Witness

I: Dr Rafael Grossi, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the International Organisations in Vienna and President-designate of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

1. This is a corrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv.
Examination of witness

Dr Rafael Grossi.

Q134 **The Chairman:** Dr Grossi, good morning. Thank you very much for being with us. We are honoured to have your presence and to share your wisdom on these crucial issues, particularly nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament generally. You, of course, are the president-designate of the RevCon coming up in 2020, so you are in a pivotal position, obviously with a background of enormous experience and knowledge in all these areas.

We would very much like to get a feeling from you of how you see this RevCon shaping up and what you think the biggest challenges will be. That is rather a general question to start with. We will back it up with more specific ones, but can we start with your overview of this important prospect?

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** Thank you very much for having me, Lord Chairman, and for the work you are doing. It is very important that we reflect on this in different places and try to contribute to what we hope will be a successful outcome for an exercise that is of global relevance. Indeed, like you said, I will preside over and steer this very important process.

Of course, everything I will say is informed by that. My whole perspective and analysis is heavily influenced by the possibilities and challenges that we have and how best to overcome them. That means that I will try—it is my duty—to transcend the partisan, regional, national or political approaches to the different issues that are part of this treaty, which, as you know very well, is so particular because it has different aspects and facets to it.

This conference comes at a very particular time. It is the 10th review Conference since the entering into force of the treaty. It is the confluence of all anniversaries, because it is the 10th conference and the 50th anniversary of the entering into force of this treaty—half a century. It is also 25 years—a quarter of a century—after we decided collectively that the treaty would have an indefinite extension. All these things, put in perspective, give the occasion a special meaning. Anniversaries are of course arbitrary, but as in life they are a good opportunity to take stock of where we are, what this instrument gives us with the rule to conduct our activities in this field, and what the prospects and challenges for the future are.

I will not regurgitate what I know you know. Everybody says that it is a moment when many of the things that we consider basic and that go to the heart of the treaty, meaning basically the disarmament provisions of the treaty, are if not challenged then under great stress. There are other important aspects that have to do with the political decisions that allowed us to have this treaty as an instrument with an indefinite duration. On this, I refer to the thorny issue of the Middle East and the possible establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in that part of
the world. I will come back to that, if you will allow me. On top of that, we have other aspects to do with peaceful uses and non-proliferation.

The treaty, in all its briefness, is incredibly rich, because it has these different aspects that interplay differently. We should make every effort to have a review that is a success. We can talk about that if you want.

**The Chairman:** Thank you very much. I should have said at the beginning and forgot to remind you that this is a televised and open session. There will be a transcript afterwards that you can correct if you wish. I also remind my colleagues about declaring interests and so on.

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** Excellent.

**Q135 The Chairman:** That is very helpful. We have some follow-up questions, but first, some of our witnesses have suggested that this coming conference is the one where the non-nuclear states, which are beginning to lose a bit of patience with the imbalance inherent in the NPT structure, are beginning to ask, 'Where is this disarmament from the nuclear states coming from? Who is doing it and why should we go on accepting this inherent structure that has held together for so long?' Is that your impression as well, or do you think that is not a major issue?

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** There are different views on this. It is clear in the provisions of the treaty that you have one article, Article 6, which has provision for a process leading eventually to a world without nuclear weapons, but there is no chronology or specifically set timelines for that.

There is of course a big debate about the pace and the concrete results that have been achieved so far. Again, there are different views on this. My impression is that there is a concern about this, and it is up to all of us as an NPT community to address it.

I do not see this necessarily as something that should be confronting nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. The one remarkable quality this treaty has is that we are all parties to it and we all have obligations with regard to it. So there is an expectation. This is why we have an embedded system of review in the treaty, which you do not have in every instrument of international law, as you know. The review itself indicates that there is an evolving nature to the instrument, which requires checking from time to time on where we are.

Coming to your reference to frustration, the question arises as to whether 50 years is a long time for nuclear disarmament, if what you mean by 'frustration' is that people do not see nuclear weapons disappearing from the surface of the earth, or whether we are talking about a sufficiently robust pace in the disarmament process. Quite clearly, the treaty does not exist in a vacuum. This is so important. We say 50 years. God knows how many things have gone through over the past 50 years.

