Written evidence from Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (SYR0005)
Background Briefing: Main Factions in Syria
Regime side
Syrian forces
Syrian Arab Army
National Defence Forces[1]
Popular Committees
The Syrian Resistance[2]
Ba’ath Brigades
The National Ideological Resistance (Syrian Hezbollah)[3]
Quwat al-Ridha (Syrian Hezbollah)[4]
Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya[5]
Al-Ghalibun: Saraya al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fi Souriya[6]
Nusur al-Zawba’a (Syrian Social Nationalist Party: SSNP)[7]
Coastal Shield[8]
Liwa Suqur al-Quneitra[9]
Jaysh al-Karama[10]
Arab Nationalist Guard[11]
Lebanese militias
Hezbollah[12]
Iraqi Shi’a militias
Harakat al-Nujaba[13]
Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’[14]
Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar[15]
Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein
Rapid Intervention Regiment
Assad Allah al-Ghalib Forces
Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces
Kata’ib al-Imam Ali[16]
Other foreign Shi’a militias
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps[17]
Liwa al-Fatemiyoun[18]
Liwa Zainabiyoun[19]
Pro-regime Palestinian factions
PFLP- General Command[20]
Liwa al-Quds[21]
Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Falastini[22]
Druze factions: Suwayda province
Dir’ al-Watan (pro-Assad)[23]
Rijal al-Karama (more third-way leaning: Sheikh Bal’ous)[24]
Pro-regime Christian factions
Sootoro[25]
Tel Tamur Guards/Khabur Forces[26]
Gozarto Protection Forces[27]
Opposition
Jihadi Factions
Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria)[28]
Jund al-Aqsa[29]
Jabhat Ansar al-Din[30]
Turkestan Islamic Party[31]
Junud al-Sham[32]
Salahuddin Shishani’s Caucasus Emirate in Syria[33]
Jaysh Muhammad[34]
Ansar al-Islam[35]
Ajnad al-Qawqaz[36]
Islamist- north Syria
Remainder of Jaysh al-Fatah besides Jabhat al-Nusra & Jund al-Aqsa: Ahrar al-Sham[37]; Faylaq al-Sham[38] et al.
Ansar al-Khilafa[39]
Levant Front[40]
Jaysh al-Mujahideen[41]
Thuwar al-Sham[42]
Nour al-Din al-Zinki Movement[43]
U.S.-backed- north Syria
Fursan al-Haq[44]
Division 30
Other
Al-Fawj al-Awal[45]
Islamist- south Syria
Jaysh al-Islam[46]
Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham[47]
Faylaq al-Rahman[48]
Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islamiya[49]
Jamaat Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya[50]
Jabhat Ansar al-Islam[51]
Jaysh al-Fatah- South: incl. Jabhat al-Nusra & Ahrar al-Sham
Western-backed Free Syrian Army
Southern Front[52]
Pro-IS factions in south
Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk[53]
Jaysh al-Jihad[54]
Kurds and allies
YPG,[55] YPJ,[56] Jabhat al-Akrad[57] and allied Burkan al-Furat rebel coalition[58]
Sutoro[59] and Syriac Military Council (part of YPG).
Islamic State
Islamic State provinces in Syria: Raqqa, Aleppo, Hama, Khayr [Deir az-Zor], Baraka [Hasakah], Homs, Damascus, ‘Euphrates’ (eastern Deir az-Zor spanning into western Anbar in Iraq).
Raqqa city serves as the de facto capital. Each province (wilaya) has a governor with his office (Diwan al-Wali).
No established presence in Idlib or Latakia provinces (where it previously had in 2013; withdrew in early 2014 amid fighting with rebels).
