Written Evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKY 13)

             

 

 

Contents

 

Introduction..................................................................................................................

UK relations with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia

Current UK policy in the Gulf Region

-          Pursuing UK strategic interests

-          Defence Engagement and Counter-Terrorism

-          The role of UK defence and security industry

Origins of the 2015 Yemen Conflict and UK Response

-          The legal basis for the Saudi-led coalition operations

-          Reports of UK arms used in Yemen by Saudi Arabia/Saudi-led coalition

-          Export Licensing and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

-          Political and Humanitarian response

DFID role in export licensing beyond Criterion 8

Annexes:

A:              Previous material laid before Parliament

B:              UK export licensing: The Consolidated Criteria


Introduction

 

CAEC Inquiry: Terms of reference

 

  1. In March 2016 the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) launched an inquiry into the use of UK-manufactured arms in Yemen. Written submissions are invited on the following issues:

 

 

UK relations with Gulf States and Saudi Arabia

 

UK-Gulf Relations

 

  1. The Gulf has mattered to the UK for generations. Founded on mutual interests of trade, commerce and security, our relationships there are amongst our most enduring in the world.

 

  1. As set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)[1], the security and prosperity of the UK and Gulf countries are mutually dependent. Our relations are broad and deep. Gulf countries are key partners for the UK in working towards sustainable, long-term regional stability, in addressing direct threats to the UK from terrorism, extremism and organised crime, and for our energy security. We cooperate closely to counter Daesh and other terrorist groups, promoting stability cross the Middle East and North Africa. In the case of Yemen and Syria, we work closely with Gulf countries in encouraging political solutions to the conflict and providing humanitarian assistance for those affected by the conflicts.

 

  1. The UK has committed to building a permanent and more sustainable UK military presence in the Gulf to reflect our historical partnerships, to recognise the long-term nature of both challenges and opportunities, and to reassure our Gulf allies. Our partnerships with the Gulf also present opportunities for increased trade – the Gulf is currently our 7th largest export market. We are major investors in each others’ countries. Many UK jobs rely on our trade with the Gulf. Around 175,000 Britons call the Gulf their home and a further million visit annually. Hundreds of thousands of Gulf citizens visit Britain each year and over 20,000 study here.

 

UK-Saudi Arabia Relations

 

  1. The United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoy a deep, long-standing history of friendship and co-operation. This extends to areas as diverse as education, healthcare, culture, energy, aid, defence and counter-terrorism, as well as the shared challenges facing the Middle East. 

 

  1. Saudi Arabia is an influential voice in the region and has an essential role to play in resolving conflicts, particularly in Syria and Yemen. The Saudi Government was instrumental in bringing together Syrian opposition groups in Riyadh at the end of 2015 to agree a common political platform and to start to form a negotiating team for UN-brokered peace talks with the Syrian regime. Saudi Arabia has a critical role to play in supporting the UN-brokered political process in Yemen and as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in helping to stabilise and secure the country post-conflict. We welcome the efforts made in recent weeks by the Saudi-led Coalition and the Houthis which have led to a decline in violence, and the Coalition announcement that major combat operations in Yemen are coming to an end. We fully support the UN announcement on 23 March that a ceasefire in Yemen will begin on 10 April, followed by peace talks in Kuwait commencing on 18 April.

 

  1. A strong relationship with Saudi Arabia matters for UK security. It is a key counter-terrorism partner for the UK. It has suffered first-hand from the effects of terrorism and has developed mechanisms to prohibit the promotion of extremist messages within the Kingdom. The Saudi Arabian Government has been at the forefront of international efforts to defeat Daesh, including conducting airstrikes and speaking out against the group’s poisonous ideology. Saudi Arabia has invested significantly in counter-terrorist financing capabilities and is one of the co-leads of the Counter-ISIL Finance Group within the Global Coalition against Daesh. It has also established the Islamic Military Coalition to fight terrorism, working in collaboration with some 40 other nations. 

 

  1. Collaboration between the UK and Saudi Arabia has foiled terrorist attacks, directly saving British lives. British-Saudi co-operation has specifically resulted in the foiling of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks that would have caused substantial destruction and loss of life. An example of this co-operation was the discovery at East Midlands Airport of a “printer bomb” on board a US-bound flight in October 2010. The initial alert came from the Saudi authorities, which have been quick to provide information to protect British interests on this and many other occasions.