The treaty was negotiated at the time of the Cold War and the Vietnam War. Now we have hindsight to indicate that this was not an easy moment in international life. It has lived through ups and downs in the
cycle of history, with the end of the Cold War and post the Cold War, with the emergence of new challenges. The treaty arches over all these events. The big question for all the 191 members of the treaty would be whether the fact that we have not reached the final goal of a world without nuclear weapons would put the NPT into question as such.

Q136 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Thank you very much, ambassador. You mentioned specifically the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone as one of the challenges you face. It was, of course, the challenge that led to the non-adoption of any agreed conclusions at the last Review Conference. Could you say a little about how procedurally this issue can best be handled in the run up to and at the conference?

Could you also perhaps comment a little on the situation of the four countries that will not be participating in the conference but which have nuclear weapons: India and Pakistan, which are conducting military operations against each other as we speak, although thank heavens so far without any threat of or actual use of nuclear weapons; Israel, which is of course an integral part of the discussion about the Middle East zone; and North Korea, which was a party to the treaty but withdrew from it and now has nuclear weapons? Could you talk a little about those four after you have said a little about the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone?

Dr Rafael Grossi: Certainly, with pleasure. The Middle East has of course become a central issue in the NPT debate after the review and extension conference in 1995, where a resolution was adopted indicating that there should be movement towards this, which has been elusive. I suppose that in the process of your previous deliberations you might have analysed how this process led to diplomatic efforts that were not successful.

In particular, after the 2010 Review Conference a decision was taken to appoint an agreed facilitator—the facilitator was appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations—who conducted a very thorough process of consultations around the region, but unfortunately no positive outcome came out of that. You mentioned that in 2015, the last time round, the issue that possibly made the whole effort fail was, again, finding an adequate form of words to try to revive, to extend, the possibility of this process coming about—basically, having a conference.

This time it is different, because there is a new element: as you may know, at the latest General Assembly there was a decision to hold a conference in New York, probably in November or by the end of the year, to deal with the issue of the denuclearisation of the Middle East. I do not know what will happen at that conference, but apart from what may or may not happen at the review conference it is fair and objective to say that there is another, new, parallel—you can qualify it any way you wish—process.

Clearly we will have to take into consideration what will happen in New York and who will come to this conference. There was a predictable divide
in voting in New York about the decision to hold it. As we speak, it is an open question whether the United States will attend or whether the United Kingdom will take part in the deliberations. Will all the other P5 countries come? Will Israel be there?

There are many open questions, but what is relevant is that there is now a new, added path to this goal to which we all subscribed; we should remember that—it is not an imposition from the Arab group. We all said collectively in 1995 that we should work on a conference to get to this establishment of a nuclear weapons-free or Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the area.

So my answer to the first part of your question would be that, come 2020, we will need to analyse this through the lens of what may or may not have happened at this conference. What will people say? Do people consider this to be the process that should channel all efforts on this, or do people want all of the above: something in the NPT and something for the conference itself? It is as if there is at least a duality of fora to deal with this issue, which is not irrelevant. That is on the Middle East.

The non-NPT countries are of course very relevant to the process. They are not parties to the treaty. They show interest, I must say. In my consultations, I often interact with them—I suppose that will happen more frequently. They follow developments very closely. They regularly say things about the NPT. You mentioned India. Apart from the fact that it has nuclear weapons, India considers that it abides by the spirit of the NPT because it is responsible. I suppose that Pakistan also has things to say about that, and even Israel. They are observers who are quite close to the process. Of course, no one has any illusion that they will join the treaty any time soon, so they are not part of the deliberations.

In the case of North Korea, it is coincidental that we are having this gathering in parallel with the Hanoi summit. I think one can fairly say that the situation looks better than it did back in 2015. We may not be aware of many of the details surrounding the negotiations and consultations with North Korea, but a couple of years ago there was a succession of nuclear tests, every one of a higher yield than the previous one. There were a number of illicit ballistic missile tests that were of enormous global concern. We do not know what the outcome of those negotiations could be, but there is diplomatic activity around the issue—at the bilateral level, granted, but this is an area where, come 2020, we certainly wish to be able to register some progress.

