Introduction

1. In 2015 UNA-UK\textsuperscript{1} welcomed the analysis of the NSS/SDSR inextricably linking Britain’s security to the health of the rules-based international system and identifying the need to “help strengthen the rules-based international order and its institution”. We also feel there is a powerful self-interest argument for multilateralism. Challenges such as climate change, extremism and cyberwarfare do not respect borders and require international cooperation. We hope to see this commitment to multilateralism and our global system reflected in future defence and security strategies.

2. In July 2017, the UK Government launched a “National Security Capability Review”\textsuperscript{2} to support the ongoing implementation of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). On 27 November the Commons Defence Select Committee confirmed that the Capability Review was intended to “refresh” the SDSR “on the basis that the threats to the UK had intensified and changed since 2015”\textsuperscript{3}.

3. However in a subsequent letter to UNA-UK, the Director of the SDSR and Defence, National Security Secretariat said “the work we are conducting is not a refresh of the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015 SDSR). Instead, as we set out in July, this is a review of national security capabilities, being conducted in support of implementation of the 2015 SDSR”.

4. The Director also said “we have also published an annual review on implementation progress”. When UNA-UK asked for his office for clarification, they indicated that this was the 2016 First Annual Report on implementation of the NSS & SDSR. A second annual report was due in November 2017 but has not yet been published. In response to requests, UNA-UK was informed that the report was overdue.

5. In January 2018 it was announced that defence elements of the National Security Capability Review (NSCR), under way since July 2017, will be the subject of a further review (the ‘Modernising Defence Programme’ (MDP))\textsuperscript{4}.

6. In the context of this uncertainty over the Government’s national security strategy, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has announced a two-part inquiry on this subject. UNA-UK’s written evidence will comment on the following aspects of the Joint Committee’s terms of reference:

\begin{itemize}
\item UNA-UK is Britain’s only charity dedicated to building support for an effective United Nations. Over the past 70 years we have built a network of members, local branches, youth groups and partner organisations in all four nations of the UK.
\item \url{https://www.gov.uk/government/news/strategic-defence-and-security-review-implementation}
\item \url{http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/news-parliament-2017/royal-marines-uk-amphibious-capability-launch-17-19/}
\end{itemize}
6.1 ways in which the threats to the UK’s national security have changed since 2015, especially in relation to one particular challenge identified in the 2015 NSS & SDSR: the erosion of the international rules-based order;
6.2 changes to the wider international security environment, such as the change in administration in the United States and the UK’s vote to leave the European Union;
6.3 the extent to which the NSCR was necessitated by challenges in delivering the capabilities set out in the 2015 NSS & SDSR;
6.4 whether the total resources allocated by, and the skills available to, the Government in relation to national security are sufficient to meet today’s challenges, and are appropriately balanced across the range of capabilities set out in the 2015 NSS & SDSR.

The need for a comprehensive and consultative approach to national security and defence

7. UNA-UK is the UK’s only charity devoted to an effective UN. We submitted evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy ahead of the 2015 review, as well as through the public consultation web-portal coordinated by the Cabinet Office. At the time we made the case that public support for the United Nations is vital to the health of the rules-based international system and, as such, squarely in the national interest. UNA-UK and its local groups across the country work hard to help build this support.

8. We are concerned, however, that the organisations such as our own, and the public more broadly, have not been given an opportunity to feed into the National Security Capability Review, or the ongoing reporting on the SDSR. Given that the UK Government saw value in such consultation in 2015, and given that the security landscape has changed dramatically enough to warrant a National Security Capability Review, we believe that submissions from outside government should have been sought.

9. As we noted in our evidence to the Joint Committee on 8 September 2017: “Over time, public disengagement can become a security risk by leading to polarisation ... Conversely, an informed and engaged public is a security asset that can support resilience at the community level and actively participate in decisions put to them on the UK’s future security.”

10. In the context of increasing threats from extremism since 2015, an informed and engaged public is even more important. So too is public support for the international system, on which Britain depends for managing the range of intensified risks it faces – from nuclear proliferation to climate change – and which is now under greater strain in the current political environment. Regardless of the precise architecture of the review process, there is a need for a comprehensive and coherent approach to national security and defence strategic planning which takes into account the radically changed political context since 2015.

