



CRFCA

Council of Reserve Forces'
and Cadets' Associations

THE UNITED KINGDOM RESERVE FORCES

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM

ANNUAL REPORT 2017



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In this reporting year it has been routinely noticeable that the Reserves of the three Services are on a far healthier footing than in previous years. The Services have either achieved (RAF) or are well set on the trajectory to achieve (RN and Army) their respective manning and trained strength targets on time. This has come about because of an absolute focus on numbers; a massive and sustained effort at unit and sub-unit level; and the ability to protect the FR20 programme adequately with a dedicated funding pot controlled within sound project/programme management principles. Fundamentally we are convinced that it has also reached this far-healthier stage because of continuous commitment and oversight from the top (both political and military).
2. Getting this far has been, at times, a tough slog – especially given the neglected Reserve base from which work began in 2011/12. The process has challenged many recently introduced ways of working. It has also been achieved against a backdrop of most other facets of Defence changing concurrently: restructuring, rebasing, re-roling, recovering from intensive campaigning, major systems evolution and (notwithstanding a relatively recent commitment to 2% of GDP for Defence spending) acute budget pressure. Despite all this our overall assessment now is that FR20 can deliver provided it is not derailed by last minute insidious funding erosion: an MOD programme delivered to target, on time and within budget. Consequently we would want to see this report set in the context of FR20 now approaching a successful conclusion and weathering a deeply turbulent environment.
3. The challenge now confronting the Services is to deliver on a number of as yet unresolved but very achievable aspects of the FR20 White Paper's ambition:
 - a. Converting Reserve numerical strength into meaningful and routinely usable capability.
 - b. Transitioning from a Reserve concentrated on growth into a Reserve in steady state.
 - c. Preserving the support mechanisms that a Reserve eco-system thrives on whilst being much better integrated with its Regular counterparts.
4. It may therefore appear that this year's report seems in places to be hypercritical. It is not; we firmly believe that the MOD and the Services are achieving success. But we do focus on those areas of neglect, which were prevalent at the outset of FR20 because the Services' corporate knowledge and memory of Reserve issues remains patchy and any return to that neglect is likely to reverse quickly all the good work so far achieved. We have also conducted a stock-take of our previous recommendations to determine the degree to which some remain valid.

5. Our main areas of concern fall roughly into the areas of policy, process, practice and funding. Almost all of our detailed observations cross these boundaries to some extent and many are inter-related.
 - a. **Policy.** Our sense is that while those organisations which routinely work with Reserves have embraced Reserve interests, those that do not can too easily overlook them. This manifests as a Regular-centric default setting which disadvantages Reserves: for example, overly demanding or unnecessary operational performance standards; decreased commitment of the Reserve to operations; or reduced priorities for support.
 - b. **Process.** Our principle observations in this area relate to the still sub-optimal recruiting pathways and impediments to speedy attestation (and hence loss of interest by otherwise suitable candidates). We are not convinced that the Army gets good value for money from its Reserve recruiting partnership effort, with units having to double up on work that is already commercially commissioned. Similarly we are still to be persuaded that all possible improvements have been made to the medical assessment process. Poorly constructed or Reserve-unfriendly support contracts are too widespread; more priority must be given to contract review which serves, rather than hinders Reserve activity.
 - c. **Practice.** We routinely come across superb examples of innovation and best practice on units. Many are too low level to mention in this report but we are at pains to ensure that the relevant Service is back-briefed on what we discover. It is therefore surprising that we see so little evidence on the ground of planned cross-pollination between units and Services to pick up on local initiatives that are easily exported. We believe this to be particularly the case when it comes to officer recruiting.
 - d. **Funding.** It is very clear to us, given the efficiencies and savings absorbed by Defence over the last five years, that the FR20 programme would not have reached this stage had it not been for a ring-fenced allocation of additional funding. This pot dries up at the end of the programme and hence the full running costs of the Reserve now need to be solidified within the routine budget. Aspects of life beyond FR20 will require the continuance of some of the enhancements and this needs to be addressed as well – not least to achieve the requisite training and manning margins as well as delivering retention-positive activity. Crucially, even in the final years of FR20, the balance of the additional £1.8Bn allocated for FR20 must be used for the purpose intended or – unsurprisingly – the capstone of the programme will not be put in place.
6. The Reserve Estate is a looming problem for the mid-term. Little progress appears to have been made since last year on developing a funded strategy to modernise or optimise the estate and the Reserves requirements consequently lack the maturity of the Regular requirement. We have no doubt that affordability lies at the heart of this but without sufficient investment in keeping the existing estate afloat, even in a rudimentary state, the risk of not delivering life support to the Reserves increases year on year.

7. MOD have provided us with a factual update on Reserve health and mental health which we include in this report. Although we register that medical support is now much more available to Reservists, we continue to believe that we do not know enough about the incidence of mental health issues within the Reserve and its veteran community.
8. **Strategic Risk.** Although we see improvement in many aspects of Regular/ Reserve relationships, away from areas where the contact is frequent we still see and hear things which tell us that cultural convergence remains too far off. There is still a 'Frozen Middle' which can be extremely divisive; it exists not just within the Regular cohort but across the spectrum of the whole force. We repeat our view from last year that although some of this is so entrenched that it will only wash away generationally, inculcating better integration through all aspects of training and career education could do much to reset attitudes more quickly, especially to ensure that the next generation is not tainted.



R V Brims
Lieutenant General (Retired)
21 June 2017



INTRODUCTION

1. The genesis for this report comes initially from a recommendation that MOD should introduce independent reporting on the progress of reforming the Reserves, following the work of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Commission¹. Our first two reports were provided at the request of the Secretary of State for Defence² in 2013 and 2014. On 1 October 2014 the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations (RFCAs) had a statutory duty placed on them to report annually to Parliament on the state of the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces³. This, our third report under statutory arrangements, builds on the earlier reports. As in previous reports and notwithstanding the wider reporting mandate specified in the Defence Reform Act, the context for our current report remains heavily driven by the implementation of the FR20 Commission's recommendations, a digest of which is at Annex C.
2. Circumstances have changed significantly across Defence since the Commission reported: first a further Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)⁴ was conducted in 2015; and second, throughout most of this reporting period the Army has conducted additional internal work on the Army Reserve model under Army 2020 (Refine). Neither of the reviews alters the Government's intention to make better use of Reserves as conceived in the FR20 Commission's report, re-growing the size of the tri-Service trained Reserve to some 35,000 personnel. Nevertheless both reviews have had significant impact on Reserve structures, organisation, basing, purpose and roles. More recently and despite a clear Government commitment to spend 2% of GDP on Defence, it has become very clear that the Defence budget is coming under major pressure, especially to achieve savings and efficiencies out to 2020 and probably beyond. This report therefore also takes account of these subsequent decisions and has specifically looked at possible implications for the Reserves arising from them.

PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

3. We submitted our last report through the Secretary for State for Defence on 24 June 2016; a digest of its recommendations (for completeness with recommendations from all earlier reports) together with our proposals for further work, are shown respectively at Annex D and Annex E. The Secretary of State placed a copy of that report in the Library of the House on 21 July 2016. On 1 December 2016 he responded⁵ to our report, updating us on progress and commenting on our recommendations. We have been encouraged to note the positive manner in which most of the recommendations have been received and taken this into account in this year's work.
4. As FR20 work enters its final years, we have this year conducted a stock-take on the continued validity of previous recommendations and the progress of the MOD and the single Services in implementing them. For the most part they have been broadly accepted and work continues to address the majority of them, although some remain only partially or superficially addressed. In this report we return to those which we judge to be challenges to the future well-being of the Reserves. Re-setting the Reserves from the parlous state in which they found themselves in 2010 has taken considerable energy, resource and inventiveness. In several of our earlier reports we commented

1. The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces. July 2011.

2. MSU 4/4/2/10 dated 31 July 2012; for convenience these Terms of Reference are at Annex A.

3. Defence Reform Act, 14 May 2014, Chapter 20 Part 3 Paragraph 47. Extract at Annex B.

4. A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom; Cm9161 dated Nov 2015.

5. Ministry of Defence 4.4.2.10 dated 1 December 2016 (copy placed in the Library of the House and attached at Annex F).

on the poor corporate memory within the Services, which led to the Reserves being neglected, and the early difficulty experienced in returning them to a sustainable footing; although knowledge of the Reserves is now relatively high, a developed corporate memory is still relatively immature and consequently perishable. Our over-riding concern as FR20 concludes is that it will be important to understand and remember how the Reserves found themselves in that state, so as not to slide back to a similar situation in the coming years. And we judge that much of the ameliorative action that has been necessary for the reset will be just as necessary in sustaining the Reserves at steady state, and in ensuring that they are routinely drawn upon as part of Defence's 'whole force' philosophy.

5. **Methodology.** Our approach to compiling this and previous reports has been to start the year by visiting Headquarters and Establishments with Reserve responsibilities to determine what they believe they have achieved in the preceding year and their plans for the forthcoming one. For the remainder of the year we visit a cross-section of units around the country to understand the situation 'on the ground' and to better understand some of the nuances of measures being undertaken. Following a trial in Scotland for last year's report, we have this year turned mainly to the RFCAs to coordinate our unit visits on a regional basis. We have found this to be much more effective in reaching many more units than previously and therefore intend to use this approach in the future. In addition we were able to meet many Reservists from all three Services (and from other nations) in a national maritime exercise using live assets; this gave rich opportunities to explore the benefits of whole force activities with both the Reserves themselves and their employing Regular commanders. Although this report is effective 'as at 1 April 2017', it cannot be compiled and passed to the Secretary of State for Defence until late June to be placed in Parliament before the summer recess, and so there is inevitably an occasional phase lag between our observations and the ameliorative action being introduced by the Services following our end of year back-brief to them.
6. **Future Reserves 2020.** From the outset we acknowledge the enormous progress that the Armed Forces have now made in delivering a re-shaped Reserve, with a new sense of self-worth and purpose. Many Reserve units are well on track to not only meeting their manning targets but also now creating meaningful capability on which Defence can and must rely with greater surety. We make this observation based on sustained trends, rather than an annual snapshot, in which the important vectors are all leading to a successful outcome, at least quantitatively. Clearly increasing the numerical strength of the three Services has been the main driver in the early years but we are also seeing very positive results in the other necessary components of the programme.
7. The MOD's original growth targets were set out on 7 January 2014. The RN and RAF targets remain extant but the Army annual growth profile was later amended in a Written Ministerial Statement⁶. The strength targets are repeated at Annex G; annual recruiting targets have been dropped. Detailed statistics on the actual strengths of the Services' Reserves are at Annex H. The MOD declined to provide us with Officer data this year, and hence we have no empirical evidence on which to assess officer manning trends.

