1. **What do you understand by the term 'modern deterrence'? And how does this differ from the conventional concept of deterrence?**
   - Will the Government’s work on ‘modern deterrence’ be undermined by the lack of firm information about the armed forces’ future capabilities?
   - Which areas of national security policy should be prioritised under the concept of modern deterrence?

Given that 'deterrence' is well defined in relation to traditional areas, whether nuclear or conventional, I take 'modern deterrence' to be an updated doctrine, covering the relatively new domain of cyber. But I do not find 'modern deterrence' a particularly useful term myself: deterrence is deterrence, whatever the domain. Logic suggests that one should work out what needs deterring before defining the capabilities necessary. As you might expect, I would suggest that cyber should be prioritised, given that other areas of deterrence are already well-rehearsed.

2. **Should the 2015 NSS & SDSR have discussed the security threats posed by China, Iran and North Korea to the UK in more detail?**

I think the threats from these three countries were well understood in 2015. but arguably the cyber threat from DPRK was underestimated.

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