathered by MHCLG from internal records and supplied to MHCLG by the Electoral Commission. MHCLG then developed a table of figures and accompanying narrative context which were sent to IFF. It was then for IFF, as evaluation leads, to use their judgement to determine whether or not the contribution claims had been met.

LIMITATIONS

The main limitations of this economic evaluation are as follows:

Enduring Impacts: some one-off costs of delivering the EIP have an impact which endures beyond individual elections, such as privacy screens. Hence, all the one-off costs since the introduction of EIP were included to ensure that no costs which were essential in delivering the impacts of EIP on the July 2024 General Election are missed in the economic evaluation. As a result, some costs unrelated to the July 2024 General Election are likely to have been included.

Unringfenced grant funding: the majority of funding was provided by MHCLG to local authorities in the form of unringfenced grant payments meaning local authorities had complete autonomy when deciding how to use said funding. This means that while MHCLG provided funding to help implement specific policies, it is unknown how local authorities utilised the funding.

Commercially sensitive costs: some costs, specified in the cost section, were deemed too commercially sensitive to be included within the report and so were excluded.

Annex 6: Voter identification: Theory of change and contribution claim pathways

This annex shows the theory of change model and contribution claim pathways for the voter identification measures in plain text format, alongside the theory of change model in image format, as shown in figure A.6.1.

The theory of change and each contribution claim pathway is made up of:

- Inputs: what is needed for the intervention to take place?;
- Activities: activities, actions and processes to take place to underpin effective delivery;
- Outputs: quantifiable deliverable resulting from the intervention activities;
- Outcomes: early 'consequential changes' from the outputs and activities;
- Impacts: longer 'consequential change' to meet the long-term goals.

VOTER IDENTIFICATION THEORY OF CHANGE

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce the requirement to bring accepted photographic identification to vote in polling stations;
- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation;
- Resources are provided to ensure electors without another form of accepted identification can obtain free of charge a Voter Authority Certificate (VAC);
- Digital platforms and services for VAC applications are built and meet minimum service requirements;
- There are sufficient numbers of staff in local authorities to process VAC applications and undertake communication campaigns;
- Resources are provided to local authorities to ensure voters can show their identification in private in polling stations;
- There are sufficient numbers of polling station staff to carry out new identification checks in polling stations;

- Police are engaged to support enforcement of the requirements.

Activities:

- Local authorities and the Electoral Commission to deliver communication campaigns to raise awareness;
- Local authorities staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Polling station staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Local authorities have systems in place to implement the VAC application process;
- Provisions are in place in polling stations for voters to show their identification in private should they wish to;
- Polling station staff carry out voter identification checks according to legislation;
- Polling station staff record voters turned away and those who return according to legislation.

Outputs:

- Electors are aware of the requirements, understand what is accepted identification, and remember to bring accepted identification to polling stations;
- In person voters who present accepted identification and have it checked are able to vote;
- Electors without accepted photographic identification, who want to vote in person, either apply for the VAC by the deadline or obtain another form of accepted identification;
- Local authorities are able to process VAC applications (and produce temporary VACs as needed) and these are delivered to or collected by electors in time for elections;
- Private areas and other support provisions in polling stations are used by those who need them;

- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Polling station staff are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities understand the training and new guidance;
- Polling station staff understand the training and new guidance.


Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- Polling station staff feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- The policy is accessible to all electors;
- Electors are not deterred from voting as a result of the requirements;
- Voters remain satisfied with the process of voting in person;
- Personation that does occur is detected.

Impacts:

- Cases of personation decrease in the longer term;
- No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise elsewhere in the electoral system due to the introduction of the voter identification requirements;
- Polling station staff and electoral administrators are more confident in the electoral process and its protections from fraud;
- Electors have more trust and confidence in the integrity of our voting and democratic process;
- Public perception of electoral fraud occurring in polling stations decreases.

Figure A.6.1 Voter Identification Theory of Change



VOTER IDENTIFICATION CONTRIBUTION CLAIM PATHWAYS

Pathway for Contribution Claim 1: Local authority staff meet their requirements by law

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce the requirement to bring accepted photographic identification to vote in polling stations;
- There are sufficient numbers of polling station staff to carry out new identification checks in polling stations.

Activities:

- Polling station staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Polling station staff carry out voter identification checks according to legislation;
- Polling station staff record voters turned away and those who return according to legislation.

Outputs:

- In person voters who present accepted identification and have it checked are able to vote;
- Local authorities and polling station staff are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities and polling station staff understand the training and new guidance.

Outcomes:

- Polling station staff feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation.

Impacts:

- Polling station staff and electoral administrators are more confident in the electoral process and its protections from fraud.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 2: Polling station staff meet their requirements by law

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce the requirement to bring accepted photographic identification to vote in polling stations;
- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation;
- Resources are provided to ensure electors without another form of accepted identification can obtain free of charge a Voter Authority Certificate (VAC);
- Digital platforms and services for VAC applications are built and meet minimum service requirements;
- There are sufficient numbers of staff in local authorities to process VAC applications and undertake communication campaigns;
- Resources are provided to local authorities to ensure voters can show their identification in private in polling stations.

Activities:

- Local authorities staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Local authorities have systems in place to implement the VAC application process.

Outputs:

- Local authorities are able to process VAC applications (and produce temporary VACs as needed) and these are delivered to or collected by electors in time for elections;
- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Polling station staff are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities understand the training and new guidance;
- Polling station staff understand the training and new guidance.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;

- The policy is accessible to all electors.

Impacts:

- Polling station staff and electoral administrators are more confident in the electoral process and its protections from fraud.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 3: Communication campaigns raise electors' awareness of Voter Identification

Inputs:

- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation.

Activities:

- Local authorities and the Electoral Commission to deliver communication campaigns to raise awareness.

Outputs:

- Electors are aware of the requirements, understand what is accepted identification, and remember to bring accepted identification to polling stations.

Outcomes:

- The policy is accessible to all electors;
- Electors are not deterred from voting as a result of the requirements.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 4: Communication campaigns raise electors' awareness of Voter Authority Certificates

Inputs:

- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation;
- There are sufficient numbers of staff in local authorities to process VAC applications and undertake communication campaigns.

Activities:

- Local authorities and the Electoral Commission to deliver communication campaigns to raise awareness.

Outputs:

- Electors are aware of the requirements, understand what is accepted identification, and remember to bring accepted identification to polling stations;
- Electors without accepted photographic identification, who want to vote in person, either apply for the VAC by the deadline or obtain another form of accepted identification.

Outcomes:

- The policy is accessible to all electors;
- Electors are not deterred from voting as a result of the requirements.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 5: Electors who want a VAC and are eligible, are able to obtain one

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce the requirement to bring accepted photographic identification to vote in polling stations;
- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation;
- Resources are provided to ensure electors without another form of accepted identification can obtain free of charge a Voter Authority Certificate (VAC);
- Digital platforms and services for VAC applications are built and meet minimum service requirements;
- There are sufficient numbers of staff in local authorities to process VAC applications and undertake communication campaigns.