11. Seeking input on the Capability Review would have been a prime opportunity to glean insights into public perceptions of national security priorities, and to make progress towards a shared vision of a ‘Global Britain’ that is capable of tackling short and longer-term threats. This is especially important given the growing divergence in views on the UK’s future that we have seen over the past two years. Civil society, and young people in particular, must be part of the conversation.

12. We very much hope that the Government will seek to involve the public in all aspects of national security and defence strategic planning. To support this, UNA-UK intends to publish a response to the Capability Review with input from its UK-wide membership.

The UK at the UN in the context of a more multipolar and polarised world

13. Since 2015 we have seen rising big power tensions as global power dynamics shifts, and a number of divisive populists elected to positions of power around the world. The effect has been greater instability and uncertainty in international affairs, a lack of engagement by traditional powers in crisis prevention and resolution, and increased risks of violence through changes in tone and policy. This has been evident in countries such as Myanmar, North Korea, Israel, Iran, South Sudan and Sudan.

14. Proceedings at the UN Security Council (UNSC) have reflected these developments. While the Council has been able to act collectively on North Korea, its divisions over Iran and Israel-Palestine could risk not only fuelling instability in this region, but also spill over into other areas. In Yemen, Syria and Myanmar, meanwhile, the Council has been paralysed at significant cost in terms of both human misery and global - and therefore British - security.

15. In this context, the UK’s role on the Security Council is ever more important. However, a confluence of factors, including the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) and subsequent developments, has - rightly or wrongly - contributed to a perception that the UK is now a less useful partner. This is the narrative that has been used to describe a number of diplomatic setbacks last year, such as the loss of a British judge on the International Court of Justice for the first time ever, and the number of states, including traditional partners, who voted against the UK in the General Assembly vote on the Chagos Islands. UNA-UK has also been told by a number of states that they now feel it is more effective to caucus with France.

16. Nonetheless, the UK will continue to hold a position of influence at the UN, not least through its seat on the Security Council, and as such, UK has the opportunity to play an important role. However, it appears increasingly that UK influence from actions such as its role as a major development donor, which is regularly cited by other states.

17. It is therefore vital that the UK pursues other soft power initiatives that demonstrate its value to the international community. At the Security Council, this means carefully calibrating the role it has often played as mediating between the US and ‘the rest’. The value of this function has been demonstrated over the past 12 months in UN budget and reform negotiations. However, the US is a less predictable partner at present, and it will not always be possible nor advisable for the UK to align itself with the US, particularly in the context of seeking to build stronger partnerships in other parts of the world.

18. The UK should find ways to demonstrate its continued appetite for working with EU partners, as well as with Commonwealth countries. The UK’s role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, and its robust response, with Germany and France, to US criticism of the deal, is a positive example of the former, and efforts to seek formal and informal ways of working with these partners should be intensified.

19. Further steps to reach out to the wider UN membership should also be considered, particularly ones that show the UK is prepared to use its permanent seat at the Security Council for the common good. This could include seeking to build bridges with proponents of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons or giving support to the longstanding proposal to give the African Union funding from the UN peacekeeping budget for UN-backed AU missions. Smaller steps, such as holding more “informal informals” and off-site meetings aimed at finding common ground between the permanent and non-permanent members would also send a positive signal.

20. Finally, shifting global power relations also means that the UK should be wary of taking sides in regional conflicts which could leave the UK exposed and with unpredictable allies. Instead encouraging rapprochement and mediation - including by supporting the UN Secretary-General’s ‘surge in diplomacy’ - and looking for common ground between regional powers, particularly in the Middle East, will be more likely to provide the UK with a wider global network of partners and allies which will better weather increased polarisation and increased turbulence.

Articulating Global Britain
21. In December 2016, UNA-UK commissioned a poll which demonstrated that the British public have internationalist instincts and values closely aligned with the UN Charter, but that recent political trends have made them wary of an explicitly ‘global’ political agenda. This implies a failure to engage the public in the positive internationalist role Britain seeks for itself on the world stage. As the analysis in the last SDSR shows, this itself constitutes a security threat. Around the world, the growing disconnect between governments and their publics has led to increased political uncertainty and the rise of divisive populists.