6. Future Reserves 2020 - Update: Written Statement - HLWS 250 made on 8 November 2016.

8. From an inauspicious start following the 2010 SDSR, the MOD and single Services have now made significant headway in delivering the vision and substance of the FR20 Commission's report. With one notable exception – achieving a Full Operating Capability in the Army Recruiting Partnership – Defence has now fully adopted all of the measures set out in the FR20 White Paper⁷. Throughout the intervening period most public attention has been directed at the headline numbers being attracted into and remaining in the Reserves: the overall and trained strength of the single Services. Although this has at times become a distraction from developing a balanced capability, the Services have nevertheless made impressive progress on the numbers. From an overall start on 1 April 2012 of some 30,070 Reservists of which 22,960 were deemed trained strength, by 1 April 2017 the figures had grown to an overall strength of 36,220 of which 31,370 were trained strength (against a FR20 final target trained strength of 35,060).
9. It is important to remember that immediately following the 2010 SDSR the Reserve was suffering an increasing net outflow of personnel who had justifiably become disenchanted with their situation because the degraded proposition offered them was neither meaningful nor fully met. At the same time, a disproportionately high number of the trained strength were reaching the end of their productive service and would expect to leave during the lifetime of FR20. Hence the manning upturn has not only had to improve recruiting but has also been forced to address retention improvement as well. Encouraging as the numerical growth is superficially, the net figures are actually more impressive given the outflow pressures the Reserves have had to cope with across this period.
10. It should also be noted that the Army, but not the RN or RAF, has revised the manner in which it counts trained strength. The latest Defence Statistics release on Service personnel⁸ takes account of this. We asked the MOD to provide us with the rationale for such a change to which they have responded:

"The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the need to strengthen the Armed Forces' contribution to UK resilience. To maximise the size of the force available to deliver this task, the Army plans to use Regular and Reserve Phase 1 trained personnel in response to crises within the UK. This change will increase the utility and size of the force available in the event of a national emergency. It will also result in Army personnel contributing more, and earlier in their careers, and therefore feeling more motivated and more valued. For the Reserves it means they will be able to participate in training and deployments with their units at an earlier stage than previously. Planning to use Army Phase 1 trained personnel to provide additional support to UK resilience tasks such as flood response, or to backfill for others deployed on such tasks, including responding to terrorist attacks, will increase the pool of trained and disciplined manpower available by around 3,000 to 5,000 Regulars and 1,800 Reserves."

11. This change has made a material difference to achieving trained strength targets, in part explaining the jump in trained strength numbers from last year (an increase of 3,630 compared to 2,000 in 15/16 and 1,000 in 14/15). Our last report noted that the Army were likely to undershoot their trained strength target; at the time we were aware that a change of definition had been mooted but not implemented. In our view, although it will undoubtedly ease progress towards meeting the FR20 trained strength targets, the latest change principally reflects a pragmatic step in making newer Reservists more available for a range of resilience operations for which they are adequately trained and, as importantly, will extend the range of training activities they can undertake with concomitant retention benefits.

7. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued; published July 2013.

8. UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics 1 April 2017.

12. In the FR20 White Paper the Government allocated £1.8Bn of additional funding over 10 years to help implement FR20⁹. This year we also asked the MOD to account for how this ring-fenced allocation had been used thus far. They provided the following statement:

"The £1.8Bn funding for the Reserves that was announced by the then Secretary of State for Defence in 2011 was an addition to the provision that the Department had already made as a part of normal business operation. It is intended to enable the MOD and the single Services to implement measures that support the tri-Service FR20 programme over a ten year period. The most significant of these measures is growth in manpower in all the Reserve Forces but it is also helping to fund:

- training, both in the UK and abroad, including additional Man Training Days;• new equipment;*
- increased occupational health provision;*
- opportunities for increased mobilisation across a broad spectrum of operations;*
- communication with employers, providing them with updates on the expected commitments of their reservists;*
- national relationship management;*
- provision of rehabilitation for those injured during training; and*
- Reserve estate improvements.*

Specific single Service measures that can be directly attributed to the additional funding include:

- two new Maritime Reserve (MR) units;*
- relocation to centres of population for two MR units and a further two planned;*
- the creation of new RAuxAF Sqns in Northern Ireland, Cardiff, Lancashire, the Midlands, the North-East and Cornwall;*
- enhanced RAuxAF Sqns in Glasgow and Edinburgh; and*
- significant RAF marketing campaigns.*

Within the Army Reserve Development Programme funding for the key capabilities as outlined aligns to the four core benefits; Capable (24%), Useable (23%), Integrated (10%) and Manned (43%)."

13. In itself the list is impressive and, from our visits we can bear testament to the results the funding has delivered materially and – just as importantly – in re-establishing the self-worth of Reservists. It has been crucially important over the FR20 period that the Reserves have been able draw on this protected funding, secure in the knowledge that the Service programmes could be properly executed. As we close with the end of the FR20 programme, in our judgement it is essential that this ring-fencing remains in place as it is necessary to carry through manning to the set targets and, pivotally, to sustain retention immediately afterwards. We make this comment fully cognisant of the pressures that the Defence budget is under and therefore the temptation that Defence may come under to use the balance of the £1.8Bn to offset other costs.

THE SERVICE ENVIRONMENTS

14. The Maritime Reserve (RN and RM) is well on course to achieve its FR20 targets. With a trained strength now of 2,560, it has exceeded its original 1 April 2017 target by 240 and, provided recent performance is maintained, is well set to achieve its overall trained strength target of 3,100 by 1 April 2019¹⁰. The headline figures disguise some specific concerns relating to particular capabilities, in which the role for two specialisations (Seaman Reserve and Information Systems) has been refocused to ensure continuing employment opportunities; we are assured that the issues associated with providing the necessary equipment and training are being addressed. Maritime Reserves are already well integrated with their Regular counterparts, not least because

9. Foreword by the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, then Secretary of State for Defence.

10. This requires a further annual trained strength growth of 270, which compares well with 470 and 420 in the preceding two years.

many of their specialisations are not vested in the Regular component but also because they are able to pick up tasks that the Regular component would be challenged by as they prepare for the introduction of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers. There is clear evidence this year, following successful RNR operational support to the Border Force and the provision of Reserves to take on safety-critical roles in major exercises, of this synergy. We have recently been briefed that the Royal Marines are now re-examining how they can achieve improved support from the RMR and would like to see how this work progresses in the coming year.

15. We now acknowledge that the Army Reserve has unquestionably improved its likelihood of reaching a trained strength target of 30,100 by 1 Apr 2019 and any deficit will be significantly reduced. Although much assisted by the change of trained strength definition, great credit is also due to the recruiting efforts of units and sub-units and an absolute focus at their level on nurturing applicants through the processes. There is no room for complacency though. The Army will now need to convert a further 3,440 recruits who will stay the course; from a current overall strength of 29,940 this would appear eminently doable. But, albeit on a small sample period, it is equally evident that the conversion trajectory has fallen away and, on current projections, could still slightly fall short at the target date of 1 April 2019. We are aware that the Army Reserve has initiated Op FINAL FURLONG to address this.
16. Typically it takes at least a year to progress an attested recruit through the training pipeline as far as completion of Phase 1. Many units have taken considerable risk¹¹ to achieve this and have traded heavily on both their more experienced staff and Operation FORTIFY enhancements to sustain the effort. We are concerned that as budgetary pressure is applied to the Army in the forthcoming years, it will become far harder to maintain this level of effort. Much of what follows in the next section of the report flags up where such risks could emerge. And we are particularly concerned that with so much focus on achieving the trained strength target of 30,100, new commanders and staff coming into post will not understand the attendant imperative to achieve the second element of the Commission's recommendation: to then build a further 8,000 training and manning margin, requiring recruiting effort to be sustained to 'keep the training hopper full', as a perpetual counterbalance to normal outflow. Moreover, even after the changes associated with Army 2020 (Refine), it is already clear that there remains a mismatch between the overall trained strength and where those trained personnel fit within the Army structure. This is more than just the disparity caused, for example, by reducing the number of REME units and increasing the number of Infantry units; it also relates to several units taking on different roles within the same 'cap-badge'. Over time, work is still needed to redress the current mismatch, albeit that we fully recognise that the Army Reserve has frequently and successfully managed to re-role its more generalist units to meet changing requirements, as it did throughout World War II. And finally, work is still required to fill niche posts and, crucially, re-establish a balanced age and rank pyramid. Officer shortages remain a significant part of this work for most units.
17. The RAuxAF effectively achieved all their manning targets last year. It has gone further this year. From an original target of 1,860, the RAuxAF trained strength now stands at 2,150. Additionally since 2010 it has grown by six further squadrons, providing far better national coverage. We have been particularly struck by the marked success of the new squadrons. Although still in various stages of progress towards full operating capability, their achievement has

11. Such as investment in pre-attestation activity and recruiting activity at the expense of more traditional retention positive activity.

been little short of outstanding. It has been difficult to identify any one factor that accounts for this but we believe that common themes include that they have all taken innovative approaches to setting themselves up; they have been given and willingly taken delegated authority for much of their activity; and they have not been hide-bound by traditional thinking. Consequently we have seen a real vibrancy and sense of ownership within these units, which we believe have many examples of best practice to offer, not only to their more established RAuxAF counterparts but also other Service units as well. In the process they are exposing some generic areas, which will still need improvement, mainly associated with better integration with the Regular component of the RAF such that they can routinely put their acquired capabilities to use.