Activities:

- Local authorities staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Local authorities have systems in place to implement the VAC application process.

Outputs:

- Electors are aware of the requirements, understand what is accepted identification, and remember to bring accepted identification to polling stations;
- In person voters who present accepted identification and have it checked are able to vote;
- Private areas and other support provisions in polling stations are used by those who need them;
- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities understand the training and new guidance.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- The policy is accessible to all electors;
- Electors are not deterred from voting as a result of the requirements.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 6: Electors, who want to have their identification checked in private, are able to do so

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce the requirement to bring accepted photographic identification to vote in polling stations;
- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation;
- Resources are provided to local authorities to ensure voters can show their identification in private in polling stations;
- There are sufficient numbers of polling station staff to carry out new identification checks in polling stations.

Activities:

- Local authorities and the Electoral Commission to deliver communication campaigns to raise awareness;
- Polling station staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Provisions are in place in polling stations for voters to show their identification in private should they wish to;
- Polling station staff carry out voter identification checks according to legislation.

Outputs:

- In person voters who present accepted identification and have it checked are able to vote;
- Private areas and other support provisions in polling stations are used by those who need them;
- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Polling station staff are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities understand the training and new guidance;
- Polling station staff understand the training and new guidance.

Outcomes:

- Polling station staff feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- The policy is accessible to all electors;
- Electors are not deterred from voting as a result of the requirements;
- Voters remain satisfied with the process of voting in person.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 7: Personation is identified more easily and reduces in the longer-term

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce the requirement to bring accepted photographic identification to vote in polling stations;

- Local authorities are engaged on voter identification changes and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation;
- Digital platforms and services for VAC applications are built and meet minimum service requirements;
- There are sufficient numbers of polling station staff to carry out new identification checks in polling stations;
- Police are engaged to support enforcement of the requirements.

Activities:

- Polling station staff carry out voter identification checks according to legislation.

Outputs:

- In person voters who present accepted identification and have it checked are able to vote.

Outcomes:

- Personation that does occur is detected.

Impacts:

- Cases of personation decrease in the longer term;
- No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise elsewhere in the electoral system due to the introduction of the voter identification requirements;
- Polling station staff and electoral administrators are more confident in the electoral process and its protections from fraud;
- Electors have more trust and confidence in the integrity of our voting and democratic process;
- Public perception of electoral fraud occurring in polling stations decreases.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 8: Electors remain satisfied with the process and ease of in-person voting

Outcomes:

- The policy is accessible to all electors;

- Electors are not deterred from voting as a result of the requirements;
- Voters remain satisfied with the process of voting in person.

Impacts:

- Electors have more trust and confidence in the integrity of our voting and democratic process.

Annex 7: Accessibility: Theory of change and contribution claim pathways

This annex shows the theory of change model and contribution claim pathways for the accessibility measures in plain text format, alongside the theory of change model in image format, as shown in figure A.7.1.

Each theory of change and contribution claim pathway is made up of:

- Inputs: what is needed for the intervention to take place;
- Activities: activities, actions and processes to take place to underpin effective delivery;
- Outputs: quantifiable deliverable resulting from the intervention activities;
- Outcomes: early 'consequential changes' from the outputs and activities;
- Impacts: longer 'consequential change' to meet the long-term goals.

ACCESSIBILITY THEORY OF CHANGE

Inputs:

- Legislation that requires local authorities to make equipment available at polling stations to help voters with a disability to vote;
- Legislation that removes the current restrictions on who can act as a companion to voters with a disability;
- EC produce guidance for local authorities on the range of support available for disabled voters in polling stations;
- Resources are provided to local authorities to obtain equipment to help voters with a disability vote in polling stations;
- Local authorities are engaged on accessibility measures and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation and Electoral Commission guidance;
- Disability charities are engaged on accessibility measures.

Activities:

- Local authorities engaged and provided with guidance on the appropriate equipment to provide in polling stations;
- Polling station staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Electoral Commission, local authorities and disability charities produce and distribute communications materials raising awareness among electors with a disability and those who support them;
- Local authorities have systems in place to establish the required provision at each polling station.

Outputs:

- Electors with disabilities and those who support them are aware of the changes and the provisions that are available;
- Electors with a disability can contact local authority staff to request provisions;
- Local authorities engage with local disabled people, or organisations that represent them, regarding the support provided at polling stations;
- Polling stations follow guidance to provide suitable measures to support voters with a range of disabilities;
- Polling station staff understand the training and new guidance;
- Polling station staff are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements.


Outcomes:

- Disabled voters are supported to vote in person if they choose to;
- Polling station staff can offer support to voters with a disability and feel confident doing so;
- Voters with disabilities are more satisfied in the process of voting in polling stations.

Impacts:

- The process of voting meets the requirements of the Equality Act by ensuring reasonable adjustments for electors with disabilities;
- The number of voters with disabilities who vote in person is unaffected, or increases, as disabled voters feel they have the necessary support to vote in person;
- Electors with disabilities have greater confidence that they can vote in person if they choose to;
- Public perception of the accessibility of voting for those with disabilities improves.

Figure A.7.1 Accessibility Theory of Change



ACCESSIBILITY CONTRIBUTION CLAIM PATHWAYS

Pathway for Contribution Claim 1: Local authority staff meet their requirements by law

Inputs:

- Legislation that removes the current restrictions on who can act as a companion to voters with a disability;
- Electoral Commission produce guidance for local authorities on the range of support available for disabled voters in polling stations;
- Resources are provided to local authorities to obtain equipment to help voters with a disability vote in polling stations;
- Local authorities are engaged on accessibility measures and how they should be implemented in accordance with the legislation and Electoral Commission guidance.

Activities:

- Local authorities engaged and provided with guidance on the appropriate equipment to provide in polling stations;
- Local authorities have systems in place to establish the required provision at polling station.

Outputs:

- Electors with a disability can contact local authority staff to request provisions;
- Local authorities engage with local disabled people, or organisations that represent them, regarding the support provided at polling stations;
- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements.

Outcomes:

- Disabled voters are supported to vote in person if they choose to.

Impacts:

- The process of voting meets the requirements of the Equality Act by ensuring reasonable adjustments for electors with disabilities.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 2: Polling station staff meet their requirements by law

Inputs:

- Legislation that requires local authorities to make equipment available at polling stations to help voters with a disability to vote;
- Legislation that removes the current restrictions on who can act as a companion to voters with a disability.

Activities:

- Local authorities engaged and provided with guidance on the appropriate equipment to provide in polling stations;
- Polling station staff provided guidance and training on how to deliver the requirements;
- Local authorities have systems in place to establish the required provision at each polling station.