Islamic State acts as a government with numerous ministries (Diwans)
Diwan | Function |
Ta’lim | Education |
Khidamat | Public Services: cleaning of streets, electricity, sewage etc. |
Rikaz | ‘Precious resources’: oil, gas, antiquities |
Zakat wa Sadaqat | Charity distributions for the poor; takes zakat tax from locals to do this |
Jund | Military |
Siha | Health |
Qada wa Mazalim | Judiciary: Islamic court, real estate etc. |
Hisba | Islamic police, enforcing public morality, consumer standards |
‘Ilam | Media |
Da’wa wa Masajid | Proselytization, control of mosques |
Asha’ir | Tribes |
Alaqat Aama | Public Relations |
Amn | Public security (e.g. monitors internet usage) |
Zara’a | Agriculture and environment |
Bayt al-Mal | Finance |
Eftaa wa Buhuth | Fatwas, training camp textbooks |
al-Khilafa/General Supervisory Committee | Central cabinet |
This comprehensive bureaucracy provides ample sources of revenue through taxation, fines for violations of regulations etc. This flow of money will continue so long as the Islamic State is not completely shut off to the outside world. Oil revenues are only part of the story: targeting them in airstrikes will not be fatal to the Islamic State financially, which has partly raised taxes in response anyway.
On training camps and military divisions http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/06/islamic-state-training-camps-and-military
Also a number of foreign fighter divisions, e.g.
Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Battalion: Gazan
Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi: Libyan
General Assessments of the Syrian Civil War
1. The Assad regime mostly finds itself on the defensive, consolidating what remains of the rump state in western Syria, amid attrition and manpower shortages with growing resistance to conscription: this is what prompted the creation of new militias like Dir’ al-Watan in Suwayda and Coastal Shield in Latakia: to recruit those who have avoided conscription and focus on defence of the rump state. The need for ‘strategic withdrawal’ from certain areas has already been admitted. At the same time the regime wants to maintain a presence in as many provincial capitals as possible: hence the small presence far out in Deir az-Zor city; and the thin corridors stretching to Deraa city in the far south and Aleppo in the north.
2. Regime’s main foreign backers- Russia and Iran- are stepping up military support for the regime, with the most recent development being the sightings of Russian personnel and fighter jets in Syria. While diplomatic engagement on the outside has increased, it is clear both countries are not prepared to jettison Assad at the present time, preferring to help consolidate the rump state and guarantee their interests through its maintenance. The main foreign militias deployed to Syria- Hezbollah et al.- also show no sign of ‘war weariness’ regarding their own efforts. In compensation for the withdrawal of many Iraqi Shi’a fighters to their home front to take on the Islamic State, increased deployments of Afghan and Pakistani Shi’a fighters, but lack the same experience as Iraqi fighters and seem to act primarily as cannon fodder.
3. One should recognize that regime forces constitute multiple armed actors, all of whom are seeking to build their own spheres of influence in the regime rump state (thus e.g. ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ and the SSNP).
4. The most successful rebel coalition has been Jaysh al-Fatah in Idlib province, backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. But it is highly problematic for its inclusion of factions like Jabhat al-Nusra and Jund al-Aqsa. Jabhat al-Nusra has used its role and influence in Idlib to impose more hardline aspects of its agenda (e.g. forced conversion of the Druze in Idlib) with other rebel groups unable to seriously oppose Jabhat al-Nusra in these regards.
5. In any case, the opposition as a whole is still too fragmented by multiple chains of commands and coalitions: the formation and subsequent fracturing of the Levant Front in Aleppo is emblematic of this problem. Envisioning a unified chain of command is a very remote prospect.
6. The war against the Islamic State is at a strategic stalemate. While strong coalition air support for the YPG- an effective ground force and reliable ally- has helped remove Islamic State control over the key northern border town of Tel Abyad and drove back the Islamic State offensive on Hasakah city, allowing the YPG to consolidate control over most of the city also at the expense of regime control, the Islamic State has made gains elsewhere against the regime in Homs desert, most recently capturing th and continues to press hard on the remainder of rebel-held north Aleppo countryside, setting its sights on the border town of Azaz (which it once held before withdrawing eastwards in early 2014) and the Bab al-Salama border crossing. The rebels here mostly find themselves on the defensive, and complain of lack of sufficient coalition air support and lack of support from Turkey. Despite all the talk of plans for a ‘safe zone’, it seems conflicting U.S. and Turkish interests- the latter primarily aiming to prevent the YPG moving westward from Kobani and connecting with Afrin in northwest Aleppo province, a concern shared by the rebels- as well as reluctance for ground intervention are hindering any practical implementation.