22. The Government should seek to set out its vision and engage the public in its development. An important first step would be to signal the importance of global citizenship, global cooperation and global institutions, in particular the United Nations. The UN should be a source of national pride, as an exemplar of British international leadership and of British pragmatism in creating a mechanism to advance national and global interests in tandem.

23. This vision should also set out a re-imagining of the UK’s role in the world. Since 1962, when the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented that Britain had lost an empire but not yet found a role, the UK has wavered between emphasising its colonial history and hard power, and its self-characterisation as a small island that punches above its weight. The current ‘Global Britain’ label appears to be the latest expression of this balancing act. On the one hand, it recognises the changing global power landscape and calls on others to step up and take responsibility for tackling shared challenges. On the other hand, some of the rhetoric on expanding the idea of a ‘UK plc’ has - rightly or wrongly - been interpreted as Empire 2.0. There is now a real opportunity to set out a vision based on the future, that recognises that exceptionalism is no longer an option.

24. Turning that vision into action, whether it be through a new SDSR, the NSCR or the MDP, requires the UK to demonstrate how it intends to secure Britain in a manner which enhances, rather than weakens, three vital elements of our security strategy: the rules based global system, our multilateral institutions, and our ability to maintain a broad array of diverse alliances. To be effective, the UK cannot cherry pick its favourite bits of multilateralism but must support the system as a whole. The UK should put its Security Council seat status to good use, speaking up for the wider UN membership and pursuing reforms and initiatives in the global interest. Earning the trust of its peers will need a more principled, multilateral and consistent foreign policy.

25. In the remainder of this submission we take a detailed look at four areas where UK foreign policy could enhance British security by being more principled, multilateral and consistent.

Arms

26. The UK Government’s practice of exporting lethal weaponry to countries with poor human rights records continues to be at odds with the objectives and priorities laid out in the NSS/SDSR and is damaging Britain’s international standing. In particular, it is inconsistent with the UK’s commitment to the rules-based international system.

27. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), ratified by the UK in 2014, is considered by the UK Government to be a key building block of the rules-based international system, and one which, according to the UK’s National Counter Proliferation Strategy, can deliver a “step-change in the rules-based international system governing the trade in conventional arms”.

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6 UNA-UK worked with professional pollsters, ComRes, on research into the personal values of the British public. See: www.una.org.uk/news/britons-tell-una-uk-what-they-stand

7 See footnote 5


Other important components of the rules-based international system relevant to arms export licensing decisions include the Mine Ban Treaty\(^\text{12}\), the Convention on Cluster Munitions\(^\text{13}\) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).\(^\text{14}\)

28. An example of incoherence in UK government policy in arms export licensing has been the UK’s authorisation throughout 2016 and 2017 of arms transfers to members of the Saudi-led coalition (SLC) of states conducting the war in Yemen (characterised by the UN as being responsible for “widespread violations of international humanitarian law”)\(^\text{15}\), where there is a risk that those arms might be used in that conflict. The situation in Yemen raises concerns over UK complicity and undermines UK international obligations, such as those contained in the ATT and R2P. The perception of selectivity in meeting such obligations is damaging the international system more broadly and reduces the UK’s ability to move international political opinion.

29. In September 2017, the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross remarked that “in Yemen, I saw how the war is eroding almost every aspect of people’s lives. The arms trade is rife and continues to flow despite repeated violations of international humanitarian law […] the words of the [ATT] remain hollow if they are not matched with actions, and result in changes in policies and behaviour.”\(^\text{16}\) It is a widespread view held by legal experts and prominent lawyers\(^\text{17}\) that States Parties of the ATT who continue to transfer weapons to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) which may be used to intervene in Yemen are in breach of their obligations – an impression which is having a negative effect on the Treaty.