Outputs:

- Polling stations follow guidance to provide suitable measures to support voters with a range of disabilities;
- Polling station staff understand the training and new guidance;
- Polling station staff are confident in applying the new requirements;
- Local authorities are confident in applying the new requirements.

Outcomes:

- Disabled voters are supported to vote in person if they choose to;
- Polling station staff can offer support to voters with a disability and feel confident doing so.

Impacts:

- The process of voting meets the requirements of the Equality Act by ensuring reasonable adjustments for electors with disabilities.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 3: Communications effectively raise awareness of reform amongst electors with disabilities and their carers

Activities:

- Electoral Commission, local authorities and disability charities produce and distribute communications materials raising awareness among electors with a disability and those who support them.

Outputs:

- Electors with disabilities and those who support them are aware of the changes and the provisions that are available.

Impacts:

- The number of voters with disabilities who vote in person is unaffected, or increases, as disabled voters feel they have the necessary support to vote in person;
- Electors with disabilities have greater confidence that they can vote in person if they choose to.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 4: Disabled electors are enabled to vote in person as a result of the new measures

Outputs:

- Electors with disabilities and those who support them are aware of the changes and the provisions that are available;
- Electors with a disability can contact local authority staff to request provisions.

Outcomes:

- Disabled voters are supported to vote in person if they choose to;
- Voters with disabilities are more satisfied in the process of voting in polling stations.

Impacts:

- The number of voters with disabilities who vote in person is unaffected, or increases, as disabled voters feel they have the necessary support to vote in person;
- Electors with disabilities have greater confidence that they can vote in person if they choose to;

- Public perception of the accessibility of voting for those with disabilities improves.

Annex 8: Absent Voting: Theory of change and contribution claim pathways

This annex shows the theory of change models and contribution claim pathways for the absent voting measures in plain text format, alongside the theory of change models in image format, as shown in figures A.8a.1 and A.8b.1.

Each theory of change and contribution claim pathway is made up of:

- Inputs: what is needed for the intervention to take place;
- Activities: activities, actions and processes to take place to underpin effective delivery;
- Outputs: quantifiable deliverable resulting from the intervention activities;
- Outcomes: early 'consequential changes' from the outputs and activities;
- Impacts: longer 'consequential change' to meet the long-term goals.

ABSENT VOTING THEORY OF CHANGE: POSTAL VOTING

Inputs:

- Legislation that requires electors using a postal vote on a long-term basis to reapply every 3 years;
- Legislation that bans political campaigners from handling postal votes;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Legislation limiting the number of electors on behalf of whom a person may hand in postal votes, and restricting those able to hand in a postal vote;
- Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements;
- Introduction of an accessible online service by which electors are able to apply for a postal vote in addition to the existing paper-based option;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service;
- MHCLG funding and support to all local authorities and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- Training and guidance for local authorities on how to deliver the revised requirements;
- Training and guidance for local authorities and polling station staff on how to deliver the new requirements;
- Local authorities have in place processes to handle the 3 year postal vote applications;
- EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the new legislation on handling and handing in postal votes to campaigners and parties;
- EC develop targeted communication campaign to ensure existing postal electors are aware of the changes;
- Local authorities contact electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed after the poll;
- Local authorities send reminders to electors when their 3 year period is due to end;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities staff understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it should be enforced;
- Local authorities and polling station staff understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it could be enforced;
- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;
- Postal votes which are handed in are only accepted if they meet the requirements of the law;
- Political campaigners are deterred from handling or handing in postal votes (except where exceptions apply);

- Electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed in know what not to do next time;
- Electors who use postal voting on a long-term basis are aware of and understand the changes and the vast majority reapply every 3 years if they wish to do so;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation;
- Local authorities and polling station staff feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation;
- Number of electors who want to vote by post is unaffected or increases by the introduction of the revised measures;
- Electors who want to vote by post find the process more convenient as a result of the revised application process;
- Greater efficiency for local authorities in processing applications in particular during pre-election surges because more applications are digital;
- Elector details for those who use long-term postal votes are kept up to date and accurate;
- Electors who want to vote by post are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to revised measures;
- The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently.

Impacts:

- The public have greater confidence in the integrity and security of postal voting;
- Polling station staff, electoral administrators, and those connected have greater confidence in the integrity of postal voting;
- The application system for absent voting is more modern as electors can apply online;

- The application system for absent voting is more secure as a result of ID verification requirements;
- The potential for electoral fraud via postal voting is reduced;
- No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise;
- The secrecy of the ballot is enhanced for absent voting.

Figure A.8a.1: Postal Voting Theory of Change

Inputs <i>What is needed for the intervention to take place?</i>	Activities <i>Activities, actions and processes to take place to underpin effective delivery</i>	Outputs <i>Quantifiable deliverable resulting from the intervention activities</i>	Outcomes <i>Early 'consequential changes' from the outputs and activities</i>	Impacts <i>Longer 'consequential change' to meet the long-term goals</i>
Legislation that requires electors using a postal vote on a long-term basis to reapply every 3 years	Training and guidance for local authorities on how to deliver the revised requirements.	Local authorities staff understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it should be enforced	Local authorities feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation.	The public have greater confidence in the integrity and security of postal voting
Legislation that bans political campaigners from handling postal votes.	Training and guidance for local authorities and polling station staff on how to deliver the new requirements.	Local authorities and polling station staff understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it could be enforced	Local authorities and polling station staff feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation.	Polling station staff, electoral administrators, and those connected have greater confidence in the integrity of postal voting
Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting.	Local authorities have in place processes to handle the 3 year postal vote applications	Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh	Number of electors who want to vote by post is unaffected or increases by the introduction of the revised measures	The application system for absent voting is more modern as electors can apply online.
Legislation limiting the number of electors on behalf of whom a person may hand in postal votes, and restricting those able to hand in a postal vote.	EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the new legislation on handling and handing in postal votes to campaigners and parties	Postal votes which are handed in are only accepted if they meet the requirements of the law	Electors who want to vote by post find the process more convenient as a result of the revised application process	The application system for absent voting is more secure as a result of ID verification requirements.
Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements.	EC develop targeted communication campaign to ensure existing postal electors are aware of the changes.	Political campaigners are deterred from handling or handing in postal votes (except where exceptions apply)	Greater efficiency for local authorities in processing applications in particular during pre-election surges because more applications are digital	The potential for electoral fraud via postal voting is reduced
Introduction of an accessible online service by which electors are able to apply for a postal vote in addition to the existing paper-based option	Local authorities contact electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed after the poll.	Electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed in know what not to do next time	Elector details for those who use long-term postal votes are kept up to date and accurate	No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise
Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service.	Local authorities send reminders to electors when their 3 year period is due to end	Electors who use postal voting on a long-term basis are aware of and understand the changes and the vast majority reapply every 3 years if they wish to do so	Electors who want to vote by post are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to revised measures	The secrecy of the ballot is enhanced for absent voting
MHCLG funding and support to all local authorities and EMS suppliers	EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.	Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes	The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently	
	Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes			

POSTAL VOTING CONTRIBUTION CLAIM PATHWAYS

Pathway for Contribution Claim 1: Polling station staff meet the requirements of the law

Inputs:

- Legislation that requires electors using a postal vote on a long-term basis to reapply every 3 years;
- Legislation that bans political campaigners from handling postal votes;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Legislation limiting the number of electors on behalf of whom a person may hand in postal votes, and restricting those able to hand in a postal vote;
- Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements.