REPORT THEMES

18. In addition to our visits we have used this year as an opportunity to review the validity of our previous recommendations and, for those that remain of concern, to examine the degree to which they have been addressed. This section of our report picks up on several which are either re-emergent or recurrent and for which we would recommend further action. Many of them have an inter-relationship and therefore need to be addressed holistically. In this and previous reports we have tried to leave the parent Services and, where relevant, MOD to determine what ameliorative action is most appropriate. We therefore attempt to avoid prescriptive recommendations and instead concentrate on identifying the nature of the issue to be addressed and the consequences of not doing so.

Army Recruiting Partnership

19. We remain extremely concerned at the efficacy of the Recruiting Partnership (RP) for Army Reserves. Fundamentally the original processes were designed to be centrally managed in order to satisfy a 'One Army' model (that is, a single recruiting process that dealt with Regulars and Reserves in the same way). While this might have worked for Regular recruitment – a moot point given the current state of Regular recruiting – it is clear that it has needed major adjustment from its inception to cope with the local nature of Army Reserve recruitment. On every unit we have visited, without exception we find units and sub-units necessarily duplicating work that should be completed centrally by the National Recruiting Centre. Although units tell us that the relationship with and the performance of RP is improving, it remains clear that the evolved process is still dysfunctional. This, coupled to the failure to deliver supporting IT as a key ingredient of the RP's full operating capability, led us last year to recommend a full contract review. The MOD responded that the contract was kept under constant review. We are unconvinced that this has realised the required improvement; it feels more like periodic monitoring and reporting of the extant contract rather than a fuller examination of whether the contract is actually fit for purpose. From our perspective the partnership is delivering a sub-optimal product, probably against unrealistic direction and assumptions, for which the Army is effectively paying twice (once for the commercial partner's element and once for the resources used at Unit level). **From our observations this year, we repeat our recommendation that a formal contract review of the Recruiting Partnership be undertaken.**

20. Putting substance to this, Operation FORTIFY significantly enhanced service manpower at Reserve units and sub-units to deal with the inadequacies of the central process and to provide more personal management and nurturing of recruits as they travelled along the recruiting pathway. The reasons for

this are sound and were already well known: a protracted period without contact causes potential recruits to walk away – and the early stages of FR20 recruitment were unacceptably protracted. One such enhancement was the provision of a Regimental Sub-Unit Support Officer (RSUSO), a member of the Regimental operational support team who managed recruiting and other personnel support business at remote locations. This was a ‘lifed’ post, which we had believed the Army might extend beyond the period of Operation FORTIFY. We understand that this will not now be the case. The consequences of this at sub-unit level (the place where most Reservists are employed) is likely to be very damaging. In our view it removes the one part of the process that works well, possibly in the misplaced belief either that the central RP provision has sufficiently improved or that the depleted regimental team will have the capacity to make good the loss, once surge FR20 recruiting has abated. In that eventuality we judge that attestations are likely to decline, that pipeline losses will increase and hence the planned manning and training margin of 8,000 recruits will be almost impossible to meet. **We strongly recommend that the continued employment of RSUSOs is revisited.**

Recruiting Medicals

21. In previous reports we have questioned both the medical standard required of recruits and the means by which it is applied during the joining process. The Surgeon General's Department stands by its advice that a single standard should be applied, arguing that it provides a basic level of insurance against muscular-skeletal injury during training and against medical wastage in later employment. While we still tend to regard this as a simple tool to address a more complex issue (given the wide range of joining ages and differing roles and working environments within the Reserve community) we have accepted that a supplementary waiver scheme provides a workable additional selection filter. Our visits this year have again demonstrated that the waiver process is only understood patchily across the three Services. The RAuxAF appear to have embraced the waiver process fully and units and headquarters tell us that they use it effectively to challenge initial medical screening decisions. The RN tell us that they have employed a specialist desk officer to manage waiver applications but every Maritime Reserve unit we visited this year was unaware that a waiver system existed. Some lifed – but not many – Army units are aware of the system but expressed frustration at how the waivers were handled, with many questioning whether the waiver authority should be vested in the NRC, for both competence and capacity reasons. **The use of medical waivers during recruiting should be better advertised to RN and Army units, and other relevant participants in the recruiting chain. The Army should examine where the medical waiver authority is best lodged.**
22. In the early years of FR20 we were constantly told by recruits of the frustration they felt over the medical screening process; it was typically the one event that delayed their passage through the recruiting pipeline. The issue mainly related to candidates who had been assessed as temporarily medically unfit, while further medical history was being sought from GPs. In this year's visits medical referrals remain the lengthiest barrier to joining but the time of flight of most recruits has significantly improved, largely due to more pro-active candidate management and the Services taking on more responsibility for dealing with medical records.
23. Nevertheless we still hear second-hand tales of 'failed' candidates who have needlessly walked away because of over-long processing. Recently successful candidates (and their unit officers as well as Service doctors)

often questioned the grounds for referrals. It is commonplace on every unit to hear that default referrals have been based on instances such as non-recurring childhood ailments (brief use of an inhaler or a very minor fracture); precautionary prescriptions that were then never used; or emotional stability because of stress/counselling in the wake of, say, a family bereavement. Medical deferrals also receive a bad press from recruits, especially in the case of manifestly athletic candidates (in at least one case playing at national level) to whom a rigid Body Mass Index has been applied. As we say earlier, we acknowledge the grounds for a specific medical standard but it does seem clear to us that in too many instances it is being applied without adequate background knowledge or common sense. We are also told that the medical opinion being applied differs widely between locations. One unit which initially experienced a near 100% referral rate, went to the lengths of making their local Capita assessing GP an honorary unit member to address the problem – which it did. As medical assessments are now conducted under civilian contracts it is reasonable to assume that the assessing GPs and their staff have little Service background. If they are to deliver this service effectively, they need better instruction/direction and we sense there needs to be better quality control across the regions. **The single Services should review their recruiting medical contracts to ensure assessments are carried out with a greater degree of consistency and common sense.**

Officer Recruitment

24. A recurrent theme in our earlier reports has been the acute shortage of officers in many units. This year we have seen a noticeable upturn in the presence of young officers on many of our visits, as those candidates who we witnessed going into training in the last two years have just emerged at unit level. The trend is welcome but, at present, not yet at sufficient volume to reassure us that junior officer manning will be sufficiently healthy soon enough. Last year we went into some detail as to why a vibrant young officer cadre was so important and will therefore not rehearse the arguments in this report. Suffice to say that this is an area that requires continued effort. That said, we have come across some units that have been so markedly successful that they have every chance of filling their officer establishment well within the FR20 timeframe. There may be specific reasons for this (such as differing time-of-flight to operational effectiveness depending on role) but we have been struck by the manner in which some units have been proactive while others seem to have resigned themselves to an inevitable shortfall. In this regard the received wisdoms on where officers can be recruited are now open to challenge¹². We also note that the differing results tend to be less influenced by central interventions (such as RMAS direction to the UOTCs) but more by local relationships and unit effort. **We recommend that the Services identify which units have experienced the most successful officer recruitment and explore the best means by which their successes can then be exported to less successful units.**

Reserve Capability Development

25. With such high political and media attention paid to raw numbers it is unsurprising that overall capability has taken more of a back seat at headquarters and unit level. In our last report we suggested the time was now right to switch emphasis to creating more utility in the Reserves by developing their professional capability. With numbers now on track we reinforce that opinion. Some early wins have been made in the areas of personal equipment issues and increased numbers of exercises. More work is also needed in the areas we discuss below. Reservists at every level of

¹². For example, a unit in the North-east achieving full officer strength in the face of a widely held view that officer recruitment in the region will always fall short.

competency tell us that they must be trained – and once trained they expect to be used intelligently. In the wake of recent SDSR changes and the like, Regulars who are acutely aware of the roles and specialisations that are now wholly or mainly vested in their Reserves also expect the Reserves to play their part – and do not understand when they do not. The issues raised below are beginning to stifle that aspiration.

26. **Individual Training.** Beyond Phase 1 Reservists need access to a range of resources and training opportunity not held at unit level. They therefore turn to Regular establishments for the provision of this training. While some of these establishments have embraced their Reserve obligations others have not, for a number of possible reasons:
 - a. **Contracts.** First, many of these establishments are constrained by support contracts that only operate a nine-to-five, 5-day regime; with minimal flexibility outside these hours, contract owners and managers too often seem reluctant to look at contract review to make courses more Reserve-friendly, especially in the provision of life support. We see a marked contrast in achievement between, for example, RMA Sandhurst which grasped the nettle by adjusting its Multi-Activity Contract (MAC) to provide supported training for Reserve potential officers in August (traditionally Academy down time) when compared with HMS Collingwood, which we are led to believe still struggles to support weekend training through separate and unsynchronised support contracts.
 - b. **Training Standards.** Second, at the outset of FR20 the three Services, and particularly the RAF, made a promising start reviewing the output standards to be achieved from training in each of their specialisations. We now sense that some trade managers and sponsors are beginning to inflate these standards back to historical Regular norms. The change is often insidious, particularly when the rationale for any Reserve/Regular differentiation is lost within the introduction of new equipment, regulation or system redesign. Our sense is that this is not a malign intent but rather an unthinking approach taken by new staff coming into post without the experience of the original FR20 issues.
 - c. **Skills Mapping.** The FR20 White Paper affirmed Defence's intent to undertake skills mapping between the Defence and Civilian sectors. Its purpose was to identify and recognise which skills were transferable. The early goal was to expose to Reservists' employers the added value that a Reservist brought to the workplace. We are unaware how well this work has progressed and would like to be briefed on it. But it is clear to us that scant regard is taken of many highly qualified Reservists' expertise when assessing their training requirements for military service. For example we have spoken to chefs, physical training instructors, drivers, mechanics, policemen and so forth who are bemused that their day-job experience counts for nothing when it comes to their military competence. We, and they, also question the validity of subjecting them to extensive specialist training when their service/unit requirement only exploits one facet of it. Why, for example, would an Army Reservist chef need to be trained in silver service and haut cuisine when the main requirement is to generate field catering? For years our Medical Reservists have been fundamentally developed around their civilian medical competences; the time has probably come when the medics' example and good practice needs to be more widely adopted.