 

  1. But there are areas in which we do not agree. On human rights, for example, Saudi Arabia remains a Foreign and Commonwealth Office priority country, not only because of the application of the death penalty, but because of restricted access to justice, women’s rights, and restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion or belief. The UK’s close relationship with Saudi Arabia means that we can have discreet but frank conversations about our human rights concerns and believe this to be a more effective way of promoting positive change. The UK’s position on human rights in Saudi Arabia is a matter of public record and is well understood by the Saudi authorities.

 

  1. The UK’s prosperity relationship with Saudi Arabia is important, but is not the key driver within the relationship. Saudi Arabia is one of the UK’s largest trading partners in the Middle East, and the leading Middle Eastern exporter of goods to the UK. A significant number of British jobs depend on contracts won in the Kingdom, but this does not in any way come at the expense of human rights.

 

Current UK policy in the Gulf Region

 

Pursuing UK strategic interests

 

Terrorism threats

 

  1. The conflict in Yemen has provided opportunities for both Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Daesh in Yemen (Daesh-Yemen) to continue to exploit governance vacuums and continuing instability. The political crisis in Yemen remains extremely concerning, particularly the risk that AQAP and Daesh-Yemen continue to take advantage of the deteriorating situation to consolidate their support base and capabilities in Yemen.

 

  1. We judge that AQAP remain intent on, and capable of, conducting external attacks and pose a significant threat to the UK and UK interests (particularly on aviation security). Throughout 2015, we saw an expansion of Daesh-Yemen, albeit starting from a small base. Despite their growing strength, they remain a threat to UK strategic interests in the region, rather than a direct threat to the UK itself.

 

  1. We have advised British nationals against travel to Yemen since 2011. We assisted the evacuation of some British nationals following the beginning of the Saudi-led airstrikes in March; we do not have an accurate number of British nationals remaining in Yemen.

 

  1. We have previously provided counter-terrorism capacity building support to the Yemeni Security Services to increase their ability to disrupt, detain and prosecute suspected terrorists in line with Yemeni rule of law and international human rights standards. Following the suspension of Embassy operations in Sana’a in February 2015, we have suspended this activity, but we continue to work with regional and international partners to tackle the threat posed by terrorist organisations including AQAP and Daesh-Yemen and to build regional capacity on counter-terrorism (CT). For operational reasons we cannot comment in detail on this activity.

 

 

 

 

Defence Engagement

 

  1. As the SDSR sets out, our defence relationships with the Gulf States will be deepened, including through the deployment of the UK military to support wider HMG initiatives in the region, as well as using defence education and training opportunities. Defence engagement supports the UK’s prosperity and security agendas, building long term strategic partnerships based around Defence sales and shared capabilities. Four objectives underpin our approach:

 

 

The role of UK defence and security industry

 

  1. The defence and security industries manufacture and support the equipment that our Armed Forces, law enforcement, security and intelligence services and our allies and partners use, and make a major contribution to our prosperity. In the UK they employ over 215,000 people, predominantly highly skilled, and support a further 150,000, as well as 6,500 apprentices. In 2014, both industries had a collective turnover of over £30 billion, including defence and security export orders worth £11.9bn.

 

  1. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States represent a significant market opportunity for UK defence and security exports. Of the UK’s total defence exports, which by value are estimated to be in the region of £8.5bn in 2014, 66% of the total were exported to Middle East countries (including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States). Over the period of 2004-2013, the Middle East region has dominated the UK defence export market reflecting the continued importance of the market to the UK, and the high levels of defence expenditure made by the region.[2]

 

  1. Security exports (including cyber security) to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries represents a growing opportunity for UK companies, as the Gulf region seeks to improve its physical and IT and critical infrastructure security measures against terrorism and cyber attacks.

 

Economies of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States

 

  1. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states are facing a challenging economic environment following the collapse in oil prices from over $110 per barrel in mid-2014 to below $30 per barrel earlier this year. Weak demand growth and continued oversupply in the market means prices are expected to remain low (around $40 per barrel) for the rest of 2016.

 

  1. Low oil prices have had a big impact on economic indicators. Saudi Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 13% in 2015 and government finances – which rely heavily on oil revenues – have deteriorated significantly. Saudi Arabia recorded a budget deficit of 15% last year, just three years after posting a 12% surplus. Across the GCC, governments are drawing on financial reserves and/or borrowing to finance budget deficits. The difficult budget situation also exacerbates pre-existing challenges around providing jobs for a growing labour force, diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons and strengthening the private sector. Whilst Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have large sovereign wealth funds to fall back on, the economic challenges are more acute in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia and the need for action more pressing.