Activities:

- Training and guidance for local authorities and polling station staff on how to deliver the new requirements;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.

Outputs:

- Local authorities and polling station staff understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it could be enforced;
- Postal votes which are handed in are only accepted if they meet the requirements of the law.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities and polling station staff feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation.

Impacts:

- Polling station staff, electoral administrators, and those connected have greater confidence in the integrity of postal voting.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 2: Local authorities meet the requirements of the law

Inputs:

- Legislation that requires electors using a postal vote on a long-term basis to reapply every 3 years;
- Legislation that bans political campaigners from handling postal votes;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Introduction of an accessible online service by which electors are able to apply for a postal vote in addition to the existing paper-based option;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service;
- MHCLG funding and support to all local authorities and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- Training and guidance for local authorities on how to deliver the revised requirements;
- Local authorities have in place processes to handle the 3 year postal vote applications;
- Local authorities contact electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed after the poll;
- Local authorities send reminders to electors when their 3 year period is due to end;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities staff understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it should be enforced;

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;
- Postal votes which are handed in are only accepted if they meet the requirements of the law.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation;
- Number of electors who want to vote by post is unaffected or increases by the introduction of the revised measures;
- Greater efficiency for local authorities in processing applications in particular during pre-election surges because more applications are digital;
- Elector details for those who use long-term postal votes are kept up to date and accurate;
- The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently.

Impacts:

- Polling station staff, electoral administrators, and those connected have greater confidence in the integrity of postal voting;
- The application system for absent voting is more modern as electors can apply online;
- The application system for absent voting is more secure as a result of ID verification requirements.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 3: Targeted communications raise electors' awareness of changes to postal voting

Inputs:

- MHCLG funding and support to all local authorities and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- EC develop targeted communication campaign to ensure existing postal electors are aware of the changes;

- Local authorities contact electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed after the poll;
- Local authorities send reminders to electors when their 3 year period is due to end;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.

Outputs:

- Electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed in know what not to do next time;
- Electors who use postal voting on a long-term basis are aware of and understand the changes and the vast majority reapply every 3 years if they wish to do so;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Number of electors who want to vote by post is unaffected or increases by the introduction of the revised measures;
- Electors who want to vote by post find the process more convenient as a result of the revised application process;
- Electors who want to vote by post are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to revised measures.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 4: Targeted communications raise campaigners' awareness of changes to postal voting

Inputs:

- Legislation that bans political campaigners from handling postal votes.

Activities:

- EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the new legislation on handling and handing in postal votes to campaigners and parties;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.

Outputs:

- Political campaigners are deterred from handling or handing in postal votes (except where exceptions apply).

Pathway for Contribution Claim 5: Electors who are eligible and want a postal vote are able to obtain one and continue to maintain their status as a postal voter

Inputs:

- Introduction of an accessible online service by which electors are able to apply for a postal vote in addition to the existing paper-based option;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service.

Activities:

- Local authorities contact electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed after the poll;
- Local authorities send reminders to electors when their 3 year period is due to end;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.

Outputs:

- Electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed in know what not to do next time;
- Electors who use postal voting on a long-term basis are aware of and understand the changes and the vast majority reapply every 3 years if they wish to do so;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Number of electors who want to vote by post is unaffected or increases by the introduction of the revised measures;
- Electors who want to vote by post find the process more convenient as a result of the revised application process;

- Electors who want to vote by post are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to revised measures.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 6: The application process for absent voting is more modern, accessible and efficient

Inputs:

- Introduction of an accessible online service by which electors are able to apply for a postal vote in addition to the existing paper-based option;
- MHCLG funding and support to all local authorities and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- Local authorities have in place processes to handle the 3 year postal vote applications;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh.

Outcomes:

- Electors who want to vote by post find the process more convenient as a result of the revised application process;
- Greater efficiency for local authorities in processing applications in particular during pre-election surges because more applications are digital;
- The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently.

Impacts:

- The application system for absent voting is more modern as electors can apply online.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 7: Postal votes are more secure

Inputs:

- Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service.

Activities:

- Training and guidance for local authorities and polling station staff on how to deliver the new requirements;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;
- Postal votes which are handed in are only accepted if they meet the requirements of the law.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation;
- Local authorities and polling station staff feel confident delivering and applying the revised requirements in accordance with the legislation.

Impacts:

- The application system for absent voting is more secure as a result of ID verification requirements;
- The potential for electoral fraud via postal voting is reduced;
- No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise;

- The secrecy of the ballot is enhanced for absent voting.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 8: Electors are confident that postal voting is secure

Inputs:

- Legislation that requires electors using a postal vote on a long-term basis to reapply every 3 years;
- Legislation that bans political campaigners from handling postal votes;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Legislation limiting the number of electors on behalf of whom a person may hand in postal votes, and restricting those able to hand in a postal vote;
- Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements.

Activities:

- Local authorities contact electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed after the poll;
- Local authorities send reminders to electors when their 3 year period is due to end.

Outputs:

- Electors whose postal votes are rejected because of how they are handed in know what not to do next time;
- Electors who use postal voting on a long-term basis are aware of and understand the changes and the vast majority reapply every 3 years if they wish to do so;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Number of electors who want to vote by post is unaffected or increases by the introduction of the revised measures;
- Electors who want to vote by post are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to revised measures.

Impacts:

- The public have greater confidence in the integrity and security of postal voting.

ABSENT VOTING THEORY OF CHANGE: PROXY VOTING

Inputs:

- Legislation limiting the number of electors for whom an individual can act as a proxy for;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements;
- Introduction of an accessible online service for electors to apply for proxy votes for reserved elections in specific polls, and for a definite or indefinite period for special category electors;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service;
- MHCLG funding and support to all LAs and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- Training and guidance for local authority staff on how to deliver the revised requirements;
- Local authorities have in place processes to deliver additional requirements;
- EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the new legislation on proxy voting including targeted communication campaign to ensure proxy electors are aware of the changes;
- Local authorities check local records of proxy holders/electors to check if a proxy is exceeding the limits;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authority staff understand the new legislation and guidance on how it could be enforced;
- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;
- Electors and those acting as proxy are aware of and understand the changes and do not exceed the proxy limits;
- Electors are aware ahead of the deadline if they need to find an alternative proxy;
- Electors who select an ineligible proxy nominate an alternative prior to the deadline;
- Electors are content with their choice of appointed proxy and feel confident that the appointed proxy is eligible;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:


- Local authorities feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- Electors do not exceed the maximum number of proxy votes;
- Electors who want to vote via proxy, including overseas electors, are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to new measures;
- Electors who want to vote by proxy find the process easier as a result of the revised application process;
- Greater efficiency for local authorities in processing applications in particular during pre-election surges because more applications are digital;
- The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently.