- d. **Course loading.** Attendance at residential courses is every bit as demanding for a Reservist as his commitment to annual camp or operations. The Reservist needs time to organise work and domestic arrangements – and once made any change can be extremely challenging and erode much-needed good-will. Too often we hear of late-in-the-day course allocations, changes and cancellations. Often units are told that courses have been cancelled because of poor take up; we sense that in large part the problem's resolution might well be within the gift of the training establishment. The very fact that so many Reserve course places are allocated so close to the course start date is also a cause for concern about cultural convergence.
- e. **Centralised Training.** In some areas, particularly but not exclusively from Maritime Reserves (and from their reconfigured Reserve Seaman specialisation), we have been asked why there is such heavy reliance on centralised, rather than local individual training. We demand a lot from Reservists to surrender a long weekend to travel from, say, Scotland or Northern Ireland to Portsmouth or Plymouth to undertake a training session that arguably their more experienced and qualified unit colleagues are just as competent to deliver. Whilst we fully appreciate that Reservists will always need to travel for some aspects of training, in the early years of FR20 we were told that the RN was also looking to provide such facilities as webinars to enable more distance learning; we are now told little progress has been made. Work is needed to assess whether more distributed/ local training can be facilitated; whether training establishment staff could deliver in the regions; and whether a greater emphasis on training assurance, rather than training itself, would be more cost efficiently focused on centralised activity.

27. Collective and Continuation Training.

- a. **Equipment Support (ES).** Many Army units, especially those whose role is implicitly vehicle-based, and some Maritime Reserve specialisations¹³ rely heavily on local provision of some of their main vehicles to complete collective training and bring to life individual development. The picture on the ground is varied with some units holding no vehicles and other being well provided. We understand the reason for this: newly introduced equipments tend to be in short supply and older equipments therefore tend to be in high demand for operations and exercises. Of real concern, though, is the paucity of ES for those units that do hold equipment. With very few exceptions, often as a consequence of a unit being close-located to its Regular paired unit, we judge that ES provision on most Reserve units is badly broken. This takes two forms. First, commanding officers have now lost their independent specialist (the OC Light Aid Detachment) who could advise on and assure ES at first line and the quality of service being returned from third line. Second, most units are suffering from significant shortages of skilled civilian support, often with 75%+ gapping of civilian posts. Last year we asked the Army to re-examine its decisions on REME lay-down; it has done so¹⁴ but only in the context of the Army 2020 (Refine) operational requirement which has not addressed the continued shortfall in ES provision at unit level.
- b. **In-year Savings Measures.** There is considerable evidence that when in-year savings are applied (typically caps on Man Training Days (MTD) or reduced availability of training areas) they tend to realise very little in

13. For example RNR and RMR personnel who require boat handling skills.

14. A reduction of two REME Battalions.

the way of real savings – especially when compared with the considerable negative impact they have on the recruitment or retention of Reserves. And frequently the perceived saving is then later negated by the consequential additional costs needed to redress the situation. Clearly this is particularly apposite in that the challenge to meet manning targets becomes far more acute. As a general rule the Services need to avoid such simplistic measures. When they are unavoidable, they need to take more innovative approaches: for example, if only 5 days per week availability is affordable, how much more efficient and effective would it be to sacrifice one weekday from Regular use in order to supply one guaranteed weekend day for Reserve (and Cadet) use?

- c. **Mandatory Annual Training Tests (MATTs).** Some Army commanding officers have suggested that while most MATTs make good sense to complete annually, others could be undertaken less frequently or, once initially completed, consigned to pre-deployment activity. In this way they believe that they could make better use of Assured Weekends by introducing more varied training, especially for longer serving personnel. Their rationale stems from the FR20 (Refine) operating model, which sees units anticipating at least six months warning for operations. We see the logic of this and believe it bears examination by all three Services.

Army Career Management

28. Having been briefed two years ago on the recommendations and acceptance of the Bell study into Army Reserve Officer career management, we had hoped that progress on all fronts would have been faster. The rapid introduction of a range of senior (AR) posts, and the establishment progressively of staff branches dealing with Reserve matters has been welcome and in our judgement successful. Wider officer career management seems to have stuttered. We were enthused by the concept of introducing a career pathway for those Reserve officers with the ambition to become employable beyond Regimental duty, both because it informed that ambition with clarity and realism but also – perhaps as importantly – because it provided opportunity for better Regular/Reserve integration in staff appointments. Army Personnel Centre (APC) Glasgow were at pains to point out that whilst they fully supported the recommendation it would fall to Army Manning and the Army's formations to populate the pathway. Since then little seems to have been taken forward.
The Army should revitalise work to create a Reserve officer career pathway.
29. In other respects we are nervous of the ability of APC to delve too deeply into direct career management at and below Regimental level. The local chain of command is, in our opinion, as well or better placed to take account of all circumstances that fit individuals for an essentially 'territorial' appointment and will be alive to aspects of suitability that are probably not going to emerge from existing personnel files. We recognise the difference this marks between Regular and Reserve processes but in this instance we believe that the Reserve eco-system is sufficiently different; we would consider APC interest is better served in an assurance role.
30. In previous reports we have expressed concern that real or imagined barriers might exist to high calibre volunteer Reservists being appointed to command or high-grade staff appointments because of their perceived time availability or distance from the post. This would be particularly worrying should they be overlooked in favour of a less well reported upon Regular or ex-Regular candidate. While we have been assured by APC that this is not the case, the

situation needs to be kept under review to avoid it becoming an unintended default. In this context we also counselled that a part-time Commanding Officer should be better provided for within his command team. This is not suggest that he/she needs a bigger team but it does suggest that for the period of his/her tenure more priority should be given to filling gapped posts and in selecting high calibre officers to fill the key Regular posts. We have previously made this observation as a soft recommendation but given the extent of gapping **we now recommend that the Army develop and implement a policy to support appropriately Reserve unit commanding officers when the incumbent is a part-time volunteer.**

Utility and Employment

31. The FR20 Commission recommended the establishment of a contingency fund to ensure that Reserve costs could be routinely covered for operations at home and overseas¹⁵. This recommendation was dropped early in the programme in favour of using FR20 funding to secure other enabling benefits¹⁶. We have twice questioned how Defence now plans to ensure Reserve involvement in operations, to which they have responded that they are confident that other arrangements would suffice: "Matters of cost for the deployment of Reserves on operations are considered on a case by case basis and are usually included as part of the overall cost of the operation which is accounted for separately¹⁷."
32. This year we have seen a body of evidence that suggests that other arrangements are not sufficing. The size and shape of the Reserve is predicated now on its ability to deliver complementary capability in partnership with the Regular component. The Reserves' relative size alone demands that it is now used proportionately. Costs are the most frequently cited reasons given by operational planners for resisting, reducing or cancelling Reserve involvement in operational activity. This is particularly disturbing when the required capability and expertise is found wholly or mainly in the Reserve but the requirement is either completely dropped or absorbed into a less-capable Regular alternative. At a conceptual level it is therefore difficult to understand how considerable amounts of public money can be expended to create much-needed capability which is then left on the shelf, especially if excused by the relatively small operational cost saving of using a sub-optimal alternative.
33. But our experience this year demonstrates that this is precisely what is happening, with every likelihood of it becoming more extensive as the Services' budgets come under greater pressure. Force Troops Command, the largest 'employer' of Reservists, especially those with unique capabilities, told us that inclusion of Reserves in any deployment is always questioned, irrespective of whether credible alternative Regular capability exists. As worryingly, they inform us that they are directed to use Reserve capitation rates, which in their and our view have been grossly inflated, to draw comparisons. In a separate but associated way, we have also been advised of the difficulty some specialist units experience when their parent command, which holds their training budget, is unable or unwilling to release personnel to support exercises in support of their operational users, such as Joint Forces Command or a different Service.
34. In the early days of FR20 and Army 2020, as commanders made key judgements on how and from which component they built future capability, their work drew heavily on analysis by the Land Environment Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCOC) team. Much of the early superficial analysis done to influence SDSR 2010 on Reserve costs was flawed until later redressed by the

15. The rationale for this recommendation was that while Regular costs were largely covered, equivalent funding would be needed for Reserve attendance on operations, above their Man Training Day annual provision.

16. Such as pensions, paid leave and aspects of medical/dental provision.

17. Annex F.

FR20 Commission's work. LEMCOC reinforced the Commission's assessments; examined in detail the whole life costs of creating and using capability (including direct and indirect costs); and exposed the weaknesses of short term quasi-comparisons. Their work made clear that cost of ownership of Reserves was in most instances markedly lower than a Regular alternative and that the cost of use of Regulars and Reserves was comparable. Thus the exclusion of a lower-cost capability from operations on short term savings grounds seems to us to be a false economy – one which in the longer term will probably backfire economically if the cost-effective alternative withers because it is routinely ignored. Defence must address the modalities of how it routinely uses the Reserves operationally, rather than denying their use on the inevitably recurring grounds of in-year budget pressures.

