

~~SECRET~~

Cannon fire was used against HMS PLYMOUTH and RFA SIR GALAHAD in SAN CARLOS water. There is no record of rockets ever being used against ships.

8. Sea Mines. By 7 Jun, the enemy had the capability of laying sea mines in FALKLAND waters. JMIC

9. ELINT. By 7 Jun it was assessed that the enemy were intercepting UK circuits and were thus able, in some cases, to be aware of future intentions. Logistic circuits were considered to be particularly vulnerable. JMIC

INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED ON OR SOON AFTER 8 JUN

10. General. The Argentinians had detected night amphibious helo operations 12-15 miles SW of STANLEY on the night 6/7 Jun. The enemy were very sensitive to the likelihood of further UK amphibious operations to the SW of STANLEY before the final push and were alert to some of what was going on. It was on this same night that INTREPID's LCUs were fired on by the enemy and an aircraft flew close to them in the entrance to CHOISEUL SOUND. A0783

11. Particular Intelligence to the Inquiry. A report from a Secret and sensitive source reveals that the Argentinians were aware of the night operations of 6 and 7 Jun which gave indication that a UK amphibious build up was about to take place in the FITZROY area. By 081400 Jun they knew by visual observation that amphibious 061400

units were unloading at anchor in PORT PLEASANT to FITZROY; as a result an air attack was arranged for later in the afternoon. Jamming of UK radio frequencies formed part of the attack plan. JMIC

DISCUSSION

12. The discovery of EXOCET ashore caused a radical re-appraisal of naval tactics to the South and East of EAST FALKLAND. No RN ship, and particularly a major unit such as an LPD, was to be risked by allowing it to enter the assessed EXOCET danger envelope. It was generally assessed that from where it was situated at HORSE PT that missiles would not be fired on a track which would take them over land. This made SEAL PT the westerly cut off and hence there was theoretical 'safe' water just to the east of LIVELY Is and ELEPHANT Is and up to FITZROY. (See Annex B). This situation, together with the political directive that a catastrophe at sea with large loss of life was unacceptable led to the situation that LPD's could not go all the way to FITZROY particularly with large numbers of Army Personnel embarked. A0117
A0119

13. A further factor which limited the deployment of LPD's was that experience had shown that ships caught individually outside the TA and its associated general air defences were very much at risk. COVENTRY was an example of this and indeed it will be recalled PLYMOUTH was attacked outside the TA in daylight hours on 8 Jun suffering considerable damage. LCU F4 was sunk the same day in similar circumstances.

E1-2

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