Impacts:

- The public have greater confidence in the integrity and security of voting via proxy;

- Polling station staff, electoral administrators, and those connected have greater confidence in the integrity of proxy voting;
- The potential for electoral fraud via proxy voting is reduced;
- No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise;
- The secrecy of the ballot is enhanced for absent voting;
- The application system for absent voting is more modern as electors can apply online.

Figure A.8b.1 Proxy Voting Theory of Change



PROXY VOTING CONTRIBUTION CLAIM PATHWAYS

Pathway for Contribution Claim 1: Local authorities meet the requirements of the law

Inputs:

- Legislation limiting the number of electors for whom an individual can act as a proxy for;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Introduction of an accessible online service for electors to apply for proxy votes for reserved elections in specific polls, and for a definite or indefinite period for special category electors;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service;
- MHCLG funding and support to all LAs and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- Training and guidance for local authority staff on how to deliver the revised requirements;
- Local authorities have in place processes to deliver additional requirements;
- Local authorities check local records of proxy holders/electors to check if a proxy is exceeding the limits;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authority staff understand the new legislation and guidance on how it could be enforced;
- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 2: Targeted communications raise electors' awareness of changes to proxy voting

Activities:

- EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the new legislation on proxy voting including targeted communication campaign to ensure proxy electors are aware of the changes;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.

Outputs:

- Electors and those acting as proxy are aware of and understand the changes and do not exceed the proxy limits;
- Electors are aware ahead of the deadline if they need to find an alternative proxy;
- Electors who select an ineligible proxy nominate an alternative prior to the deadline;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Electors do not exceed the maximum number of proxy votes;
- Electors who want to vote via proxy, including overseas electors, are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to new measures.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 3: Electors who are eligible and want a proxy vote are able to obtain an eligible proxy

Inputs:

- Introduction of an accessible online service for electors to apply for proxy votes for reserved elections in specific polls, and for a definite or indefinite period for special category electors;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service.

Activities:

- Local authorities check local records of proxy holders/electors to check if a proxy is exceeding the limits;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced.

Outputs:

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;
- Electors who select an ineligible proxy nominate an alternative prior to the deadline;
- Electors are content with their choice of appointed proxy and feel confident that the appointed proxy is eligible;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Electors who want to vote via proxy, including overseas electors, are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to new measures;
- Electors who want to vote by proxy find the process easier as a result of the revised application process.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 4: Proxy votes are more secure

Inputs:

- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;

- Introduction of an accessible online service for electors to apply for proxy votes for reserved elections in specific polls, and for a definite or indefinite period for special category electors;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service.

Activities:

- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering the requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation.

Impacts:

- The potential for electoral fraud via proxy voting is reduced;
- No new opportunities for electoral fraud arise;
- The secrecy of the ballot is enhanced for absent voting.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 5: The application process for proxy voting is more modern, accessible and efficient

Inputs:

- Introduction of an accessible online service for electors to apply for proxy votes for reserved elections in specific polls, and for a definite or indefinite period for special category electors;
- MHCLG funding and support to all LAs and EMS suppliers.

Activities:

- Local authorities have in place processes to deliver additional requirements;
- EC, campaigners, polling station staff and wider council staff engaged on the changes, revised processes and how they can be enforced;
- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh.

Outcomes:

- Electors who want to vote by proxy find the process easier as a result of the revised application process;
- Greater efficiency for local authorities in processing applications in particular during pre-election surges because more applications are digital;
- The online application system is easy to use and enables more individuals to complete their application independently.

Impacts:

- The application system for absent voting is more modern as electors can apply online.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 6: Electors are confident that proxy voting is secure

Inputs:

- Legislation limiting the number of electors for whom an individual can act as a proxy for;
- Legislation extending the secrecy of the ballot requirements in polling stations to absent voting;
- Police engaged to support enforcement of the requirements;
- Introduction of ID verification requirements for all absent vote applications in line with the Register to Vote service.

Activities:

- Local authorities carry out identity checks when processing applications for absent votes.

Outputs:

- Local authorities process applications and verify applicants' ID via paper-based and online application routes ahead of deadlines and handle the absent vote refresh;
- Electors who select an ineligible proxy nominate an alternative prior to the deadline;
- Electors are content with their choice of appointed proxy and feel confident that the appointed proxy is eligible;
- Electors engaged on the changes and revised processes.

Outcomes:

- Electors do not exceed the maximum number of proxy votes;
- Electors who want to vote via proxy, including overseas electors, are not deterred or unable to cast their vote due to new measures;
- Electors who want to vote by proxy find the process easier as a result of the revised application process.

Impacts:

- The public have greater confidence in the integrity and security of voting via proxy.

Annex 9: Overseas Electors: Theory of change and contribution claim pathways

This annex shows the theory of change model and contribution claim pathways for the overseas electors measures in plain text format, alongside the theory of change model in image format, as shown in figure A.9.1.

Each theory of change and contribution claim pathway is made up of:

- Inputs: what is needed for the intervention to take place;
- Activities: activities, actions and processes to take place to underpin effective delivery;
- Outputs: quantifiable deliverable resulting from the intervention activities;
- Outcomes: early 'consequential changes' from the outputs and activities;
- Impacts: longer 'consequential change' to meet the long-term goals.

OVERSEAS ELECTORS THEORY OF CHANGE

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation for GB and NI to extend franchise to all UK citizens living overseas (previously only applied from 15 years after leaving UK and previously registered to vote);
- Primary and secondary legislation for GB and NI to extend the OE registration period up to 3 years before renewal;
- New legislation for OE of documentary evidence for Identity verification, ahead of attestation (as with existing exceptions process);
- Funding is provided for additional costs incurred resulting from the changes;
- MHCLG funding for EMS suppliers, digital service providers;
- Processes to enable OE applicants to apply for a renewal of their registration with the renewal of absent vote arrangements at the same time;
- Digital platforms and services for OE enable online registration including automatic register and historic address checks.

Activities:

- Local authorities, the EC and the AEA engage with the content of the changes and develop procedures to implement them;
- Training and guidance for local authorities on how to deliver new requirements;
- EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the franchise change;
- Newly enfranchised OEs apply for an absent vote (unless voting in person);
- Existing enfranchised OEs are reminded by local authorities when it is time to review their registration, and are automatically moved over to the new arrangements at the point of re-registration;
- Newly eligible OEs register to vote providing information as set out in new legislation;
- Local authorities check registration applications.