7. Internally, the Islamic State faces no serious challenges to its rule, having a rigid security apparatus able to put down internal dissent and rebellion with ruthless efficiency. The comprehensive bureaucracy- for all its shortcomings- brings a sense of order, and no one has yet been able to propose an alternative to it. Additionally, the issue of stopping flow of money is impossible to achieve from the outside, short of an intervention that takes on the Islamic State on the ground and dismantles its state structure. In short, there is no ground force capable of taking the fight to the Islamic State’s heartlands in central Raqqa, southern Hasakah province, Homs desert and Deir az-Zor province.
8. Talk of a ‘political solution’ in Syria under the present circumstances needs to appreciate the huge obstacles: variety of actors, their concerns and conflicting goals etc. No side has a vision that can actually bring a settlement amenable to everyone. One needs to think of the timescale of conflict and instability in decades.
9. If no international coalition is willing to deploy a large-scale ground force and engage in a monumental nation-building task, then a problem policy-wise is conflict of stated policy goals and current practical steps amount to. Current rhetoric suggests the Islamic State is an imminent, existential threat that must be destroyed, but present policies actually amount to containment.
10. If any additional viable policy recommendations can be made, then the best step right now would be the imposition of a no-fly zone in Syria. At the minimum, on a humanitarian level, this will help reduce civilian suffering and damage to what remains of Syria’s infrastructure amid indiscriminate regime air strikes. Further, a no-fly zone can reduce the Islamic State’s appeal by damaging its narrative that it is the most viable protector of Sunnis in Syria. On the more local front, I would recommend a more intense effort in airstrikes on the north Aleppo front to drive back the Islamic State’s offensive. The presence of Jabhat al-Nusra is now greatly reduced on this front, and the main rebel actor working to push back the Islamic State on this front (the Levant Front) is worthy of engagement and air support, based on the author’s own experiences in north Aleppo countryside in late 2014.
11. Much controversy surrounds engagement with Ahrar al-Sham, perhaps the largest single rebel actor in Syria. This author’s view is that the group remains too problematic for its close coordination with and ennabling of Nusra, as well as significant hardline elements that only perpetuate sectarian polarization etc. In the event of the imposition of no-fly zone, any proposed engagement would have to be conditional on intense pressure to break off coordination with Nusra. At the same time, risks accompany such steps as Ahrar members may defect to and strengthen Nusra further in terms of manpower and influence on the ground.
Further Resources
http://www.aymennjawad.org
7 September 2015
[1] Trained and advised by Iran and Hezbollah. Designed to incorporate Popular Committees and other early pro-regime militias. Predominantly Alawite but also recruits from other minorities (incl. Druze and Christian) as well as many Sunnis in Aleppo.
[2] Home-base in Latakia, but also participated in Idlib fighting, Aleppo and Sahl al-Ghab. Mostly Alawite. Limited presence in Damascus.
[3] Home-base in Tartous and western Hama with Shi’a and Alawite recruits: fights mainly in Hama and Aleppo. Coordinates with Hezbollah.
[4] Recruits mainly from the Syrian Shi’a of Homs province, developed by Hezbollah first in Homs, and subsequent engagements in Aleppo, Palmyra, Idlib and Damascus.
[5] Mainly recruits from the Syrian Shi’a of Damascus. Has links to foreign Shi’a militias like Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’. Named for the Ruqayya Shi’a shrine in Damascus. Also called the ‘Ja’afari Force’
[6] Similar to Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya.