 

  1. Governments are taking steps to balance the public finances, such as cutting energy subsidies, trimming government spending and increasing non-oil revenue, but further steps are required to put economies on a more sustainable footing. In the long-term, Gulf economies will need to become more diversified – in terms of GDP composition, exports and government revenue – whilst governments will need to create the conditions for the private sector to expand, including through reform of the labour market, improving education and increasing competitiveness. The UK is supporting Gulf governments in their attempts to reform and is able to offer expertise in a number of areas, including Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects, skills and qualifications, and delivery of public services.

 

  1. As well as being crucial to UK interests in the region via the interplay between economic factors and security, economic stability in the Gulf has a significant bearing on global energy markets. Saudi Arabia accounts for 11% of world oil production and is the leading voice within OPEC. 

 

Origins of the Yemen Conflict

 

  1. The thirty-three year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end in Yemen in November 2011. Saleh resigned under international pressure, with the promise of immunity for himself and regime allies, following almost a year of street protests. The political transition roadmap, known as the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative (GCCI), saw the transfer of the presidency to Abdo Rabo Mansur Hadi, Saleh’s Vice President of fourteen years.

 

  1. The Houthis participated in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) that ran from March 2013 to January 2014 but suffered two assassinations of NDC members. The Houthis’ power in the north had grown steadily in the years after the Sa’dah conflicts (between the Houthis and the Saleh regime, 2004 – 2010). By the time the NDC ended, they had won a series of local conflicts, dramatically increasing their power in north-western Yemen. The Houthis complained that the transition process was not being adhered to and the political situation hit crisis point over the summer of 2014. UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar sought to broker an agreement between the Yemeni parties.

 

  1. However, in September 2014, Houthi forces entered Sana’a. The military that protected Sana’a was still under the influence of the previous Saleh regime, and the ease of the Houthi takeover confirmed for many the (at minimum) informal alliance between the Houthis and Saleh. In January 2015, the Houthis placed President Hadi, Prime Minister Bahah, and eventually Defence Minister Subayhi, under house arrest.

 

  1. In February 2015, the Houthis announced the formation of a governing Supreme Revolutionary Council and the disbanding of the 1994 Constitution in favour of their own Constitutional Declaration. The same month, President Hadi escaped to Aden to re-establish the Government of Yemen there.  Houthi military forces backed by former Republican Guard forces under the command of Saleh and close family members pushed out from Sana’a, taking control of areas in central and southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia warned the Houthis that they would take military action if they extended their military ambitions south of Taiz towards Aden.

 

  1. In March 2015, the Yemeni Air Force, probably under Saleh’s command, bombed the presidential palace in Aden where President Hadi was thought to be residing. Houthi and former Republican Guard forces were also moving towards Aden. At the request of President Hadi, on 26 March 2015 Saudi Arabia began a coalition military intervention to protect and restore the legitimate government of Yemen.  

 

The Legal Basis for the Saudi-led Coalition intervention in Yemen

 

  1. The legal basis for the intervention in Yemen by the Saudi Arabian-led Coalition[3] is host nation consent. President Hadi wrote to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 24 March 2015 requesting a Chapter VII Resolution “inviting all countries that wish to help Yemen to provide immediate support for the legitimate authority by all means and measures to protect Yemen and deter the Houthi aggression”. In that letter, he also informed the Security Council that he had requested assistance from the Arab League and the Gulf Co-operation Council to provide “all means necessary, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from continuing Houthi aggression”. In its Resolution 2216, the UNSC noted President Hadi’s requests for assistance and also reaffirmed its support for “the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi”. President Hadi has therefore requested and consented to Saudi assistance in Yemen in broad terms. As such, that consent provides a legal basis for the Saudi military intervention. 

 

 

Military Support to Saudi Arabia during the conflict in Yemen

 

  1. As the conflict in Yemen escalated in March 2015 the Saudi Government requested additional UK support. After consideration of Saudi needs and the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations the Government has: accelerated delivery of Paveway precision-guided bombs; provided increased training in targeting and weapon use to help improve Saudi processes; provided liaison officers in Saudi headquarters to observe Saudi processes, increase the UK’s insight into the air campaign and help to improve maritime access to Yemeni ports by identifying vessels that may be breaching the arms embargo; and scoped and met Saudi training needs to help strengthen defences at the Saudi southern border which has suffered repeated cross border raids. Further detail is provided below:

 

  1. Munitions and Equipment. The UK continues to provide munitions to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) under existing arrangements. These exports have been assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Exports Licensing Criteria, which underpins one of the most robust arms export control regimes in the world. Alongside military equipment sold to Saudi Arabia we have also provided technical support.