Outputs:

- Local authorities understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it should be enforced;
- Newly eligible OEs are aware of the franchise change;
- Increased number of registered OE ahead of next General Election;
- OEs register using the correct route, and in the correct constituency;
- Increased number of OEs with an AV arrangement in place ahead of the next General Election;
- Increased local authorities' workload immediately after implementation due to larger volumes of eligible OEs registering;
- Ballots of OEs who apply for a renewal of their registration to vote at the same time as their renewal of their absent vote are posted soon after nominations close.

Outcomes:


- Local authorities feel confident delivering the new requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;

- Increased understanding of OE registration process amongst overseas franchise;
- OEs are satisfied with the process of registering;
- Overseas franchise is not deterred from registering by the new requirements or processes;
- Digital systems enable efficient application processing;
- OE who are eligible and who wish to are able to register in time and able to cast their vote.

Impacts:

- British citizens overseas enabled to participate in the electoral process;
- OE electorate expands to incorporate the newly enfranchised OEs who choose to register to vote;
- Levels of public trust and satisfaction with the running of elections are maintained;
- More OEs remain registered between elections, lowering peaks in applications and reducing pressure on local authorities ahead of an election.

Figure A.9.1 Overseas Electors Theory of Change



OVERSEAS ELECTOR CONTRIBUTION CLAIM PATHWAYS

Pathway for Contribution Claim 1: Local authority staff and the electoral services teams meet their requirements by law

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation for GB and NI to extend franchise to all UK citizens living overseas (previously only applied from 15 years after leaving UK and previously registered to vote);
- Primary and secondary legislation for GB and NI to extend the OE registration period up to 3 years before renewal;
- New legislation for OE of documentary evidence for Identity verification, ahead of attestation (as with existing exceptions process);
- Funding is provided for additional costs incurred resulting from the changes;
- MHCLG funding for EMS suppliers, digital service providers;
- Processes to enable OE applicants to apply for a renewal of their registration with the renewal of absent vote arrangements at the same time;
- Digital platforms and services for OE enable online registration including automatic register and historic address checks.

Activities:

- Local authorities, the EC and the AEA engage with the content of the changes and develop procedures to implement them;
- Training and guidance for local authorities on how to deliver new requirements;
- Local authorities check registration applications.

Outputs:

- Local authorities understand the revised legislation and guidance and how it should be enforced;
- Increased local authorities' workload immediately after implementation due to larger volumes of eligible OEs registering.

Outcomes:

- Local authorities feel confident delivering the new requirements and applying them in accordance with the legislation;
- Digital systems enable efficient application processing;
- OE who are eligible and who wish to are able to register in time and able to cast their vote.

Impacts:

- OE electorate expands to incorporate the newly enfranchised OEs who choose to register to vote;
- More OEs remain registered between elections, lowering peaks in applications and reducing pressure on local authorities ahead of an election.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 2: Local authorities and electoral services teams' workloads are manageable at peak points around the election cycle

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation for GB and NI to extend the OE registration period up to 3 years before renewal;
- Funding is provided for additional costs incurred resulting from the changes;
- Processes to enable OE applicants to apply for a renewal of their registration with the renewal of absent vote arrangements at the same time;
- Digital platforms and services for OE enable online registration including automatic register and historic address checks.

Activities:

- Local authorities check registration applications.

Outputs:

- Increased local authorities' workload immediately after implementation due to larger volumes of eligible OEs registering.

Outcomes:

- Digital systems enable efficient application processing.

Impacts:

- Levels of public trust and satisfaction with the running of elections are maintained;
- More OEs remain registered between elections, lowering peaks in applications and reducing pressure on local authorities ahead of an election.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 3: Communications effectively raise awareness of reform amongst eligible British citizens living abroad

Activities:

- EC develop communications materials and key messaging to raise awareness and promote the franchise change.

Outputs:

- Newly eligible OEs are aware of the franchise change;
- OEs register using the correct route, and in the correct constituency.

Outcomes:

- Increased understanding of OE registration process amongst overseas franchise.

Impacts:

- OE electorate expands to incorporate the newly enfranchised OEs who choose to register to vote.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 4: Overseas electors who want to vote are able to correctly apply in time to vote

Inputs:

- Funding is provided for additional costs incurred resulting from the changes;
- Processes to enable OE applicants to apply for a renewal of their registration with the renewal of absent vote arrangements at the same time;
- Digital platforms and services for OE enable online registration including automatic register and historic address checks.

Activities:

- Local authorities, the EC and the AEA engage with the content of the changes and develop procedures to implement them;
- Newly enfranchised OEs apply for an absent vote (unless voting in person);
- Existing enfranchised OEs are reminded by local authorities when it is time to review their registration, and are automatically moved over to the new arrangements at the point of re-registration;
- Newly eligible OEs register to vote providing information as set out in new legislation.

Outputs:

- OEs register using the correct route, and in the correct constituency;
- Increased number of OEs with an AV arrangement in place ahead of the next General Election;
- Ballots of OEs who apply for a renewal of their registration to vote at the same time as their renewal of their absent vote are posted soon after nominations close.

Outcomes:

- Overseas franchise is not deterred from registering by the new requirements or processes;
- Digital systems enable efficient application processing;
- OE who are eligible and who wish to are able to register in time and able to cast their vote.

Impacts:

- OE electorate expands to incorporate the newly enfranchised OEs who choose to register to vote.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 5: Newly enfranchised British citizens living abroad register to vote as overseas electors

Activities:

- Newly enfranchised OEs apply for an absent vote (unless voting in person);
- Newly eligible OEs register to vote providing information as set out in new legislation.

Outputs:

- Increased number of registered OE ahead of next General Election;
- Increased number of OEs with an AV arrangement in place ahead of the next General Election.

Outcomes:

- Overseas franchise is not deterred from registering by the new requirements or processes.

Impacts:

- OE electorate expands to incorporate the newly enfranchised OEs who choose to register to vote.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 6: Overseas electors who want to vote are satisfied with the process of registration

Inputs:

- Processes to enable OE applicants to apply for a renewal of their registration with the renewal of absent vote arrangements at the same time;
- Digital platforms and services for OE enable online registration including automatic register and historic address checks.

Outputs:

- OEs register using the correct route, and in the correct constituency;
- Ballots of OEs who apply for a renewal of their registration to vote at the same time as their renewal of their absent vote are posted soon after nominations close.

Outcomes:

- Increased understanding of OE registration process amongst overseas franchise;
- OEs are satisfied with the process of registering;

- Overseas franchise is not deterred from registering by the new requirements or processes.