Q137 **Lord Grocott:** We have heard from previous witnesses, fairly obviously I suppose, about the continuing advantages to non-nuclear states of being in the NPT—the sharing of civil use and all the rest of it. At the other end of the spectrum, what are the disadvantages, if any, to states that are not signatories to the NPT of remaining non-signatories? It seems to me that they might as well carry on as things are. Unless some clear advantages become apparent, is it not likely to remain pretty much as it is at present?
**Dr Rafael Grossi:** Thank you for the question. The two parts of it are very relevant. If I have the opportunity, I would like to talk about the advantages for countries of being part of the NPT, because I intend to make that a considerable part of my effort. Especially in the lead-up to the review conference, I will have a number of consultations and regional conferences specifically on that, so we may come back to it.

Talking about the disadvantages, since you take this particular angle, it is very relevant to say that the NPT has been such a success that countries that violate or find themselves in a position marginal to the NPT would have enormous trouble internationally. They would be referred to the Security Council. They would have enormous costs of entry for whatever they may like to do in the peaceful uses area—getting technology and cooperation—let alone the cases where they proliferate or intend to proliferate.

By the way, for North Korea to do what it did, it had to leave the NPT. There was no way in which it could proliferate, because the NPT, in its articulation and in the way it operates in conjunction with the safeguards system administered by the IAEA, makes it very difficult for such countries to go unnoticed. Of course, there was the case of Iraq in the 1990s. We all know about that—it brought about the additional protocol and the ameliorations in the safeguards system that we happily have at the moment. It is clear that being in the NPT for countries in good standing in the international community is an indispensable rule of civility in international life.

Let me start, as one should always do, by citing my own example from my region. After the years of military dictatorship in Argentina and the return of democracy, we saw clearly that we could not sustain a nuclear programme outside the NPT. That raised troublesome questions about our intentions. Of course, there was the fascinating process that we had with our neighbour, Brazil, that led to a joint system of mutual inspections that exists today. All that was done under the aegis of the NPT.

I can say this, because I remember growing up as a young diplomat with a completely different narrative, which held that the NPT was a conspiracy of the haves against the have-nots. That was fantasy and very negative. In a sense, Argentina’s civil nuclear programme thrived after joining all the nuclear regulations and nuclear norms. Argentina is even one of the few exporters of nuclear technology in the southern hemisphere, precisely because we joined the NPT and the export control regimes.

Coming back to India, I happened to preside for two successive terms over the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of 48 countries that harmonise and exchange views on their export policies and controls. One of the big hot potatoes I had in front of me was the intense desire of India and Pakistan to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has as one of its conditions being party to the NPT. That was one reason why the issue was not successful, but the discussion is not completely over.
That tells you the high cost of entry that is put on you when you are not party to the NPT or the existing export control regimes. I am sorry for this digression into regional or national examples, but they show nicely how the NPT actually works. This is the message that I take when I go to developing countries, and it is something that people sometimes do not realise: everything they do in their small research reactor or their nuclear medicine facility, be it in north or southern Africa, central America or south-east Asia, is possible because there is an NPT that allows for it.

The NPT is a service; it is not a big, solemn piece of international law that is out there or up there in disconnect from day-to-day life, particularly in developing countries.

So it has this strategic aspect, which is so important—the Middle East, nuclear disarmament and the pace of disarmament—but it also has this other fundamental aspect, hence the necessity of having a successful outcome that will protect the integrity of a treaty that provides a concrete return, in my opinion.

Q138 **The Chairman:** Ambassador, I see all that, but does it not raise a danger of undermining the central proposition of the NPT, which is that it is legal for five nations to hold nuclear weapons but it is illegal for those who are not the existing five nations to hold them? What you are talking about seems to be a grey area between the two, where there are certain things that these nations can do and so on.

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** There is no grey area. Perhaps this takes us back into history, but the NPT—I am talking in the country of common sense—is common sense applied to international life. At a certain point in time, we came to the conclusion collectively as an international community that there was an issue: a group of countries had nuclear weapons, but there was an enormous risk of the group becoming much bigger. Something had to be done about it. On this, almost no one could argue that the NPT has not been a success in containing the number of countries that hold nuclear weapons to the number—nine or less—that we have now.