 

  1. Training. We have a longstanding defence engagement relationship with Saudi Arabia. As part of this we have provided training courses and advice and guidance both in the UK and Saudi Arabia. UK training provided to the RSAF since March 2015 has included:

 

 

  1. Liaison Officers. We have deployed a small number of military personnel serving as liaison officers in Saudi Headquarters to exchange information; to observe Coalition processes and increase UK insight into the Coalition’s air campaign; and to help to improve maritime access to Yemeni ports by identifying vessels that may be breaching the arms embargo. The liaison officers remain under UK command and control. These liaison officers are not involved in carrying out strikes, directing or conducting operations in Yemen or selecting targets and are not involved in the Saudi targeting decision-making process.

 

  1. Capacity building. In order for Saudi Arabia to better protect its southern border from significant cross-border raids, the UK has scoped and has provided training to improve co-ordination between Saudi units on the border and their use of some defensive capabilities. To date this has consisted of a seven-man short-term training team which visited Saudi Arabia to provide training in weapons-locating radar and field artillery to the Royal Saudi Land Force. We are currently considering further Saudi training needs for border security to provide a longer-term response to their border security challenges.

 

Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia

 

  1. Under a Government-to-Government Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1986, the UK has supplied the Saudi Armed Forces with a range of military aerospace and naval equipment and services that has included Tornado, Hawk and Typhoon military aircraft, naval Minehunters and weapons, logistics support, training and infrastructure packages. The Government-to-Government agreements are managed by the Ministry of Defence Saudi Armed Forces Projects team (MODSAP) with the delivery of equipment and services contracted through MODSAP onto BAE Systems, the designated Prime Contractor under the 1986 MOU.

 

  1. MODSAP has also provided advice to the RSAF on procurement, support and use of UK-supplied equipment including Tornado and Typhoon aircraft and associated weapons. This involves:

 

  1. Oversight of the performance of BAE Systems in the delivery,  modification, maintenance and support of equipment;
  2. The provision of service-to-service advice on relevant safety, technical and operational doctrine and developments and guidance on UK best practice; and
  3. The provision of service-to-service advice on training developments and oversight of the performance of BAE Systems in delivering technical and aircrew training to the RSAF in Saudi Arabia.

 

  1. Under these long-standing arrangements, the above support for the Saudi Typhoon and Tornado fleets includes support for aircraft deployed on operations over both Yemen and Syria, but UK personnel are not permitted or required to participate in such operations. For example, MODSAP and BAE Systems personnel have not loaded weapons for operational sorties, nor have they been involved in the planning of operational sorties. It is worth noting that British personnel are not involved in carrying out strikes, directing or conducting operations in Yemen or selecting targets and are not involved in the Saudi targeting decision-making process.

 

  1. UK companies provide a range of military and dual-use equipment and services to Saudi Arabia under commercial agreements. In the first three quarters of 2015, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) granted 249 Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)[4] for Saudi Arabia, of which 138 licences were for military goods with a value given by exporters of £2.7bn. Details of export licences granted and refused are published quarterly and annually as Official Statistics by BIS which are available on-line.

 

  1. The table below summarises the number and value of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) granted in 2013, 2014 and the first three Quarters of 2015. Some points to note:

 

    1. The figures relate to licences granted in the specified period. They do not necessarily represent the volume or value of sales of equipment nor do they represent the value of goods actually shipped in that period. 
    2. The wide variation in yearly values for licences for military goods is accounted for by a small number of very large-value licences. In 2013, one licence for export of combat aircraft accounted for approximately £1.5bn of the total; because the goods had not been shipped by the time the licence expired a further licence of a similar value was granted in Q2 2015. There is therefore an element of double counting in these values.
    3. In addition, one licence was granted in Q3 2015 for almost £1bn of air-to-air missiles and related equipment. This relates to a long-term contract for the delivery of a new munitions capability over a number of years and has no direct relationship to current operations by the Royal Saudi Air Force in Yemen.
    4. The vast majority of licences for dual-use items in the table below are for two specific categories of equipment: (i) corrosion resistant manufacturing equipment (e.g. pumps, valves, etc.) for use in industries such as oil and gas and petrochemicals (279 licences); and (ii) equipment and software employing encryption for information security (125 licences). Together these items accounted for 87% of all dual-use licences granted.