[7] Has fought on most fronts involving regime forces: has particularly popular appeal to Christians in Homs province.
[8] Latakia-based: front for Republican Guard designed to recruit those who evaded military service, focusing on defending the province.
[9] Local outfit in Quneitra coordinating with Syrian army. Helps defend al-Ba’ath city and other parts of the province still under regime control.
[10] Pro-regime tribesmen in Hasakah province.
[11] Recruits from native Syrians as well as Nasserite pan-Arab nationalists from Egypt and Lebanon etc. Mainly fights in Damascus area but also engagements in Aleppo.
[12] Currently claims a role on all fighting fronts involving regime forces: most important engagements have included Homs, Aleppo, Damascus and Qalamoun areas. Has also helped cultivate and lead other Shi’a militias (e.g. Quwat al-Ridha: Syrian Hezbollah) and played key advisory role for Iraqi Shi’a militias.
[13] Iranian proxy. First emerged in 2013 with formations like Liwa Ammar ibn al-Yasir. Most notably involved now on Aleppo front but claims involvement in Idlib, Latakia, Damascus, Hama and even Hasakah. Also fights in Iraq.
[14] Iranian proxy. Also emerged in 2013: now involved mainly in Damascus and Deraa areas, including the failed Deraa-Quneitra offensive earlier this year. Also fights in Iraq.z
[15] Close links/overlap with Assad Allah al-Ghalib Forces, Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, Rapid Intervention Regiment and Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein: primarily splinters from Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement supported by Iran (many were veterans of Jaysh al-Mehdi). Engagements primarily in Damascus area (most recently also Zabadani), but also engagements and building links with pro-Assad forces in Latakia province. Other areas of operation: Deraa and Quneitra provinces.
[16] First emerged in Iraq as part of ‘Hashd Sha’abi’: expanded to Syria in Damascus area in summer this year. Linked to Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who coordinates pro-Iranian militia/proxy efforts in Iraq.
[17] Over 100 personnel have died fighting in Syria.
[18] Mostly Afghan Shi’a Hazara refugees in Iran recruited by the IRGC. Participated in the failed Deraa-Quneitra offensive earlier this year.
[19] Mostly Pakistani Shi’a residing in Iran, also recruited by the IRGC: newest formation of foreign Shi’a fighters to have emerged.
[20] Has presence in Aleppo and Damascus but has failed to retake Yarmouk refugee camp from the Islamic State.
[21] Recruits from Palestinian refugee camps of Handarat and Nayrab. Engagements in Aleppo and Idlib.
[22] Primarily fights in the Damascus area but also deployments in Suwayda province. Most recent engagement: Zabadani.
[23] Competing with Bal’ous’ faction for influence amid growing Druze resistance to conscription into Syrian armed forces: led by army veterans and two pro-Assad mashayakh: Jerbo and Hanawi. Also works alongside other pro-Assad factions in Suwayda like SSNP.
[24] Bal’ous and a number of his associates were assassinated in a bomb attack in Suwayda on 4 September. Likely some pro-Assad actors perceived him as a threat though his agenda was more focused on reform and greater autonomy. Number of militias came under his banner in a variety of Suwayda villages: Bayraq al-Basha, Bayraq Al Nu’aim. Rijal al-Karama has vowed to continue operating.
[25] Based in Qamishli. Break-off from the Syriac Union Party’s Sutoro. Promotes Syriac Christian identity.
[26] Assyrian Christian militias
[27] Joint project between Sootoro and the Tel Tamur Guards/Khabur Forces
[28] Strongest presence in Idlib province, where it controls a number of northern towns. Played an important role in taking of Idlib city and other major towns from regime forces. Has judicial body: Dar al-Qada; and services administration. But degree of governance is not consistent: as part of the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition it has also formed a joint judicial council. Most opposition factions coordinate with Jabhat al-Nusra, despite its weaker presence in the far south of Syria. Most fighters have abandoned the north Aleppo countryside front against the Islamic State following announcement of plans for U.S.-Turkey ‘safe zone’: some Nusra fighters of local origin remain.