You ask, ‘What about the others?’ For the others, there is provision in the treaty. Then we get into the realm of discussion. Are we doing all the necessary things to move to a world free of nuclear weapons? That is to some extent in the eye of the beholder nation. A sizeable group of nations considers that enough has been done or that perhaps more could be done. Other nations—as we know, there are other instruments around now or in the future—consider that more radical measures should be adopted to get there faster.

Q139 **Lord Jopling:** Ambassador, could you give us your thoughts on the relationship between the Ban Treaty and the NPT? Do you see what might be perceived as a rivalry between the two affecting and causing problems at the Review Conference in 2020?

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1 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
**Dr Rafael Grossi:** It is an excellent question, because there is a big debate about this. Quite clearly, the existence of a law that is not in force yet, although it might be by the time we get to the Review Conference, dealing with the same material subject raises questions. This is the case not only now, but even when the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was being negotiated. There is a history, of which I am sure you are aware.

In the resolution from this negotiation, it was specifically indicated that the Ban Treaty should not detract from the NPT but should complement and support it. I do not know the exact form of words that were chosen, but that was the intention—granted, that was only the intention. But then there is the political position of some countries. You will find different views among the countries that support the treaty. For some it is an additional piece of international law that is needed to get there faster; others might have a more dramatic view of things and consider that this is the treaty of the times, given that the NPT is moving at a painfully slow pace in the era of disarmament.

The Review Conference, as I have said and will continue to say, should not be the place to discuss the merits or drawbacks of another agreement. It would be a frustrating and divisive exercise if we went down that road. I say that to both sides of the debate in my position as president-designate. I ask proponents of the TPNW not to bring issues pertaining to the treaty to the review of the NPT. I ask those who have criticised the Ban Treaty harshly to abstain from using the NPT platform for this debate. The Ban Treaty could become detrimental if we allow this to happen. We should be determined and clear-sighted about our mission, which is to review the NPT. I suppose that those in favour of the Ban Treaty will take note of its existence and others will also have something to say.

One of my efforts as president will be to make sure that this will not be a review or debate about the TPNW. I have a lot of respect for countries that have been pushing for that instrument but, as I said, it is a different treaty and the NPT is something else. It will take an effort by all those present and working there to prevent this kind of thing from happening.

I humbly believe that it is in everybody’s interest that this does not happen. It is important that the TPNW believers are not seen as sabotaging the NPT and that those who criticise the TPNW do not destroy any disarmament initiatives. We all have a great interest in talking about the NPT and not about the TPNW.

**Q140 Lord Purvis of Tweed:** Forgive me for saying so, but it sounds to me that you are taking the NATO position, which clearly says that the Ban Treaty is contradictory to any way of making the NPT a success—that is what NATO has said to this Committee. I wonder whether it is an unhelpful position to make an artificial difference between how the states see the issue.

You talked about the Middle East moving towards a Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Free Zone. In the latest P5 Chairman’s report, on the discussions of the P5 and the nuclear powers, the South Asian Weapons-Free Zone is referenced. The countries involved are all signatories of the Ban Treaty. How can you make a distinction between the two, when many of the states that are looking for progress see the deliberations on the Ban Treaty as one of the means of bringing about that progress? I am struggling to understand the argument that they are separate instruments—

Dr Rafael Grossi: Because they are.

Lord Purvis of Tweed: Clearly, but these countries are signatories to both the NPT and the Ban Treaty. They are not separate countries.

Dr Rafael Grossi: First of all, I do not think that what I am saying is the view of NATO. I will not speak for NATO countries, but I think that NATO countries are more eloquent about what the Ban Treaty is and does than I have been.

All I am trying to say is that we need to focus on the review of our treaty. When it comes to disarmament, Article 6 of the NPT has a forward-looking provision, as you will remember, which of course is a different proposition from what is in the TPNW. My task is to review those words. It would be illogical to bring the logic of another treaty that goes for the immediate outright prohibition of nuclear weapons. I am not criticising that; I am simply trying to be objective about the basic aim and provision of the TPNW.