- 35. We strongly recommend that the MOD, Joint Forces Command and the single Services review the terms under which Reserves are included on or in support of operations, in order to develop protocols which make their inclusion easier.**

Retention

36. While the manpower strength of the Armed Forces can to a large degree be regulated by inflow, their sustained effectiveness is far more dependent on controlled outflow. As overall numbers become far healthier under FR20, attention is now being directed to towards achieving a more balanced age/ rank/experience pyramid within units. The more successfully recruited units are particularly registering the importance of this, especially when purely in the interests of building numbers they had become overweight with senior ex-Regulars at the expense of pulling new talent into their corporals' and sergeants' messes. Overall, though, we have been impressed at the rebalancing that units are undertaking and their determination to move forward with a better mix of ab initio volunteers and ex-Regulars.
37. In contrast to the enthusiasm that challenging and rewarding training can generate in a new recruit, repetitive and boring continuation training can quickly turn off a seasoned hand. It is therefore vital to retain their sense of purpose and personal satisfaction by ensuring that they too have rewarding challenges of their own. It is for this reason that we have made much of the utility of the Reserves and the importance of using it once available; it is this trained cohort which expects to be able to generate capability and from which they derive their professional pride and personal satisfaction when it is used. Activity underpins this satisfaction: activity which can be planned in good time; which attracts Reservists in good numbers; which has clear military purpose; and which is achievable. **We recommend that the Services resist short-term in-year budgetary palliatives which directly or indirectly reduce routine Reserve activity.**
38. Good retention brings at least one other benefit which serves as a useful side-bar to our observations on short term savings expediency. The Services sink a large and mostly irreducible amount of the Defence budget into their training machinery and its overheads. The size of the training machine is driven by throughput, which is driven by front-line demand. Throughput therefore increases when trained outflow is high. We would contend that there is more enduring efficiency to be had by therefore reducing the outflow, rather than tinkering in the margins of the training machine around inflow. A tauter, more-effective training machine operating at full intensity to service a more stable front-line, in turn giving a sound return of service is an admirable ambition – but one that rests heavily on having a front-line that is content and fit to be retained. This is not the exclusive preserve of the Reserve, with greater benefits still for Regulars to travel this path.

39. It is therefore unsurprising that **we recommend that the Services now initiate work to determine optimum return-of-service/retention rate(s) for their Reserves and put in place measures to achieve them, with the same vigour that they have applied in their recruiting effort.** This is why we make the point at the start of this section of the report that many of our observations are interrelated. Retention measures for Reserves tend to be far less complex or expensive than they are for Regulars¹⁸. They tend to hinge on measures which furnish Reservists with a sense of purpose in their role, reinforced by appropriate training and development at every level; a sense of belonging; a pride that they are used intelligently; and the knowledge that their value is rewarded in modest ways. In our view adoption of many of our previous recommendations covers much of what is needed here.

Reserve Centre Administrative Support

40. In previous reports we have highlighted the importance of well-led sub-units as the bedrock of the Reservist culture: it generates the activity which cultivates a strong sense of belonging and plays a fundamental role in both recruiting and retention. This year we have heard of and observed at first hand instances of poor administrative and training support at the sub-unit level. Equally, we have seen exceptional examples of good practice and innovation which have had a major impact on sub-unit success. We therefore stress the importance of the Permanent Staff Administration Officer (PSAO) – and their single Service equivalents – and other permanent staff in supporting OCs in the Reserve centres – and of keeping these posts well manned with capable and well-motivated people.

ESTATE

41. Our approach this year has given us extensive opportunity to visit large parts of the Defence Estate used by the Reserves and Cadets, traditionally known as the Volunteer Estate (VE). Even in the short time that we have been reporting it has become apparent that the VE is in a state of continued and progressive decline. As an illustration, at the time FR20 was initiated (i.e. when the Reserves were actually in a period of acute neglect) the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) – and its forerunner Defence Estates (DE) – allocated some £27.674M annually to the RFCAs to maintain the VE¹⁹. Paradoxically, by 2016/17 and when the Reserves were in other respects being cosseted, that figure had continued to decline to £17.515M, a 37% reduction of actual funding across six years and significantly more than that in real terms.
42. These headline figures subsume some more worrying underlying trends. For example in 2009/10 preventative maintenance was funded by DE to the tune of £3.038M but last year this had virtually disappeared to some £0.001M. Similarly, funding for condition improvement and life cycle maintenance/replacement, which had already dropped to £4.624M, has now reduced to £1.471M. We are also concerned that Defence investment in the RFCAs' estate management teams has not kept pace; in the aftermath of the 2008 recession the RFCAs could attract high calibre people with the appropriate skills, as the property world stagnated. The situation has now changed, not just in being able to compete with market employment rates, but also in fielding estates teams with the new set of commercial skills demanded by DIO.

¹⁸. One obvious example is the pressing need to modernise and re-provide married and single accommodation for Regulars.

¹⁹. Although DIO terminology and to some extent the maintenance philosophy has changed within this period, the figures used here are a close approximation to enable like-for-like comparisons.

43. Fortunately the RFCAs have some ability and capacity to generate additional income from the estate and other activities and are thus able to supplement VE funding. In the past this would have been used to cover a wide range of provision – typically, condition improvement, minor enhancement projects and new build of dilapidated cadet huts, as well as supporting estate-related retention and recruiting measures at local unit level. However, the bulk of this generated income appears to be increasingly necessary to cover the deficit of DIO provision for basic Statutory and Mandatory (S&M) work such as inspections, crucial maintenance and some reactive work arising from both – in other words, the essential minimum to keep an establishment open even at a most rudimentary level.
44. We have been struck by the efforts made by the RFCAs and the single Services to shore up the VE and to make good deficiencies in the level of funding provided by the DIO to complete S&M work. We cannot be complacent about this. Funding sources for regional income generation are variable and discretionary; and they require good local networks to achieve the sort of relationships that sustain the income. Equally, when it comes to letting out spare capacity, the deteriorating state of the some buildings is beginning to turn off existing and potential users.
45. Some estates funding, notably directly by the RN and the RAF, has been far more reassuring and in some instances inspirational. Most of the new RAuxAF facilities have been well served, both within the VE and on main operating bases. The Reservists we have met at these sites express considerable satisfaction with their accommodation, especially when compared with their Regular counterparts' living conditions. The RN recognised early on that their old estate was occasionally mal-located and not fit for future purpose. Therefore at the start of FR20 they embarked on a substantive re-provision and refurbishment programme, which sought to improve significantly their ability to generate a maritime presence in major population centres, while concentrating the estate to ensure maximum utilisation (by Reserves, University units, regional RN teams and – where possible – Sea Cadets). We understand that budget pressure within the RN is possibly now threatening the previously ring-fenced Maritime Reserve FR20 funding, potentially compromising the latter part of this infrastructure programme for a ground-breaking initiative in Cardiff and a much-needed re-location in Portsmouth. This is particularly worrying as both projects were underpinned by FR20 funding which now appears to be earmarked to bail out measures unrelated to FR20 and therefore beyond that ring-fence.
46. By contrast Defence faces a herculean task to improve conditions with Army Reserve Centres (ARCs). Some are undoubtedly in good condition and well-suited to their planned role(s). Many are not. While there is an extensive ARC lay-down which theoretically gives good national coverage, at the local level some are probably not optimally located – and this situation is likely to deteriorate, especially in re-generating cities. The MOD's Future Estates Strategy needs to address this and we have been briefed that it will, albeit it is still some way off the maturity of the Regular Estate Strategy. In the meantime the Army has made regular, modest funding injections under Operation FORTIFY to address immediate concerns that ARCs should support recruiting and retention effort. With so little funding available, we recognise that this has been the correct priority, no matter that in pure estates terms it is often cosmetic and superficial. We have visited many ARCs where the facade disguises a crumbling edifice behind it, notwithstanding the Army's and RFCAs' laudable efforts, which in truth are often little more than a sticking plaster that buys time but little else. In consequence the continuing lack of an estate strategy – probably driven by not being able to identify the requisite funding to underpin any major estate changes – stultifies other areas where local minor disposal, reinvestment and re-provision would be perfectly viable.

47. The deductions we draw from the figures above and our visits are fourfold:
- The VE remains in a sustained period of only just being kept viable in an increasingly degraded condition.
 - The VE is consequently building up a bow wave of annually increasing maintenance requirement, with little to no confidence that funding will be available to address that growing need in the near term.
 - And, because no meaningful investment is being made in re-provision, life cycle replacement or condition improvement, alternative strategies for provision of a low-maintenance, appropriately located, fit for purpose VE will take a protracted period to implement.
 - The overhead of running the VE will increase, whether or not managed by the RFCAs or an alternative provider.
48. **We recommend that work on the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing VE until a new strategy can be implemented.** Any failure to address the second point will significantly undermine the previous good work achieved over recent years in recruiting and retaining the Reserves.

RESERVIST HEALTH

49. The Act specifically requires us to report on mental well-being of the Reserves. Last year we made the point that we are ill-equipped to do so, reflecting that the MOD also has little ability to track mental health amongst Reservists, many of whom might not manifest psychological problems in the same way and with the same relative ease of discovery as a Regular. During the course of this year's visits a number of unsubstantiated observations from Reservists and commanders suggest that there is some unease about the incidence of mental illness amongst the Reserve community, with at least one Reservist's family apparently citing post-operational-deployment problems as a contributory factor in a Reservist's condition. It seems reasonable to assume that the rate of mental health problems amongst Reserves at least replicates that of Regulars but the simple fact is that there is little definitive data for us to make even a lay judgement. Intuitively we accept that when it does arise, despite the mental health provisions put in place specifically for Reservists under FR20, a mental health problem might well be more difficult directly to relate to Reserve service, given that the individual is highly likely to be remote from the Service workplace at the time it manifests. Therefore, while we register the need to keep the topic under annual review, we remain poorly placed to do so without recourse to professional and academic advice and support.
50. This year we have asked the MOD to comment on their progress since the 2016 report. For completeness we also include their observations on occupational health, rehabilitation and dental health:

"An enhanced package of services is available to all Reservists. These services are delivered by Defence Primary Healthcare (DPHC) or approved independent service providers. Accessing these services requires contact with the DPHC Regional HQs, who will assist Units.