Impacts:

- Overseas franchise is not deterred from registering by the new requirements or processes;
- Levels of public trust and satisfaction with the running of elections are maintained.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 7: Integrity of overseas elector registration is maintained

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation for GB and NI to extend franchise to all UK citizens living overseas (previously only applied from 15 years after leaving UK and previously registered to vote);
- New legislation for OE of documentary evidence for Identity verification, ahead of attestation (as with existing exceptions process).

Activities:

- Local authorities, the EC and the AEA engage with the content of the changes and develop procedures to implement them;
- Local authorities check registration applications.

Outputs:

- OEs register using the correct route, and in the correct constituency.

Outcomes:

- Increased understanding of OE registration process amongst overseas franchise.

Impacts:

- Levels of public trust and satisfaction with the running of elections are maintained.

Annex 10: Digital Imprints: Theory of change and contribution claim pathways

This annex shows the theory of change model and contribution claim pathways for the digital imprints measures in plain text format, alongside the theory of change model in image format, as shown in figure A.10.1.

Each theory of change and contribution claim pathway is made up of:

- Inputs: what is needed for the intervention to take place;
- Activities: activities, actions and processes to take place to underpin effective delivery;
- Outputs: quantifiable deliverable resulting from the intervention activities;
- Outcomes: early 'consequential changes' from the outputs and activities;
- Impacts: longer 'consequential change' to meet the long-term goals.

DIGITAL IMPRINTS THEORY OF CHANGE

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce requirement for digital imprints which requires anyone paying for digital political material to be advertised, or other electronic material, which has been promoted by specific political entities (e.g. candidates), to explicitly show who they are, and on whose behalf, they are promoting the material;
- Development of statutory guidance on DI by the EC and MHCLG including guidance on enforcing bodies remits and powers, and what campaigners must do to comply;
- Process for reporting non-compliant digital political materials developed by the EC and police.

Activities:

- Training undertaken by enforcing bodies on how to deliver the requirements;
- Training delivered by campaigning organisations, using guidance from the EC, to campaigners on the requirement;

- Some members of the public and campaigners report non-compliant materials to the EC or police;
- The EC and the police monitor digital campaigning materials, supported by the complaints process;
- The EC and the police open investigations, where appropriate, where digital material which requires an imprint is published without one and an offence may have been committed;
- Where appropriate, the EC use powers to require material to be taken down, apply civil sanctions, agree enforcement undertakings, or issue stop notices;
- The police refer cases to the CPS as appropriate;
- The EC and the police use digital imprints as an evidence source when investigating the accuracy of spending returns of regulated entities (e.g. candidates, third party campaigners, parties) during the regulated period.

Outputs:

- Enforcing bodies and campaigners involved in implementation complete training and understand the guidance;
- Increased awareness among campaigners of statutory guidance and how they are affected by these new rules;
- Where required, digital campaigning materials have an imprint;
- Cases of non-compliance referred to the CPS as appropriate;
- Investigations opened by the EC and the police;
- The EC and police use remedial action to encourage campaigners to amend or remove non-compliant materials, and this applies to most cases;
- Civil sanctions applied or stop notices issued on identified non-compliance;
- Sanctions applied by CPS e.g. criminal convictions and court orders as appropriate;
- Non-compliant materials taken down.


Outcomes:

- The EC and police feel confident in the guidance and enforcement requirements and are able to apply them consistently;
- Campaigners feel appropriately supported to comply with new guidelines and are not deterred from campaigning as a result of the new requirements;
- Electors have a better understanding of who is promoting digital material and on whose behalf;
- Increase in digital campaigning materials that include an imprint showing who is promoting the material and on whose behalf;
- The EC and the police are better able to evaluate spending returns of relevant regulated entities after an election/referendum;
- Campaigners fix or remove non-compliant materials.

Impacts:

- Increased transparency and integrity of digital campaigning and online debate;
- Public perceptions of transparency around political campaigning improve;
- Electors are empowered to make informed decisions about the material they view online;
- Better enforcement of spending rules by the EC and police due to increased transparency around paid-for advertising by campaigners.

Figure A.10.1 Digital Imprints Theory of Change



DIGITAL IMPRINTS CONTRIBUTION CLAIM PATHWAYS

Pathway for Contribution Claim 1: Police and the EC fulfil their responsibilities as enforcing bodies under the new requirement consistently

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce requirement for digital imprints which requires anyone paying for digital political material to be advertised, or other electronic material, which has been promoted by specific political entities (e.g. candidates), to explicitly show who they are, and on whose behalf, they are promoting the material;
- Development of statutory guidance on DI by the EC and MHCLG including guidance on enforcing bodies remits and powers, and what campaigners must do to comply.

Activities:

- Training undertaken by enforcing bodies on how to deliver the requirements;
- The EC and the police monitor digital campaigning materials, supported by the complaints process;
- The EC and the police open investigations, where appropriate, where digital material which requires an imprint is published without one and an offence may have been committed;
- Where appropriate, the EC use powers to require material to be taken down, apply civil sanctions, agree enforcement undertakings, or issue stop notices;
- The police refer cases to the CPS as appropriate.

Outputs:

- Enforcing bodies and campaigners involved in implementation complete training and understand the guidance;
- Cases of non-compliance referred to the CPS as appropriate;
- Investigations opened by the EC and the police;
- The EC and police use remedial action to encourage campaigners to amend or remove non-compliant materials, and this applies to most cases;
- Civil sanctions applied or stop notices issued on identified non-compliance;

- Sanctions applied by CPS e.g. criminal convictions and court orders as appropriate;
- Non-compliant materials taken down.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 2: Non-compliant materials are found, reported, investigated and sanctioned as appropriate

Activities:

- Some members of the public and campaigners report non-compliant materials to the EC or police;
- The EC and the police monitor digital campaigning materials, supported by the complaints process;
- The EC and the police open investigations, where appropriate, where digital material which requires an imprint is published without one and an offence may have been committed;
- Where appropriate, the EC use powers to require material to be taken down, apply civil sanctions, agree enforcement undertakings, or issue stop notices;
- The police refer cases to the CPS as appropriate.

Outputs:

- Cases of non-compliance referred to the CPS as appropriate;
- Investigations opened by the EC and the police;
- The EC and police use remedial action to encourage campaigners to amend or remove non-compliant materials, and this applies to most cases;
- Civil sanctions applied or stop notices issued on identified non-compliance;
- Sanctions applied by CPS e.g. criminal convictions and court orders as appropriate;
- Non-compliant materials taken down.

Outcomes:

- Increase in digital campaigning materials that include an imprint showing who is promoting the material and on whose behalf;
- Campaigners fix or remove non-compliant materials.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 3: Campaigners are aware of the new requirements and comply with the requirements of the law

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce requirement for digital imprints which requires anyone paying for digital political material to be advertised, or other electronic material, which has been promoted by specific political entities (e.g. candidates), to explicitly show who they are, and on whose behalf, they are promoting the material.