As I said, with the NPT we all took a reality and formulated it in a way that will allow us to operate together, which I suppose is different from what we have in the TPNW. With the TPNW, if you have weapons and want to join the treaty you have to get rid of your weapons, now or through a process. You have to change your nature, your skin.

With the NPT, you do not need to do that. You are there and you commit yourself to doing certain things. In the end, the result is the same, but the way is different. I do not know whether I am making myself a little clearer than I may have been hitherto.

Q141 Baroness Smith of Newnham: We move on to the verification of disarmament, which is one of the issues that the Ban Treaty is keen on; obviously it is keen on nuclear disarmament. We have been told by various witnesses that there has been progress on disarmament. How far has that been the case? How far is it possible to verify that? Is it really leading us towards meeting the commitments of Article 6 of the NPT? Is Article 6 under threat at the moment?

Dr Rafael Grossi: On nuclear verification, we have seen a few interesting initiatives. The UK has been one of the main participants in one of them, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification—the IPNDV. Thank you, Dr Williams, for helping me with the name. Argentina is also part of that.
This is interesting. Apart from the grandiosity of getting rid of nuclear weapons, there is the technical work, which is awfully complicated because of everything that is involved in the process. Exercises such as the IPNDV have been very interesting in trying to bring inspectors together, because when we eventually get into the process of verifying nuclear disarmament it will have to be done through a wider circle of inspectors. I saw this first hand in my days as a chemical weapons disarmer—there were inspectors working on chemical weapons who did not come from countries with the expertise or that ever produced chemical weapons. For nuclear weapons, it is much more complicated, although chemical weapons disarmament is itself very tricky. The good thing about this effort is that it is preparing the ground for when one gets to that point.

This has been very positive. I could cite the analogy of the Nuclear Test Ban treaty. For many years I was a delegate in Geneva, where there was not even a negotiation on a Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty. In those days in Geneva we had a group of scientific experts, the GSE who met regularly and looked into the seismic and other technologies that have now been brought into the CTBTO\(^2\) and the system that it has brought about. In those days, some people were a bit cynical about the effort and the fact that we had a very nice group of scientists meeting in my room in Geneva when there was not even a negotiation on a treaty on that.

So when people say that there has been progress in tackling, or starting to tackle, the technical issues, the methods, the sequences, the technologies, the non-proliferation barriers that you have to set up in order to have a truly multinational inspectorate dealing with nuclear disarmament verification, I think that is true. But, of course, that is what it is. It does not necessarily mean that you are moving forward with actual disarmament, but I would not discount it or discard it at all. It is very useful. The exercise is in fact continuing. I think we are in phase 2 of the IPNDV, and I hope to see this continue.

Your question also has the interesting aspect of allowing me to say that in all these things one always has to be very humble and to work on every part. It is like parallel chess games: you have to be active at all these different tables to be efficient—the international law one, the technical one—because political circumstances change, and when they do they had better catch us ready.

Q142 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could we look at the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which you have played a distinguished role in recent years?

I have a couple of questions about it. Do you think it is adequately resourced for the tasks that are put upon it or might be put upon it in the future? Do you think that the Additional Protocol, which after all was developed because the previous safeguard regime had proved itself to be inadequate, is now a genuine gold standard that should give assurance

\(^2\) The Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organisation
that no untoward activities are taking place in countries that have agreed to, have signed up to, the Additional Protocol? Could you answer those two questions?

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** Thank you for those questions, Lord Hannay. They are very relevant. Quite clearly, the IAEA plays an indisputable and indispensable role in all this.

In terms of resources, having had the privilege of serving the two international agencies dealing with weapons of mass destruction in force—the OPCW\(^3\) in The Hague and the IAEA—I know that secretariats sometimes have a bit of a tendency, as you know as a former ambassador, to push for more resources.

This cuts both ways. In a certain sense when it comes to the IAEA, when you do a very simple accountant’s analysis of the number of facilities and locations outside facilities that come under inspection, and look into the amount of nuclear material that comes under safeguards, you will see an increase. Does that mean that we need an unstoppable degree of resources to be allocated to the IAEA lest we defund it?