Occupational Health. In FY 16/17, DPHC delivered 1,204 medical assessments at weekend or evening clinics, in addition to specific audiometry and vaccination clinics. Currently, six out of the eight DPHC regions are running regular out-of-hours clinics in a mixture of routine weekend clinics and bespoke 'surgeries' for Units as required. We have been able to recruit 29.3 staff, of which 10.5 are clinicians. We are currently re-working plans to be able to use existing staff more flexibly in order to deliver to requirement.

Rehabilitation. DPHC accepted 1,051 referrals of Reservists for rehabilitation in FY 16/17 (up from 892 in 15/16). Rehabilitation for Reservists injured on duty has been modified to reflect their conditions of service and their disparate geographical spread by utilising a contracted service. The aim is to provide timely rehabilitation where it is required. If a Reservist is injured on duty, they must attend a DPHC facility for an assessment by a doctor who will then refer them to their nearest Primary Care Rehabilitation Facility. However, since 1 April 17, there is also the option of receiving rehabilitation via a civilian contractor; the advantage to the Reservist is that this can be arranged close to their work or home address and can be delivered outside normal working hours.

Mental Health. DPHC intended to recruit nine mental health nurses to champion the needs of Reserves in each of the DPHC regions; we currently have eight regions and this is being further refined to six in the near future. We have recruited (or are awaiting final checks in the recruitment of) six additional mental health nurses. The low numbers of Reserves accessing care through the Veterans' and Reserves' Mental Health Programme indicate that this will not present a risk; in FY 15/16 there were 72 Reserves assessed by Departments of Community Mental Health, of which 18 went on to have treatment. We do not yet have clarity with regard to how many of the assessments in 2016/17 were deemed to be attributable conditions that would benefit from treatment.

Dental Inspection. Under the White Paper, DPHC was instructed to conduct dental inspections prior to mobilisation; it was deemed to present too much risk if DPHC only inspected, so we now also provide any required restorative work in order to make Reserves dentally fit to be mobilised."

51. While we do not doubt the commitment of the MOD to make provision for medical and mental health support to Reservists, and that they are now doing so, we have a residual suspicion that insufficient is being done to understand the incidence of mental health problems amongst the Reserve (and Reserve veteran) community. Hence while the MOD assessment may be correct that the current low levels of Reservists accessing mental health support is low and can be matched by available resource, neither we nor the MOD have the ability to say whether those numbers reflect the actual numbers of Reservists who are experiencing mental health problems but – for whatever reason – have not turned to the available support. **We therefore recommend that the MOD update the work on mental health in the Services that it has undertaken with King's College and commission fresh work to look specifically at the current situation for Reserves.** We would then draw on this work to meet our reporting obligations.

ASSESSMENT

52. The situation for Reserves of all three Services is much improved in most important respects since the FR20 commission reported in July 2011. The RAF has already reached its target trained strength and the RN should do so on time. The Army has increased its trained strength well above its previous growth rate, partly through redefinition of trained strength but also because of sustained recruiting effort at unit level. In recent months the Army's growth rate has slowed a little but, provided effort is sustained under initiatives such as FINAL FURLONG, there is every chance that they should reach their target on time.

53. For all three Services the trick to take will be not to drift back to the malaise of the pre-2010 years. Those lessons which have been learnt in delivering FR20 will need to be 'baked in' to steady-state modalities for recruiting and retention, to keep trained numbers healthy. This is more than just manning; it speaks to all those factors (the purpose, proposition and enabling) which lead to the manifestation of poor manning. The single Services, and the Army especially, need also to turn attention now to building the 8,000 manning and training margin as an essential follow-through of the programme; they will need to formalise how these additional 8,000 personnel will be held on their books (i.e. how they will be held on unit establishments and accounted for). We suggest that this number is to some extent fluid and, depending on the success of improved retention, could be revised downwards.
54. There is still some way to go in turning basic trained strength into materially useful military capability across the full gamut of Defence tasks. Indeed, it may well be that for the most part Reserves and Reserves' units do not develop the complete spectrum of capability until such time as they are warned and mobilised for operations – at which time the nature of operations would drive any additional training needs. That should not, though, preclude continual personal development for the bulk of Reservists as they emerge from basic training.
55. Much is being done to complete all the objectives of FR20 and is to be applauded. The next challenge is to remove the final impediments that still pervade many of the processes, especially as the headline pressures of trained strength are removed. In this report we flag up many of those which should be continued beyond merely the FR20 epoch. Improved retention which then helps reshape an enduring Reserve rank and age pyramid sits prominently as a next step. So too does the urgent need to develop an estates strategy, particularly for the Army Reserve.
56. In all our reports we have commented on a lack of cultural convergence as the main strategic risk to success in delivering a viable Reserve. We still hold to that view, albeit we see much improved relations between Reserves and that part of the Regular component which is now working together more routinely. Deep within the staff layers, though, we see too many examples of poor practice which hint at the same entrenched ideas that prevailed before FR20. In this report we major on examples such as a reluctance to factor a Reserve component into operations. We also touch on old thinking in how training establishments approach their Reserve obligations. These all smack of cultural dissonance, suggesting that although the risk is possibly reducing in many areas, cultural convergence remains unresolved in others. We repeat our observation from last year that the integration of Regular and Reserve components is incomplete and will probably remain so until such time that it has been inculcated through routine education, training and activity.



Annexes:

- A. FR20 Implementation External Scrutiny – Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Association's External Scrutiny Team Terms of Reference.
- B. External Reporting Provisions of the Defence Reform Act 2014.
- C. Summary of the FR20 Independent Commission's Main Recommendations.
- D. Previous Report Recommendations.
- E. Previous Proposals for Further Work.
- F. Secretary of State for Defence Response to 2016 EST Report.
- G. MOD Targets for Strength and Recruitment.
- H. Defence Statistics – Reserve Manning Achievement & Trends.
- I. 2017 Report Main Recommendations.
- J. Summary of Priorities for 2017/18 Work.
- K. External Scrutiny Team – Membership.

FR20 IMPLEMENTATION EXTERNAL SCRUTINY – COUNCIL OF RESERVE FORCES' AND CADETS' ASSOCIATION'S SCRUTINY TEAM TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The FR20 Report²⁰ was commissioned by the Prime Minister in October 2010 in recognition of the relative decline and neglect of Reserve Forces. The Independent Commission concluded that the state of some elements of the Reserve was so fragile that resources and action were required immediately to arrest their decline; also, it sought to promote a wider vision to be realised over several years.

PURPOSE

2. The Commission identified²¹ a requirement for an annual report on the overall health of the Reserve Forces. It recommended that the Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations (CRFCA) was best placed to meet this requirement given its existing provision by (non-discretionary) statute to provide independent advice to the Defence Council and Ministers on Reserve Matters.

ROLE

3. The CRFCA External Scrutiny Team is to report to the Secretary of State for Defence on implementation of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme and provide independent assurance to Parliament.

MEMBERSHIP

4. Lt Gen (Retd) Robin Brims CB CBE DSO DL is appointed to chair the CRFCA External Scrutiny Team to provide external assurance on the implementation of the FR20 Programme.
5. Membership of the External Scrutiny Team should comprise no more than six, to be decided by the Chair after consultation with the MOD through VCDS. It should provide representation from the three single Services, appropriate Regular and Reserve experience and independent expertise. Whilst its composition may change over the course of the five years, the External Scrutiny Team must retain the expertise that enables the Chair to perform his duties effectively.

SCOPE

6. The External Scrutiny Team's work is to be set in the context of the ability of the Reserves to deliver capability required by Defence, and is to assess:
 - a. Progress against delivery of the FR20 Mandate²²And in the context of the Recommendations of the FR20 Report:
 - b. The condition of the Reserves.

20. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent External Scrutiny Team to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces. July 2011.

21. Para 104 (p. 43).

22. DCDS Pers/RFC/FR20/5/09 dated 5 Jun 12.

BASELINE AND METRICS

7. 1 April 12 is to be taken as the baseline date from which progress will be assessed, and anniversaries of this date thereafter, to baseline their findings.
8. The FR20 Programme Management Office (PMO) will undertake coordinating activity with the single Services to ensure that the External Scrutiny Team has the assistance it requires to enable them to assess trends based on monthly manning and demographic information (such as age). Metrics to be routinely monitored are to be agreed in consultation with the MOD but may include:
 - a. Outflow rate and return of service;
 - b. Fit for Employment; Fit for Role; Fit for Deployment;
 - c. Percentage achieving bounty;
 - d. Gapping levels of Regular, Reserve, FTRS and Civilian Permanent Staff who support the Reserve community.

ASSESSMENT

9. The External Scrutiny Team's report should assess the state of the programme including:
 - a. Progress against the Plan and milestones;
 - b. Risk management and corporate governance;
 - c. Definition of benefits and progress in delivering them;
 - d. Communication with key stakeholders;
 - e. Effectiveness of application of resources under the Programme.
10. CRFCA will be involved in the development of the Plan through the Reserves Coordination Group and the FR20 Programme Board.

ACCESS

11. The FR20 PMO will assist in facilitating access to serving military personnel, sites and furnishing additional data as required.



EXTERNAL REPORTING PROVISIONS OF THE DEFENCE REFORM ACT 2014

The Defence Reform Act 2014 placed a responsibility on Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations to submit an annual report on the state of the UK's Reserve Forces under the following provisions²³:

113A Duty to prepare report on volunteer Reserve forces

- (1) An association must prepare an annual report on the state of the volunteer Reserve forces so far as concerns the area for which the association is established.
- (2) A report on the state of the volunteer Reserve forces is a report that sets out the association's assessment of the capabilities of the volunteer Reserve forces, having regard to the duties that may be imposed on members of those forces by or under this Act or any other enactment.
- (3) The assessment referred to in subsection (2) must, in particular, include the association's views on the effect of each of the following matters on the capabilities of the volunteer Reserve forces –
 - (a) the recruiting of members for the volunteer Reserve forces;
 - (b) the retention of members of those forces;
 - (c) the provision of training for those forces;
 - (d) the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the association is responsible.
- (4) A report under subsection (1) must also set out the association's assessment of the provision that is made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the volunteer Reserve forces.
- (5) An association must send a report under subsection (1) to the Secretary of State –
 - (a) in the case of the first report, before the first anniversary of the day on which the last Future Reserves 2020 report prepared before the coming into force of this section was presented to the Secretary of State, and
 - (b) in the case of subsequent reports, before the anniversary of the day on which the first report was laid before Parliament under subsection (6).
- (6) On receiving a report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
- (7) The duties under this section may, instead of being performed by an association, be performed by a joint committee appointed under section 116 by two or more associations in relation to their combined areas.
- (8) Where by virtue of subsection (7) a joint committee has the duty to prepare a report –
 - (a) references in subsections (1) to (5) to an association are to be read as if they were to the joint committee, and
 - (b) section 117(1)(a) (power to regulate manner in which functions are exercised) has effect as if the reference to associations were to the joint committee.
- (9) In subsection (5)(a), 'Future Reserves 2020 report' means a report prepared by the External Scrutiny Group on the Future Reserves 2020 programme.