[29] Founded in 2013 originally as a ‘third way’ between Nusra & Islamic State. In practice has been closer to Nusra since 2014 following Islamic State withdrawal from Idlib, with some overlap in personnel. Mainly fights in Idlib. Some members suspected of having Islamic State sympathies. Defections to the Islamic State have occurred: most prominent case Dutch-Turkish fighter Yilmaz. Some members may be acting as covert Islamic State sleeper cells targeting rebels in Idlib for assassination.
[30] Coalition comprising Jaysh al-Muhajireen (Caucasus Emirate wing in Syria and absorbed Saudi jihadi group Green Battalion), Harakat Sham al-Islam (founded by Moroccan ex-Gitmo detainees) and Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya (Aleppo-based jihadi group). Primarily operates in Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia provinces. Originally maintained neutrality towards Islamic State and suggested a truce in 2014 but official statements have since openly denounced it. However, no evidence indicates active participation in fighting against the Islamic State. Jabhat Ansar al-Din has also denounced the international coalition against Islamic State and U.S.-Turkish safe zone plans.
[31] Mostly Uyghur refugees in Turkey and acting as Syrian wing of the original organization in Xinjiang and Pakistan. Models itself on Jabhat al-Nusra: ‘Nusrat li-Ahl al-Sham’ (support the people of al-Sham). Played notable role in fighting in Idlib province.
[32] Another Caucasus Emirate affiliate in Syria, led by Muslim al-Shishani. Primarily operates in Latakia province and has some British recruits.
[33] Break-off from Jaysh al-Muhajireen following Salahuddin’s deposition as amir of Jaysh al-Muhajireen.
[34] Created in Azaz area in north Aleppo on border with Turkey by Abu Obeida al-Masri (an Egyptian) in 2012: co-existed with Islamic State when latter took Azaz town in autumn 2013. Remained after Islamic State withdrawal but was forced to withdraw from Azaz in August 2014 by rebels. Moved westward to Idlib and Latakia. Participated in Idlib fighting alongside Jaysh al-Fatah. Despite suspected Islamic State sympathies, group officially proclaims allegiance to Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, while advocating neutrality in fighting between Nusra & Islamic State.
[35] Expanded from Iraq to Syria in 2011. Initially established presence in Hasakah then spread throughout northern Syria. Rise of Islamic State destroyed its presence in central and northeastern Syria. Today exists in Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia. Participated in Idlib fighting in the spring of this year.
[36] Affiliated with Jamaat al-Khilafa al-Qawqazia of Abdulhakeem Shishani, who in turn is affiliated with Caucasus Emirate. Primarily in Idlib and Latakia.
[37] Probably largest single opposition faction in Syria, with strongest presence in Idlib and Aleppo but also active in Damascus, Deraa & Quneitra. Has an affiliated legal body (Islamic Commission to Administer Liberated Territories) but coordinates closely with Jabhat al-Nusra in north and south and joins in same coalitions (Jaysh al-Fatah). More emphasis on national struggle but has elements in the organization inclined to global jihadist thinking. Can only be seen as local counterbalancing at best- i.e. preventing Nusra from being more hardline at the local level- rather than countering it strategically. Ahrar’s strength and influence are particularly apparent in its status as negotiator with Iran over the status of Zabadani and the remaining Shi’a villages in Idlib not controlled by the rebels: Fou’a and Kafariya.
[38] Formed in 2014 from a number of brigades incl. defectors from the Muslim Brotherhood-backed “Revolution Shields Commission” (which has since gone into sharp decline). Not as prominent as Ahrar al-Sham or Jabhat al-Nusra. Described as ‘Muslim-Brotherhood oriented’ by some analysts but links are officially denied.