 

Year

Military items

Dual-Use items

 

No. of SIELs

Value (£)

No. of SIELs

Value (£)

2013

128

1.6bn

175

22m

2014

129

80m

181

55m

Q1-Q3 2015

138

2.7bn

111

102m

 

 

Reports of UK arms used in Yemen by Saudi Arabia/Coalition

 

  1. UK-built and licensed Typhoon and Tornado aircraft from the Royal Saudi Air Force have been deployed on combat missions in the Yemen campaign. UK- sourced weapons (including Paveway precision-guided bombs and small numbers of Dual Mode Brimstone and Storm Shadow missiles) have also been used. In addition, we have in the past supplied the UAE with PGM 500 precision-guided bombs (also known as the Hakim 2) that have also been used in the conflict.  

 

Licensing Considerations and Consolidated Criteria: International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

 

UK export licensing regime

 

  1. The UK Government takes its arms export responsibilities very seriously and operates one of the most robust arms export control regimes in the world. All export licence applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria[5], taking account of all relevant factors at the time of the application.

 

  1. A licence will not be issued, for any country, if to do so would be inconsistent with any provision of the mandatory Criteria, including where we assess there is a clear risk that the items to be licensed might be used in the commission of a serious violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The Government is currently satisfied that extant licences for Saudi Arabia are compliant with the UK’s export licensing criteria.

 

Allegations of IHL violations

 

  1. We take all allegations of IHL violations very seriously. We continue to monitor the situation closely, seeking further information where appropriate. The MOD monitors and analyses allegations of IHL violations arising from air strikes in Yemen conducted by the Coalition. Allegations are identified from a range of sources. This includes UN agencies and officials, European Parliament and reports of NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. It also includes additional sources such as open source media reports including social media, foreign governments, the FCO, the British Embassy in Riyadh and the Department for International Development (DFID) and open source and classified reports.

 

  1. In carrying out its analysis the MOD has access to a wide range of information including: Saudi-led Coalition operational reporting data; imagery; and other reports and assessments, including UK Defence Intelligence reports and some battle damage assessment.

             

  1. We regularly raise the importance of compliance with International Humanitarian Law with the Saudi Government and other members of the military coalition. We have also raised this with the Houthis. It is important to determine the facts of any incident. We have provided training and advice to the Coalition to support continued compliance with IHL and minimise civilian casualties.

 

  1. Saudi Arabia has mounted investigations into incidents of concern including specifically the investigation into the air-strike on a Médecins Sans Frontières health facility in Sa’ada Province on 25 October 2015, as reported in a Saudi press conference of 31 January 2016. We have also been briefed on the findings of several preliminary investigations conducted by the Saudi Government. These investigations are considered to indicate preparedness on the part of Saudi Arabia to learn lessons from incidents of concern, including specifically those in which civilian casualties occurred.

 

  1. On 1 February 2016, the Saudi Government issued a statement reaffirming its respect, commitment and compliance with the rules of IHL, reaffirming that “all possible measures” are taken to protect all civilians in Yemen, and noting the establishment of an independent high level team of civilian and military experts to assess reported incidents of civilian casualties, investigation procedures and mechanisms of precision targeting. An additional investigation team is currently being established to liaise with the Yemeni National Committee, as detailed in the statement of the Saudi Permanent Mission to the UN on 1 February 2016.

 

  1. On 15 March 2016, the Coalition committed to investigating an attack on the marketplace in Mastaba, Haijah province.

 

  1. We are aware of reports of the alleged use of Cluster Munitions by the Coalition in Yemen. We have raised this with the Saudi Arabian authorities and, in line with our obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, continue to encourage Saudi Arabia, as a non-party to the Convention, to accede to it.

 

  1. In particular we note that: (1) the Saudi-led Coalition is not targeting civilians; (2) Saudi Arabian processes and procedures have been put in place to ensure respect for the principles of IHL; (3) Saudi Arabia is investigating incidents of concern, including those involving civilian casualties; (4) Saudi Arabia has throughout engaged in constructive dialogue with the UK about both its processes and incidents of concern; (5) Saudi Arabia has been and remains genuinely committed to IHL compliance. The Government is currently satisfied that extant licences for Saudi Arabia are compliant with the UK’s export licensing criteria. We continue to urge all sides to the conflict to conduct thorough and conclusive investigations into all incidents where it is alleged that IHL has been breached.