23. Inserted in Part 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (reserve associations), after section 113.



SUMMARY OF THE FR20 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION'S MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

Stabilisation and Betterment. Resources are needed immediately to arrest the severe decline in the state of the Reserves. Included in this is the need for a revised Proposition which provides the challenge and reward that makes Reserve service worthwhile and sustainable. This will require enhancements to individual, collective and command training. It will also require increased command opportunities, in peacetime and on operations. The Reserve will require new roles, more viable structures and better mechanisms to integrate with the Regular component. We estimate that a betterment package, when coupled with the need to abate other savings measures against Reserves, will cost £590M over four years.

Revised Roles. The National Security Council should examine the breadth of roles which Reservists undertake. We recommend that Reservists should play a greater part in Homeland Security (for example maritime coastal protection) and UK Resilience. We are not advocating a third force, rather that Reserves should have a more formal role in support of specific security tasks and their local civil communities. More widely, specialist tasks should expand, specifically in areas such as cyber, stabilisation and medical roles in humanitarian crises. Beyond individual operational augmentation, Reserves should be able to meet some operational tasks as formed sub-units and units. And our Reserves must form the framework around which military regeneration can be effected.

Enablement. The availability of a larger and more usable Reserve has to be guaranteed. Such a guarantee has to be underpinned by legislative changes which permit greater ease of mobilisation, better employee protection and greater recognition of employers, perhaps through a nationally endorsed Kitemark. We should exploit the potential for innovative partnerships between Defence, Education and Industry to optimise the sharing and development of human talent. And we need modern administrative systems for enlistment, processing and transfer between the Regular forces and the Reserves.

Adjusting the Regular/Reserve Balance. Defence should adopt a Whole Force Concept which optimises the most cost-effective balance of Regular, Reserve, Contractor and Civilian manpower. Within this, the Reserve element should proportionately increase. By 2015, the trained strength of the Reserves should be: Royal Navy Reserves/Royal Marine Reserves 3,100; Territorial Army 30,000 and Royal Auxiliary Air Force 1,800. Thereafter the size of the Reservist component should increase further to maximise the cost effectiveness of having a larger Reserve component within the Whole Force. The Commission's view is that, in the future, the trained strength of the Army – Regular and Reserve – should be about 120,000.

Force Generation. In order to improve the efficiency of Force Generation, the Reserve estate should be rationalised in a way that is sensitive to maintaining geographically dispersed local links whilst providing access to training. Once we have rebuilt the officer and non-commissioned officer structures, and in the context of more effective Regular:Reserve twinning, the requirements for Regular Permanent Training Staff should be reviewed. And the overall Force Generation ratio within the TA should be optimised so that, if required, a 1:8 ratio of mobilised to non-mobilised Reservists could be sustained.

Governance. A revised governance structure for the Reserve is recommended to: first, oversee the implementation of recommendations arising from this Review; second, to provide an independent mechanism to report to the Ministry of Defence and Parliament on the state of the Reserves; and third, to help ensure the appropriate influence of certain Reserve appointments. The Commission believes that, if these recommendations are carried through, then the overall capability, utility and resilience of our Armed Forces will be enhanced, in a way that meets the security, financial and societal challenges of the day, and in a way that maintains continuity with historic British practice.



PREVIOUS REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF 2013 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 13.1 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 3, 4 & 8)

As a matter of priority the Department should issue a plain-English narrative which sets out the Reserves proposition: a narrative which is commonly adopted across all the Services and, as a minimum, covers the purposes of the Reserves; the manner in which they are likely to be used; and individual levels of obligation.

Recommendation 13.2 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 6 & 12)

FR20 manpower metrics should be more granular for the period to 2018 to demonstrate changes within the recruit inflow pipeline and should not concentrate solely on the achievement of Phase-2-trained Reservists.

Recommendation 13.3 (Link to the Commission's recommendation 26)

Priority must be given to fund and introduce quickly an effective management information system which accurately captures Reservists numbers; states of training, preparedness; availability; attendance; and skill sets.

Recommendation 13.4

More analysis is undertaken to determine the causes of 'manning churn', to better inform how retention measures could be better targeted.

Recommendation 13.5 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 2 & 21)

In parallel to development of pairing/parenting responsibilities, further analysis is needed for scaling of equipment and vehicle holdings at Reserve unit level, including the provision of low-tech simulation alternatives.

Recommendation 13.6 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 5, 6, 17, 18 & 23)

FR20 Army basing should take account of regional capacity to recruit, not just to facilitate proximity, and should also be phased to initially preserve current TA manpower until such time as alternative inflow is more fully developed.

Recommendation 13.7 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 8, 22 & 23)

That work is initiated to look at the potential to employ Reserves with critical skills, where their employment was best served in a reach-back rather than deployed role; and that their TACOS be examined for appropriate adjustment.

Recommendation 13.8 (Link to the Commission's report, Annex C, paragraph 8)

That senior military and political leadership initiate a comprehensive information campaign with the Services' middle management to address the cultural change necessary to secure FR20, drawing on the narrative we recommend above.

SUMMARY OF 2014 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 14.1 Further work on Whole Force and the New Employment Model, coupled with the desirability of easier transfers between Regular and Reserve service, suggest that the necessity of merging the Armed Forces' Act and the Reserve Forces' Act should be kept under review.

Recommendation 14.2 The narrative developed for the White Paper should be updated to take account of FR20 delivery to date and used more extensively to market the value of Reserve service and the recruiting offer. It should also be used more extensively cross-government.

Recommendation 14.3 FR20 measures which seek to bring down the average age of Reservists should be phased to follow those measures which will rely heavily on Reservist knowledge and experience for their introduction.

Recommendation 14.4 The single Services should examine the scope to apply a 'special measures approach' to turning round those units and sub-units most in need of assistance in reaching FR20 targets.

Recommendation 14.5 The single Services should examine a range of measures which better preserve the corporate memory of their Reserve components, including procedures for recording whether and how savings measures are planned to be restored during programming.

Recommendation 14.6 Recruiting processes should be subject to continuous improvement measures, with recognition that central marketing and advertising campaigns must be complemented by appropriately funded local/unit activity to nurture and retain applicants through the process.

Recommendation 14.7 Final decisions on Reserve Centre laydown and unit/sub-unit closures should be re-tested against local recruiting capacity and retention factors.

Recommendation 14.8 In order to ensure that necessary differences between Regular and Reserve service are appropriately managed, the single Services should consider the reintroduction of a dedicated Reserve career management staff branch (predominantly manned and led by Reservists) within their Personnel Headquarters.

Recommendation 14.9 Command appointments of Reserve units should continue to provide opportunity for part-time volunteer officers. When part-time volunteers are appointed, command team manning of the unit should be reviewed to ensure that the commanding officer is fully supported with no gapping in key headquarters posts.

Recommendation 14.10 The MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal that a contingency reserve fund should be established to be available for short duration domestic operations making use of Reserves.

SUMMARY OF 2015 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 15.1 The MOD give further consideration to how it will safeguard the ability of Reserves to play a proportionate part in resilience operations, especially once the Reserves are at full Manning and would otherwise have to dilute funds for annual training to offset costs.

Recommendation 15.2 Working within the existing governance system, build more inter-Service cooperation on experimentation and best practice on recruiting and retention, whether or not initiatives are universally adopted.

Recommendation 15.3 The three Services should review the separate roles played by the national call centres, the Armed Forces Careers Offices, the recruiting field forces and Reserve units to ensure that they are clearly optimised for Reserve recruiting.

Recommendation 15.4 The MOD and the Services should review the medical entry standards required of recruits and ensure that the screening contracts are appropriately incentivised and assured to achieve success.

Recommendation 15.5 The Services should initiate work to determine the recruiting resources necessary to ensure steady state Manning of the Reserve beyond the FR20 period.

Recommendation 15.6 The Services should examine what more could be done to enhance Manning through retention-positive measures, at least in the short-term, including bespoke extra-mural activities targeted at the Reserve.

Recommendation 15.7 FR20 planning and risk mitigation should increasingly turn more attention to the growth of capability within the Reserve component, rather than a slavish pursuit of numerical growth.

Recommendation 15.8 Army Reserve basing requirements should be revisited as a consequence of availability of funds to deliver the original basing concept and on the evidence of other FR20 achievement; link to Recommendation 15.10.

Recommendation 15.9 DIO and the Services should review their multi-activity and support contracts and, where relevant, explore ways in which they can be amended to ensure that they are Reserve-friendly.

Recommendation 15.10 The Services should conduct a command-led stock-take on all aspects of FR20 implementation by the end of FY 2015/16 and share lessons learned; link with recommendation 15.8.

SUMMARY OF 2016 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 16.1 An urgent contract review of the Army Recruiting Partnership.

Recommendation 16.2 The Services undertake more granular analysis within their data gathering, to reduce the risk of specialist manning gaps in the final years of FR20 and beyond.

Recommendation 16.3 The high incidence of medical deferrals and time to resolution remain under close scrutiny in order to reduce both.