30. The UK, with cross-party consensus, played an integral role on the world stage in the development phase of the ATT in its eventual adoption in 2013. The UK considers Treaty universalisation to be a foreign policy objective. Consistent implementation to a high standard by major exporters and supporters of the Treaty is important if it is to become the credible and effective instrument originally envisioned by the UK.\(^\text{18}\) But undermining the ATT on one hand while simultaneously encouraging non-state Parties to join the Treaty on the other gives an impression of incoherence that is damaging the UK’s international standing and is unlikely to be the most effective strategy for Treaty universalisation.

31. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the lead country (or “penholder”) on Yemen and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict within the Council, the UK’s conduct with regards to Yemen has not gone unnoticed internationally.\(^\text{19}\) A lack of Council action on Yemen has led to questions being asked about the UK’s role as penholder\(^\text{20}\). Yemen has been gripped by conflict for almost three years, it is surprising to note that during this period there has been just one substantive Security Council Resolution and a handful of Presidential Statements and Press Statements on Yemen.

\(^{13}\) https://www.un.org/disarmament/ccm/
Nuclear disarmament

32. Reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use is a fundamental and existential objective in the interest of all UN member states. The UK places emphasis on the role played by the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in nuclear security, describing it as the ‘cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament’.21

33. UN High Representative for Disarmament, Izumi Nakamitsu, recently warned that the health of the NPT is at risk, stating that only demonstrable progress towards Nuclear Weapons States implementing their obligation under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to negotiate in good faith towards disarmament can “ensure the long-term viability of the Treaty”.

34. This reflects the clear perception from a critical mass of member states that progress on disarmament through the NPT framework has been inadequate - a position that has led to a majority of states embarking on parallel processes to promote disarmament, which culminated in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Adoption of the treaty was supported by 122 UN Member States.22

35. Since 2013, opportunities for the UK to improve relations with the non-nuclear weapons states have been missed, with a lack of UK participation in significant conferences and processes contributing to the perception that the UK is not living up to its obligation under Article 6 of the NPT. Examples of UK non-participation include:

35.1 Open-Ended Working Groups in 2013 and 2016
35.2 Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo, 2013, and Nayarit, 2014
35.3 United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in 2017

36. The deepening divide between the Nuclear Weapons States and those supporting the TPNW is damaging the health of the NPT at a time of growing nuclear tensions surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear ambitions, US actions casting doubt over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, emergent signs of a new nuclear arms race as a result of the US’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and technological developments that pose increasing risk to nuclear arsenals.

37. In this environment, diplomatic engagement is vital to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons. As a country with a formal role in maintaining peace and security and as a recognised Nuclear Weapons State, the UK has a duty to take all opportunities to engage with the majority of member states on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

38. The approaching UN High Level Conference (HLC), organised as part of a follow-up measure from a 2013 High Level Meeting of the General Assembly23 attended by the UK at ministerial level24, provides an opportunity for re-engagement. Attending the HLC at ministerial level, would send a strong signal that the UK takes seriously its commitment to disarm. Conversely, failing to participate in a democratically mandated conference of this type, would send a negative message, with implications for the UK’s perceived support for the UN and the rules-based international system.

39. The UK’s current practice of disengagement with the TPNW is also inconsistent with UN guidance, as articulated25 by Izumi Nakamitsu, UN High Representative on Disarmament Affairs, who recently urged nuclear-armed states to develop a new approach of: “don’t ignore

it, don’t attack it” with respect to the TPNW. The approaches of non-signatories such as the Netherlands\textsuperscript{26} and Australia\textsuperscript{27} could provide instructive examples with regards to participation and engagement on the TPNW.

40. Ultimately, the success of the 2020 NPT Review Conference in 2020, and the framework more generally, will depend on building common ground between states and identifying a shared criteria for success at an early date. The UK should use the opportunities presented by the High Level Conference and the 2018/19 NPT Preparatory Committees to improve diplomatic relations with Non-Nuclear Weapons States and demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to disarm. In this regard, UNA-UK and BASIC’s 2017 report contains 30 examples of concrete disarmament actions compatible with the manifesto commitments of all major UK political parties which, if implemented, would contribute to the health of the NPT and the rules-based international system more broadly.\textsuperscript{28}

**Peacekeeping**

41. The UK should make peacekeeping a core part of its future defence strategy. It should articulate the role that it sees itself playing in UN peacekeeping beyond 2020, and that role should be increased and enhanced.