 

Legal Challenge

 

  1. Leigh Day solicitors, acting on behalf of Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), wrote to the Business Secretary on 8 January requesting a suspension of extant licences and a halt to the granting of new licences for military equipment for Saudi Arabia; to which the Government provided a response.

 

  1. Leigh Day then issued proceedings on 9 March seeking permission for a judicial review, challenging the decision of the Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills not to suspend extant export licences for the sale or transfer of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia, and to continue to grant new licences for the sale or transfer of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia. No decision has yet been taken by the Court as to whether permission should be granted, but a decision is imminent.

 

Political and Humanitarian response

 

Political Response

 

  1. A political solution is the best way to bring long-term stability to Yemen and end the conflict. We are supporting the UN’s efforts through diplomatic channels for the resumption of an inclusive political process and are providing financial support to the UN Special Envoy’s office (£1.05m).

 

  1. We fully support the UN announcement on 23 March that a ceasefire in Yemen is due to begin on 10 April, followed by peace talks in Kuwait scheduled to commence on 18 April. We welcomed and fully supported the UN-facilitated talks, and accompanying ceasefire, held in Switzerland between 15 and 20 December 2015. The FCO Minister for the Middle East, Mr Tobias Ellwood MP regularly engages with the UN Special Envoy and President Hadi, including speaking to President Hadi in the run up to and during the talks in December, to encourage commitment to the political process and to respect the ceasefire. Our Ambassador to Yemen was present at the last round of talks in December and has been active in supporting the UN Special Envoy in his efforts with the Government of Yemen and Houthi/General People’s Congress (GPC) delegation, for example supporting economic confidence-building measures and the de-escalation committee to monitor a future ceasefire.

 

  1. We are also working to support the peace process through the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). In addition to financial support to the office of the UN Special Envoy to increase its capacity to facilitate peace talks and develop confidence building measures, we are also supporting a Track II dialogue project which aims to broaden the peace process – and are planning a project which supports the greater inclusion of women into the peace process and wider political dialogue. The UK is also funding a project with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to help rebuild the capacity of national mine action infrastructure and support survey and mine clearance work.

 

  1. Mr Tobias Ellwood chaired a meeting at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2015 to encourage all parties to support the UN political process to achieve lasting peace. Discussions also focused on the dire humanitarian situation, with the UK continuing to call for all sides to facilitate access for humanitarian aid and commercial goods, including through all of Yemen’s ports, and the need to protect civilians. Attendees also discussed the importance of establishing a secure environment as part of Yemen’s stabilisation and recovery. The Secretary of State for International Development also co-chaired a humanitarian side-event at UNGA in 2015. The event raised the profile of the humanitarian situation, provided a forum to discuss some of the key operational challenges, and encouraged additional funding from donors.

 

  1. The UK is the penholder in the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Yemen. We played an instrumental role in the drafting a number of UNSC Resolutions in 2015 and also managed the technical rollover of the Sanctions Resolution which established and extended the regime to renew travel bans and assets freezes against spoilers in Yemen until February 2017.

 

  1. The UK is not a member of the Saudi Arabian-led Coalition and British military personnel are not directly involved in the Saudi-led Coalition’s operations.  We do not have any embedded personnel taking part in the Saudi-led operations in Yemen. All personnel remain under UK command and control. The UK has been using diplomatic and military channels to engage with Saudi Arabia on compliance with IHL.

 

  1. At a ministerial level the Foreign Secretary has engaged with his Saudi counterpart on the importance of compliance with IHL, most recently in February 2016 but also throughout 2015 including a call in December 2015, a visit to the region in October 2015 and a meeting in August 2015. This year Mr Ellwood has exchanged correspondence on IHL compliance with the Saudi Ambassador and visited the region in January 2016. Most recently the Defence Secretary also discussed the issue with his counterpart in Riyadh on 28 March 2016.

 

Humanitarian Response

 

  1. The UN declared Yemen a Level 3 crisis on 1 July 2015, a category reserved for the most serious and complex crises. According to the UN, there are now an estimated 21.2 million people or 82% of the population requiring some form of humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs and/or protect their fundamental rights. A fifth of the world’s total population in need of humanitarian aid live in Yemen.