It depends. It is reasonably resourced. The JCPOA, for example, has brought a very difficult challenge in additional burdens of work and money that the agency has had to solve through the unorthodox means of extra-budgetary voluntary contributions, which is not very healthy because verification should be on the basis of a regular budget.

This has more to do with the way safeguards will be conducted in the future. I know that you have been looking into certain aspects of new technologies—cyber and other things—in your deliberations, which are very relevant. We are moving into a world where verification and techniques for safeguards should also become more efficient. Of course, member states, in particular those with nuclear weapons, should make sure they keep the agency and every institution dealing with non-proliferation adequately resourced, but it is a two-way street and we should look into more efficient ways.

The Additional Protocol you mentioned is a way to look into this more efficiently. Once you get into integrated safeguards and what in the jargon is called the ‘broader conclusion’, where you feel that a country, by and large and by the amount of inspection work you do, is in good compliance, you can start moderating the inspection effort in that country and you can share your resources more efficiently.

Clearly, and contrary to what one may have thought after Fukushima, nuclear energy continues to be an important factor in the energy matrix of many countries, particularly the big emerging economies such as China, which is constructing 18 new reactors, India, Russia—you name it. It is not going to go away anytime soon.

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\(^3\) The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
We will need to watch that and how we conduct safeguards. Of course, it is a matter not of putting in more and more money, because that is not sustainable as a business model, but also of integrating new technology and getting to the best standards of verification.

**The Chairman:** Thank you. The final question of our discussion comes from Baroness Anelay.

**Q143 Baroness Anelay of St Johns:** Ambassador, thank you for being here today.

In answer to a question about the Ban Treaty you referred to some of the work you hope to do as the president-designate of RevCon. In particular, you said that you would be asking those who have fallen against the Ban Treaty to abstain from using RevCon as a platform for further expanding discussion on it.

In advance of the RevCon, what could the nuclear-weapons states do to help you by building bridges with non-nuclear weapons states? What kind of activity do you think would assist the ability of both sides to avoid using the RevCon for that platform?

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** Thank you for that question. They can do a lot. The P5 are recognised by the NPT as the countries with nuclear weapons. In that group you have no less than three depositaries of the NPT. A depository, for anyone familiar with international law, brings a moral responsibility towards the aims and objectives of the treaty. I intend to consult with the P5 as frequently and intensely as I can. I know that the co-ordination of the NPT efforts of the P5 reverts to the United Kingdom for this year, so I hope I will be able to interact with my colleagues at the Foreign Office to see how they can help me.

While it would be difficult to say in which concrete ways, the P5 need to show engagement with the president, because in the run-up to and during the conference I will bring to them the sentiment of the many and will try to work with them in ways that will, as I said, preserve the integrity and usefulness of the treaty for us all, otherwise there is no sense in even having all this effort. They have a great responsibility in staying engaged, showing unity of purpose and being prepared to listen.

As I said, I will try, as a good president should, to act as an active honest broker and to work as closely as I can with them. As I said, there is a happy coincidence of London being the place where this co-ordination will take place for the remainder of the time after the next PrepCom in New York until the conference proper in 2020. I hope to be able to come to tell you how well I am doing, if I can.

**The Chairman:** Dr Grossi, Ambassador, you have been immensely valuable to us. I think we are all quite struck by your reminder that these sorts of reviews cannot take place in a vacuum and that this time round it is a very different world from last time—

**Dr Rafael Grossi:** It is.
The Chairman: —with the vast expansion of China and a very different America with different policy. Some idealists, including me, thought that Russia would be a member of NATO and a happy democracy by now, which it is very far from being. As you said, the outside world determines how you will get on, but what you have to tell us is positive, focused and valuable to us, and we are very grateful to you.

Dr Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much. I thank you for the opportunity to talk to all of you about this. As you can see, I do not have a magic wand, but I have a clear determination. I know where I want to go: a successful outcome for the review of the treaty. As the Latins used to say, there are no good winds for those who do not know where they want to sail. I know where I want to go. I am helping you, and I thank you for helping me, to do that, and I hope to see more of you in the next few months.

The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.