42. The United Kingdom has a commendable track record on UN peacekeeping. The UK has for some time been one of the largest financial contributors, and currently contributes around 700 troops, the majority to Cyprus and South Sudan. In addition a small number of mission experts and staff officers deployed to other missions perform vital and appreciated functions.

43. However, the UK is able to play a greater role. Its military is the fifth largest in the world by spending, and it has a relative lack of other active deployments, meaning there is capacity for the UK to contribute more troops. Yet the UK provides less than one per cent of the UN’s total uniformed personnel.\textsuperscript{29} It has also made no announcements regarding how it intends to continue contributing to UN peacekeeping after the current deployment to South Sudan ends in 2020. This represents a missed opportunity.

44. The UK was once the largest contributor of troops to the UN and has long recognised the value of UN Peacekeeping in building stability overseas, upstream conflict prevention\textsuperscript{30} increasing the UK’s global influence, rebuilding fragile states, preventing the rise of violent extremism, securing ungoverned spaces and increasing influence at the United Nations and ability to influence other Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Many TCCs - such as India and Brazil - are important strategic partners who will become yet more important after Britain leaves the EU.

45. Peacekeeping provides a mechanism for new forms of engagement with other permanent members of the Security Council. This can strengthen cooperation and de-escalate tension, but can also provide diplomatic leverage and contribute to the containment and ‘influence matching’ of other permanent members.

46. UN Peacekeeping also provides a way for the UK’s armed forces to maintain a state of combat readiness and to receive active duty experience. It provides unmatched training and career enrichment opportunities in peacetime, and the skills it develops – international by design: working in coalition, working in complicated political environments, overseas engagement and capacity building, delivering logistics in challenging circumstances – are precisely the skills that have been identified as being important to our future armed forces as

\textsuperscript{26}https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/latest/news/2017/07/07/explanation-of-vote-of-ambassador-lise-gregoire-on-the-draft-text-of-the-nuclear-ban-treaty

\textsuperscript{27}http://www.disarmament.ch/events/looking-ahead-what-next-for-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/

\textsuperscript{28}https://www.una.org.uk/meaningful-multilateralism-30-nuclear-disarmament-proposals-next-uk-government

\textsuperscript{29}http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors

\textsuperscript{30}http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/the-royal-marines-and-uk-amphibious-capability/written/77024.html#_ftn3
part of the “Army 2020 refine” strategy and as raised by senior British military personnel in recent roundtables and workshops. The UK’s world-leading skills in the fields of counterinsurgency, IED disposal and capacity building in fragile states (one of the stated purposes of the Adaptable Force) will only remain world-leading if they are practiced.

Preventing Atrocities

47. The UK should:
   47.1 Make atrocity prevention and the Responsibility to Protect a central strand of the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security documents
   47.2 In so doing, develop a strategy for preventing atrocities which would detail precisely what measures and indicators would lead the R2P Focal Point to declare that there is an imminent risk of atrocity crimes occurring in any given country and what mechanisms and actions this would trigger
   47.3 Elevate the role of R2P Focal Point to ministerial level
   47.4 Champion the doctrine of R2P across Government, using atrocity prevention as a ‘lens’ to analyse policy in all areas including within peacekeeping, arms export policy and immigration and asylum policy

48. There is no greater test of our international system than its record when it comes to preventing atrocities. Atrocities – genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing – represent humanity at its worst: horrific crimes affect communities for decades. It also affects the UK in multiple ways: as a source of instability and a root cause of extremism, as a push factor for mass migration, and as a challenge to the authority of the UK as a Security Council member.

49. The international community’s record on preventing atrocities is poor, but past failures have produced a set of tools to guide our response. These tools allow for the graded application of pressure and actions to prevent and discourage atrocity crimes before they occur, measures to mitigate harm as it is occurring and subsequent accountability processes to prevent recurrence and provide justice to survivors. They are collectively known as the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” – a principle endorsed by all UN member states at the World Summit in 2005.