[39] Linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir
[40] Originally a merger of Islamic Front, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Keep on the Path as You Have Been Ordered Grouping, Authenticity and Development Front and Nour al-Din al-Zinki. The Levant Front officially proclaimed its dissolution months later but has reconstituted following multiple splits. Administers towns in north Aleppo countryside (e.g. Azaz) and is doing most of the fighting on the north Aleppo front against the Islamic State.
[41]Originally formed as a coalition of Aleppo-based rebel groups to fight the Islamic State. It then joined the Levant Front and then split off. A military force in nature, does not govern territory. Also has small presence in Idlib and Latakia provinces. Members have received CIA training in Qatar and Turkey.
[42] Break-off from the Levant Front, based in Aleppo province.
[43] Islamist and Salafi grouping based in Aleppo. Joined Levant Front but broke off.
[44] Backed by the U.S. through an operations room in Turkey, and operating in Idlib province
[45] Originally a component of Liwa al-Tawheed (an Islamic Front group based in Aleppo): it broke off after Liwa al-Tawheed joined the Levant Front, seeing the Levant Front as too Islamist. Now participated in Ansar al-Shari’a, an operations room in Aleppo spearheaded by Jabhat al-Nusra.
[46] Merger of Liwa al-Islam and dozens of similar smaller Salafi groups in late 2013: Jaysh al-Islam joined the Islamic Front coalition alongside Ahrar al-Sham & other groups but the coalition has since fallen apart. Jaysh al-Islam has a limited presence in the north of Syria but is very strong in Damascus province, controlling a number of towns and suburbs (e.g. in East Ghouta). Its monopolisation of power in many areas and crackdowns on rivals have attracted some local protests against it. Jaysh al-Islam’s rhetoric has been highly sectarian and anti-Alawite/Shi’a.
[47] Another Damascus-based Islamist grouping. Less hardline than Jaysh al-Islam. Has had tensions with Jaysh al-Islam.
[48] Primarily based in East Ghouta. Along with Nusra has helped mediate problems between Jaysh al-Islam and the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham.
[49] Salafi group mainly based in Deraa. Appears to take a neutral stance towards the Islamic State.
[50] Salafi group mainly based in Deraa. Claims to be an independent. On account of similarity of flag etc., seen by some as pro-Islamic State.
[51] Independent Islamist coalition primarily active in Deraa, Quneitra & Damascus, with leadership based in Jordan. Has received TOW missiles.
[52] Largest coalition in Deraa and Quneitra. Tried to spearhead a ‘Southern Storm’ operation to take Deraa city but this has faltered.
[53] Based in Deraa. Accused by Jabhat al-Nusra of being an Islamic State cell but Nusra failed to dismantle it.
[54] Based in Quneitra. Clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra & other rebels.
[55] There are of course other Kurdish political actors inside Syria (e.g. some tied to Barzani and his KDP in Iraq), but their influence compared to the YPG and its political wing- the PYD, linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)- pales in comparison.
[56] Female wing of YPG
[57] Liaison front group for YPG to conduct outreach to rebels and reach understandings of neutrality.
[58] Burkan al-Furat consists of a variety of rebel groups that splintered off from other groups and/or found refuge in the YPG-held canton of Kobani: thus, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa is an ex-Nusra affiliate (which it joined in 2013 to protect itself from Islamic State) that fled to Kobani after Islamic State took over Raqqa in January 2014. Jaysh al-Qasas consists of locals from Deir az-Zor who found refuge in Kobani. North Sun Brigades belongs to the Dawn of Freedom grouping that is ex Liwa al-Tawheed etc. North Sun Brigades aims to retake Manbij and Jarabulus from the Islamic State, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa the city of Raqqa. Administration of territories retaken from the Islamic State falls on the YPG and its political wing- the PYD. Main exception at present is Ain Issa in Raqqa under Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, which is courting locals in a bid to build a strike force to take on Islamic State in Raqqa city.
[59] Syriac Union Party armed wing. Supports PYD administration. Anti-Assad regime.