 

  1. Given the recent conflict and severity of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, DFID has refocused its programme in Yemen on meeting humanitarian needs. We have more than doubled our humanitarian funding to Yemen over the last year, from £37.5 million in 2014/15 to £85 million for 2015/16, making the UK the 4th largest donor to the humanitarian crisis. We are funding priority needs of food, nutrition, water, health, and emergency shelter, as well as improving the overall capacity of the international humanitarian community to respond to the crisis and supporting the work of the UN to co-ordinate the humanitarian response and to fund the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism.

 

  1. Since the start of 2015, the UK has so far helped more than 1.3 million Yemenis by providing amongst other things, food, medical supplies, water, and emergency shelter to those most in need. Our funding is going to the World Food Programme, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and NGOs operating on the ground both directly and via the UN’s Humanitarian Pooled Fund. We have also started planning for stabilisation and post-conflict recovery to lay the foundation for longer-term development.

 

  1. It has been clear from the beginning of the recent conflict that emergency assistance can only address a fraction of the humanitarian needs in Yemen. Commercial imports and functioning markets are critical as Yemenis are highly reliant on imports of fuel, food, and medical supplies for their basic needs. Although there has been an improvement in recent months, imports have been severely restricted by the conflict and have varied month on month; food and fuel prices have fluctuated as a result of shortages. DFID is providing £1.42 million for the new UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism which will verify and, where necessary, inspect ships to ensure illicit goods do not enter Yemen, in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. This should facilitate a faster and more transparent clearance process, which we hope will give commercial shippers confidence and reduce the price of basic goods.

 

  1. The conflict has also made humanitarian access difficult within Yemen and hampers the humanitarian community’s ability to assess needs and scale up the response. The UK has publicly called on all parties to the conflict to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect civilians and take all reasonable steps to allow and facilitate rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access throughout the country.

 

  1. As part of a broader UK strategy and working closely with other Government Departments, DFID has had four strategic priorities since the start of the recent conflict:

 

 

  1. We continue to believe that the best way to improve commercial and humanitarian access and the protection of civilians is a permanent and sustainable ceasefire: it would transform humanitarian access, enabling humanitarian partners to rapidly scale up activities. The UK fully supports the UN’s efforts to achieve this.

 

DFID Role in export licensing beyond Criterion 8

 

  1. The ToRs asks the following question: Should DfID’s formal involvement in granting arms export licences be extended to consider the impact on the sustainable development of both the recipient country and countries where British arms may ultimately be used?

 

  1. DFID is responsible for Criterion 8. This considers the compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.

 

  1. Assessments against the other Criteria are the responsibility of the FCO and MOD. It is unnecessary to duplicate this responsibility in DFID.

 

 

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

8 APRIL 2016

A:              Previous material laid before Parliament

 

UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain: The Foreign Affairs Committee conducted an inquiry into the FCO's foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, in the broader context of relations between the UK and the Gulf States. They published their Report on 22 November 2013 and received the Government response on 22 January 2014 (link below).

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-house-of-commons-foreign-affairs-committees-fifth-report-of-session-2013-2014-hc888

 


B:              UK Export Licensing: The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria: 25 March 2014

 

Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable) : Tuesday 25 March 2014

 

Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria

 

The UK’s defence industry can make an important contribution to international security, as well as provide economic benefit to the UK. The legitimate international trade in arms enables Governments to protect ordinary citizens against terrorists and criminals, and to defend against external threats. The Government remain committed to supporting the UK’s defence industry and legitimate trade in items controlled for strategic reasons.

 

But we recognise that in the wrong hands arms can fuel conflict and instability and facilitate terrorism and organised crime. For this reason it is vital that we have robust and transparent controls which are efficient and impose the minimum administrative burdens in order to enable the defence industry to operate responsibly and confidently.

 

The Government’s policy for assessing applications for licences to export strategic goods and advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence was set out on behalf of the then Foreign Secretary on 26 October 2000,Official Report, column 199W. Since then there have been a number of significant developments, including:

 

-          the entry into force of the Export Control Act 2002

 

-          the application of controls to electronic transfers of software and technology and to trade (brokering) in military goods between overseas destinations

 

-          the adoption by the EU of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment

 

-          further development of EU export control law, including: the adoption of Council regulation (EC) 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community; and the re-cast Council regulation (EC) 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items

 

-          the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 of an international arms trade treaty, which the UK signed on 3 June 2013.

 

The Government believe that the procedures for assessing licence applications and our decision-making processes are robust and have stood the test of time. We also believe that the eight criteria continue adequately to address the risks of irresponsible arms transfers and are fully compliant with our obligations under the EU common position and the arms trade treaty.