50. Some experts and commentators have argued that the UK only champions R2P when it aligns with its strategic interests, and is not itself a strategic priority. The fact that the UK, unlike the US, has no clear policy on atrocity prevention, and that preventing atrocities does not receive more than a cursory mention in the UK’s strategic security documents reinforces this perception, as do allegations of selectivity around the non-application of the doctrine, for example, with respect to credible allegations of atrocity crimes by UK allies in Yemen.

51. A recent report by the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee also suggested that the role of the R2P focal point is being underutilised. The Foreign Affairs Committee found that:

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38 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_33_38.pdf
“Whether actions are defined as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide has important consequences: such a definition invokes the Responsibility to Protect on the state involved and on the international community. The Government’s hesitation would therefore be understandable if the FCO was waiting for the results of its own analysis, but when we asked the Minister what legal assessment had been conducted by the FCO, the Minister said that none had taken place. He explained that the FCO was focused on the political and humanitarian situation and that the UN and International Criminal Court was the correct decision-making body to consider allegations of crimes against humanity and genocide.”

52. This circular logic risks precluding a risk of atrocities from being noticed, and so stymies the role of the Focal Point which is to be aware of when there is an imminent risk of atrocity crimes occurring in a given country and to demand appropriate action. The International Criminal Court would, by definition, only act once it was far too late to prevent atrocities, and the use of the term "UN" in this context is unclear - the Security Council is an appropriate forum for discussions of this nature but the UK has many tools for atrocity prevention and harm mitigation at its disposal that don’t require a Security Council resolution.

53. A better approach, avoiding selectivity, would be to develop a strategy which would detail precisely what the measures and indicators which would lead the Focal Point to declare an imminent risk of atrocity crimes are, and what mechanisms and actions that would trigger. Increasing the seniority of the UK’s R2P Focal Point to ministerial level could help give these issues prominence, and better enable the UK to implement the required actions. Further, the UK should make preventing atrocities an explicit national security priority and adopt a consistent approach that adheres to international standards.

54. R2P has perhaps been most successful when it comes to UN Peacekeeping, where the UN mission likely prevented a genocide in the Central African Republic and reduced the prevalence of atrocities in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UK can build on such success by offering diplomatic and logistical support for the robust implementation of “protection of civilians” mandates within UN Peacekeeping contexts. The UK should also push for the early deployment of missions and oppose their premature withdrawal.

55. R2P needs to be a cross-government initiative. An atrocity prevention ‘lens’ should be applied to all government policy. If implemented properly, R2P goes beyond conflict prevention and looks at what makes target groups vulnerable and how they can be protected. A likely consequence would be to refuse arms export licences to countries where there is a risk of them being used to commit atrocity crimes; and to amend immigration and asylum policy to ensure that safe passageways for migration are provided for those fleeing atrocities.

39 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/435/43506.htm#:~:text=Whether%20actions%20are%20defined%20as%20ethnic%20cleansing%2C%20crimes%20against%20humanity%20and%20genocide%20has%20important%20consequences%3A%20such%20a%20definition%20invokes%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20on%20the%20state%20involved%20and%20on%20the%20international%20community.%20The%20Government’s%20hesitation%20would%20therefore%20be%20understandable%20if%20the%20FCO%20was%20waiting%20for%20the%20results%20of%20its%20own%20analysis%2C%20but%20when%20we%20asked%20the%20Minister%20what%20legal%20assessment%20had%20been%20conducted%20by%20the%20FCO%2C%20the%20Minister%20said%20that%20none%20had%20taken%20place.%20He%20explained%20that%20the%20FCO%20was%20focused%20on%20the%20political%20and%20humanitarian%20situation%20and%20that%20the%20UN%20and%20International%20Criminal%20Court%20was%20the%20correct%20decision-making%20body%20to%20consider%20allegations%20of%20crimes%20against%20humanity%20and%20genocide.%20

40 https://www.una.org.uk/magazine/2017-2/without-un-there-would-have-been-genocide

41 http://nebula.wsimg.com/474933405a5f1c98073148cb5d46d805?AccessKeyId=9136D1A332A73825C5CB&disposition=0&alloworigin=1