Activities:

- Training delivered by campaigning organisations, using guidance from the EC, to campaigners on the requirement;
- Some members of the public and campaigners report non-compliant materials to the EC or police.

Outputs:

- Increased awareness among campaigners of statutory guidance and how they are affected by these new rules;
- Where required, digital campaigning materials have an imprint;
- The EC and police use remedial action to encourage campaigners to amend or remove non-compliant materials, and this applies to most cases.

Outcomes:

- Campaigners feel appropriately supported to comply with new guidelines and are not deterred from campaigning as a result of the new requirements;
- Increase in digital campaigning materials that include an imprint showing who is promoting the material and on whose behalf;
- Campaigners fix or remove non-compliant materials.

Impacts:

- Increased transparency and integrity of digital campaigning and online debate.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 4: Digital imprints allow the EC to better enforce spending rules

Inputs:

- Primary and secondary legislation introduce requirement for digital imprints which requires anyone paying for digital political material to be advertised, or other electronic material, which has been promoted by specific political entities (e.g. candidates), to explicitly show who they are, and on whose behalf, they are promoting the material.

Activities:

- Training delivered by campaigning organisations, using guidance from the EC, to campaigners on the requirement;
- The EC and the police open investigations, where appropriate, where digital material which requires an imprint is published without one and an offence may have been committed.

Outputs:

- Increased awareness among campaigners of statutory guidance and how they are affected by these new rules;
- Where required, digital campaigning materials have an imprint.

Outcomes:

- The EC and the police are better able to evaluate spending returns of relevant regulated entities after an election/referendum.

Impacts:

- Better enforcement of spending rules by the EC and police due to increased transparency around paid-for advertising by campaigners.

Pathway for Contribution Claim 5: Public perceptions of transparency and integrity around political campaigning are maintained or improved

Activities:

- Some members of the public and campaigners report non-compliant materials to the EC or police.

Outputs:

- Where required, digital campaigning materials have an imprint;
- Non-compliant materials taken down.

Outcomes:

- Electors have a better understanding of who is promoting digital material and on whose behalf;
- Increase in digital campaigning materials that include an imprint showing who is promoting the material and on whose behalf;
- Campaigners fix or remove non-compliant materials.

Impacts:

- Increased transparency and integrity of digital campaigning and online debate;
- Public perceptions of transparency around political campaigning improve;
- Electors are empowered to make informed decisions about the material they view online.

Annex 11: Divergence of measures between UK nations

Not all measures apply to all four nations in the United Kingdom, and to all elections in each nation. This means that the measures were introduced in some nations earlier than in others, and therefore that some nations have had more time and practice with implementing them.

The table below shows how each measure applies in each of the UK nations, and the elections they apply to.

Table A.11.1 Divergence table of EIP measures by UK nations

Nation	Absent voting measures that apply	Elections where absent voting measures apply	Elections where voter identification measures apply	Elections where accessibility measures apply	Elections where overseas measures apply	Digital imprints – organic material	Digital imprints – paid for material
England	<p>Online absent vote application service</p> <p>Absent vote identity checking</p> <p>3-year postal vote arrangement</p> <p>New proxy limit</p> <p>Postal vote handling and secrecy</p>	<p>UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions</p> <p>Local elections</p> <p>Mayoral elections (which include local and combined authority, London and London Assembly elections)</p> <p>Police and Crime Commissioner elections</p>	<p>UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions</p> <p>Local elections</p> <p>Mayoral elections (which include local and combined authority, London and London Assembly elections)</p> <p>Police and Crime Commissioner elections</p>	<p>UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions</p> <p>Local elections</p> <p>Mayoral elections (which include local and combined authority, London and London Assembly elections)</p> <p>Police and Crime Commissioner elections</p>	<p>UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions</p> <p>UK-wide referendums</p>	<p>UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions</p> <p>Local elections</p> <p>Mayoral elections (which include local and combined authority, London and London Assembly elections)</p> <p>Police and Crime Commissioner elections</p>	<p>This is not bound to election periods, and instead applies to any paid advert that can be reasonably regarded as intended to influence the public, or any section of the public to give support to or withhold support from the holding of, or a particular outcome of, any kind of referendum in the UK.</p>

Nation	Absent voting measures that apply	Elections where absent voting measures apply	Elections where voter identification measures apply	Elections where accessibility measures apply	Elections where overseas measures apply	Digital imprints – organic material	Digital imprints – paid for material
		Local and regional referendums UK-wide referendums	Local and regional referendums UK-wide referendums	Local and regional referendums UK-wide referendums		Local and regional referendums UK-wide referendums	
Scotland	Online absent vote application service Absent vote identity checking 3-year postal vote arrangement New proxy limit	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums Local elections	This is not bound to election periods, and instead applies to any paid advert that can be reasonably regarded as intended to influence the public, or any section of the public to give

Nation	Absent voting measures that apply	Elections where absent voting measures apply	Elections where voter identification measures apply	Elections where accessibility measures apply	Elections where overseas measures apply	Digital imprints – organic material	Digital imprints – paid for material
	Postal vote handling and secrecy					Scottish Parliament Elections	support to or withhold support from the holding of, or a particular outcome of, any kind of referendum in the UK.
Wales	Online absent vote application service Absent vote identity checking 3-year postal vote arrangement New proxy limit Postal vote handling and secrecy	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions Police and Crime Commissioner elections UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums Police and Crime Commissioner elections	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums Police and Crime Commissioner elections	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums Police and Crime Commissioner elections Local elections Senedd Elections	This is not bound to election periods, and instead applies to any paid advert that can be reasonably regarded as intended to influence the public, or any section of the public to give support to or withhold support from the holding

Nation	Absent voting measures that apply	Elections where absent voting measures apply	Elections where voter identification measures apply	Elections where accessibility measures apply	Elections where overseas measures apply	Digital imprints – organic material	Digital imprints – paid for material
							of, or a particular outcome of, any kind of referendum in the UK.
Northern Ireland	New proxy limit Postal vote handling and secrecy	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions Northern Ireland Assembly elections Local elections Local and regional referendums UK-wide referendums	Requirement to show photographic identification is already in place in Northern Ireland pre-Elections Act 2022.	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions Northern Ireland Assembly elections Local elections Local and regional referendums UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums	UK Parliamentary Elections, including by-elections and recall of MP petitions UK-wide referendums Local elections Northern Ireland Assembly Elections	This is not bound to election periods, and instead applies to any paid advert that can be reasonably regarded as intended to influence the public, or any section of the public to give support to or withhold support from the holding of, or a particular outcome of, any kind of

Nation	Absent voting measures that apply	Elections where absent voting measures apply	Elections where voter identification measures apply	Elections where accessibility measures apply	Elections where overseas measures apply	Digital imprints – organic material	Digital imprints – paid for material
							referendum in the UK.