 

Nevertheless it is appropriate to update these criteria in light of developments over the last 13 years. In particular: the list of international obligations and commitments in criterion 1 has been updated; there is explicit reference to international humanitarian law in criterion 2; and the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer is now addressed under criterion 7 rather than criterion 5. There are also minor changes to improve the clarity and consistency of the language used throughout the text. None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.

 

These criteria will be applied to all licence applications for export, transfer, trade (brokering) and transit/transhipment of goods, software and technology subject to control for strategic reason—referred to collectively as “items”; and to the extent that the following activities are subject to control, the provision of technical assistance or other services related to those items. They will also be applied to MOD form 680 applications and assessment of proposals to gift controlled equipment.

 

As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application is assessed. While the Government recognise that there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the following criteria, we will not refuse a licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of those criteria.

 

In making licensing decisions I will continue to take into account advice received from FCO, MOD, DFID, and other Government Departments and agencies as appropriate. The Government’s strategic export controls annual reports will continue to provide further detailed information regarding policy and practice in strategic export controls.

 

The application of these criteria will be without prejudice to the application to specific cases of specific criteria as may be announced to Parliament from time to time; and will be without prejudice to the application of specific criteria contained in relevant EU instruments.

 

This statement of the criteria is guidance given under section 9 of the Export Control Act. It replaces the consolidated criteria announced to Parliament on 26 October 2000.

 

 

 

 

 

 

CRITERION ONE

 

Respect for the UK’s international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

 

The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

 

a) the UK’s obligations and its commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;

b) the UK’s obligations under the United Nations arms trade treaty;

c) the UK’s obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the biological and toxin weapons convention and the chemical weapons convention;

d) the UK’s obligations under the United Nations convention on certain conventional weapons, the convention on cluster munitions (the Oslo convention), the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, and the convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction (the Ottawa convention) and the Land Mines Act 1998;

e) the UK’s commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the missile technology control regime, the Zangger committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar arrangement and The Hague code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation;

f) the OSCE principles governing conventional arms transfers and the European Union common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

 

CRITERION TWO

 

The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.

 

Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

 

a) not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression;

b) exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the European Union;

c) not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

 

For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end use or end user and used for internal repression.

 

The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the universal declaration on human rights and the international covenant on civil and political rights.

 

In considering the risk that items might be used for internal repression or in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children.

 

CRITERION THREE

 

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

 

The Government will not grant a licence for items which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

 

CRITERION FOUR

 

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

 

The Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the items aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim.

 

When considering these risks, the Government will take into account, inter alia:

a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;

b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;

c) the likelihood of the items being used other than for the legitimate national

security and defence of the recipient;

d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension.

 

 

 

CRITERION FIVE

 

The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK’s responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

 

The Government will take into account:

 

a) the potential effect of the proposed transfer on the UK’s defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;

b) the risk of the items being used against UK forces or against those of other territories and countries as described above;

c) the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.

 

CRITERION SIX

 

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

 

The Government will take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

 

a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;

b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;

c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in criterion one.

 

CRITERION SEVEN

 

The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

 

In assessing the impact of the proposed transfer on the recipient country and the risk that the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, the Government will consider:

 

a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;

b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the items;

c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;

d) the risk of re-export to undesirable destinations and, as appropriate, the record of the recipient country in respecting re-export provisions or consent prior to re-export;

e) the risk of diversion to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;

f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

CRITERION EIGHT

 

The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

 

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

 

The Government will consider in this context the recipient country’s relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.

 

OTHER FACTORS

 

Article 10 of the EU common position specifies that member states may, where appropriate, also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the common position.

 

The Government will thus continue when considering licence applications to give full weight to the UK’s national interest, including:

 

a. the potential effect on the UK’s economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;

b) the potential effect on the UK’s international relations;

c) the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;

d) the protection of the UK’s essential strategic industrial base.

In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.

 

 

March 2016

17

 

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015

 

[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/444359/20150710_-_Defence_and_Security_Export_Statistics_for_2014_-_Core_Slides.pdf

[3] The other States forming the Coalition are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates.

[4] A SIEL is typically valid for up to two years and the export may be made at any time within those two years. In some cases not all – or indeed any – of the goods licensed for export are actually exported; in such cases the exporter may apply for a new licence.

 

[5] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmquad/186/186ii20.htm