Recommendation 16.4 The Royal Navy and Army absorb recent innovations in officer Phase 1 training into their core officer development activity, as the issue will require sustained attention well beyond the timeframe of FR20.

Recommendation 16.5 Consideration be given to greater cross-pollination, shared practice and coordination between the three Services in the officer recruiting environment, particularly in the area of achieving greater penetration of the Higher and Further Education recruiting hinterland.

Recommendation 16.6 The Services keep under review the impact of losing Op FORTIFY enhancements (or Service equivalents) and, where appropriate to sustain recruiting beyond 2019, bring relevant elements into their core activity.

Recommendation 16.7 The Services examine units which have a significant young officer deficit to determine whether a poor proposition might be the cause and, if so, to assess whether it can be legitimately improved.

Recommendation 16.8 The Army consider how the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force use their Reserves in order to develop a better understanding of potential use of Auxiliaries in the Army Reserve; and that such analysis helps shape policies for the future employment system.

Recommendation 16.9 The Army revisits the decision to withdraw LADs from Reserve units to create REME battalions.

Recommendation 16.10 The manner in which Reserves can be routinely employed on national operations or for back-fill be revisited.

Recommendation 16.11 The Reserve narrative be reviewed to ensure it cannot be interpreted as intent to prevent use of Reservists for routine mobilisation and on national operations.

Recommendation 16.12 Work on defining the Army Reserve officer career pathway be re-invigorated.

Recommendation 16.13 Defence reviews whether a more flexible range of employment terms should be considered, to better incentivise recruitment and to provide more agility within a Whole Force approach to employment.

Recommendation 16.14 As options are considered for disposal of Regular estate, decisions are not taken before current or potential usefulness to Reserve capability-building has also been taken into account.

Recommendation 16.15 MOD and the Services recognise incomplete cultural change will be the main impediment to FR20 delivery and long-term Reserve sustainability, and introduce specific measures to inculcate cultural change.

Recommendation 16.16 The importance of localism for effective sub-unit command be addressed by simplifying systems where possible; providing adequate permanent staff support; and keeping training requirements at practical levels.

PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER WORK

2013/14 WORK

- Medical Reserves, to ensure coherence with single Service plans.
- Manpower metrics.
- Manpower MIS.
- Unit and sub-unit leadership and management.
- The recruiting & training pipelines and process effectiveness.
- Development of integrated training and (where relevant) pairing mechanisms.
- Harmonisation of training directives and resources.
- Enhanced measures for engaging with employers.
- Improved relationships with employers
- Families' welfare.
- Terms and Conditions of Service.
- Cost of Reserves.

2014/15 WORK

- Terms and Conditions of Service for Reserves.
- Medical screening process and regional performance.
- Maritime Reserves pipeline improvement pilots.
- Reserve officer recruiting, training and development.
- The Reserve recruiting and training pipeline to Phase 2.
- Concepts of employment and manning for the Medical Reserves.
- Contractual constraints.
- Single Service arrangements for personnel and career management of Reserves.

2015/16 WORK

Review

- An assessment of the conclusions and implementation of adjustments arising from the Army Reserve stock-take; parallel reviews within the other Services; and arrangements to share findings.
- Progress with the Reserve Footprint Strategy.

Funding

- Costing and cost comparison modelling.
- Governance and assurance arrangements for the £1.8bn FR20 funding.

Capability

- Development and growth of Reserve capabilities. Initial points of interest:
 - › Joint and single Service progress with Medical capability.
 - › Arrangements for Reserves use within employing formations.
 - › Development of defence engagement and resilience roles for Reserves.
 - › Refinement of the proposition, with particular attention to officers.
 - › Achievement of mandated collective training at unit and sub-unit level.

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Progress towards FR20 manning levels.
- Sustainability of long-term support arrangements for Reserves, particularly to maintain inflow once measures such as Op FORTIFY have run their course.
- Effectiveness of retention positive activity.
- Capacity of Phase 2 and 3 training arrangements.

Management

- Progress with personnel management change implementation.

Betterment

- Provision and availability of unit equipment.
- Provision and availability of individual and collective training opportunity.

Infrastructure

- Progress with FR20 basing.

2016/17 WORK**Policy Review**

- An assessment of the impact of Army 2020 Refine work on the Army Reserve.
- Progress with the Reserve Footprint Strategy.
- Applicability and application of the Reserves narrative.

Funding

- Costing and cost comparison modelling.
- Arrangements for final programme reconciliation of the £1.8Bn FR20 funding.
- Impact of post SDSR 15 efficiency measures and budget pressures.

Capability

- Development and growth of Reserve capabilities. Initial points of interest:
 - › Joint and single Service progress with Medical capability.
 - › Arrangements for Reserves to be routinely mobilised and used.
 - › Development of defence engagement and resilience roles for Reserves.
 - › Refinement of the proposition, with particular attention to officers.
 - › Achievement of mandated collective training at unit and sub-unit level.
 - › Impact of efficiency measures on capability development.

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Progress towards FR20 manning levels.
- Sustainability of long-term support arrangements for Reserves, post Op FORTIFY.
- Effectiveness of retention positive activity.
- Entry Medical deferrals and rates of resolution.
- Training output standards and provision for progression from Phase 1 to Phase 3.
- Coherence of statements of training requirements (SOTR) with future employability.
- Policies for establishing and maintaining the training and manning margin.

Management

- Progress with personnel management change implementation.
- Progress creating an Army Reserve officer career pathway.
- Measures to build on initiatives such as the Engineer Staff Corps.
- Arrangements for professional development for young officers and SNCOs.

Infrastructure

- Progress with FR20 basing and coherence with the Basing Strategy.

Cultural Change

- Measures to effect cultural change and measurement of their effectiveness.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE RESPONSE TO 2016 EST REPORT



SECRETARY OF STATE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 FLOOR 5 ZONE D MAIN BUILDING
 WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone: 020 721 82111/2/3
 Fax: 020 721 87140
 E-mail: defencesecretary-group@mod.uk

4.4.2.10

1st December 2016

Dear General Brims

In my letter of 21 July, I said I would write to you again after I had taken some time to consider in detail the recommendations made in the External Scrutiny Team's 2016 report. Specific comments on each of the recommendations are at the Annex to this letter but I should also like to respond to some of the other observations the team has made.

Firstly, I should like to take the opportunity to thank you and the team again for the report. The independent scrutiny that you are able to bring to the Reserve Forces and the delivery of the Future Reserves programme is most welcome and is highly valuable to the MOD.

The report covers a year of continued growth in the strength of our Reserve Forces. In the year to 1 April 2016, 8,200 people joined the FR20 volunteer reserve, an increase of over 20% compared with the previous 12 month period. Trained strength as at 1 October stood at 30,580, which means we have almost reached the April 2017 target. The total strength of the Army Reserve increased by over 7% between October 2015 and October 2016 and the Army is confident that it will reach its trained strength target. The Royal Auxiliary Air Force have now reached their 2019 FR20 trained strength target and they are continuing to grow. We remain committed to our plan to create a trained Reserve force of around 35,000 by 2019 and we are on course to do so.

Reservists have continued to make a significant contribution to UK Defence operations worldwide. Some 870 reservists have been accepted into permanent service since October 2015, including to the "Train, Advise and Assist" mission in Afghanistan, as formed units in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands and in support of the UK Border Force's operations in the Mediterranean and around the UK.

I recognise and understand the team's concerns about the Army's Recruit Partnering Project (RPP). This is a critical programme, which has experienced considerable challenges and which has yet to deliver to full capability. It is a programme that we keep under close review at the highest levels. However considerable progress has been made to improve performance, both by the contractor, Capita, and by the Army and we will continue to review delivery and performance of this contract.

The report makes a number of recommendations relating to officer recruitment and training and I am pleased to say that we have made considerable progress in this area over the past year. The Maritime Reserve has now established its Accelerated Officer Programme (formerly Project HERMES) as routine business and is looking to expand its coverage nationwide. The Army's modular training programme is proving very successful and has been taken into the core Sandhurst programme. The Army is also considering how it might

Lt Gen Robins Brims CB CBE DSO DL
Chairman
RFCA External Scrutiny team

Enclosure


deliver officer training regionally. A number of other initiatives are also being pursued to put in place structures and programmes to provide enduring capability to meet the challenge of officer recruiting and training. I anticipate that we will see that these efforts are beginning to have a positive effect.

Culture change is, as I have said previously, an enduring challenge. I am reassured by the Team's comments on the progress that has already been made, but no-one would dispute that there is still much more to be done to embed the Whole Force ethos. Over the past few months, we have been developing a set of key indicators of culture change and we have put in place a process through which the Services will assess their progress against these indicators and provide evidence of progress to senior leadership in the Department. The new reporting tool will allow us to identify areas of real progress and to share examples of good practice as much as it identifies issues that still need to be addressed.

That said, we must not forget that one reason we need Reserves is because they can bring distinctive skills and expertise to the Armed Forces. So we also face a challenge to make sure that this expertise is respected and acknowledged as essential to delivering defence outputs, rather than being seen as a divisive factor. I firmly believe that there is a real commitment in all the Services to achieve culture change and work towards greater integration and interoperability. I am particularly grateful for the suggestions from the Team about areas we might explore further in this context.

The report also suggests that the MOD should carry out a review of employment terms to incentivise recruitment and provide more agility within a whole force approach to employment. The Reserves do, of course, already offer the Services considerable flexibility to attract the right people and respond to changing operational and business requirements. Reserve service can also attract people who are looking for a new challenge but who do not find the idea of joining the military full-time appealing. All the Services recognise the value of the flexibility afforded by the Reserves and are keen to encourage it. But we do recognise that there may still be barriers to promoting a continuum of service between the Regulars and the Reserves. We are working to establish exactly where the barriers exist and what could be done to minimise them.

I was interested in the observation that that the Further and Higher Education sectors might be promising areas for exploration in terms of Reserve recruitment. Our own research indicates that certain elements of the Reserves offer could be particularly attractive to students, including remuneration, opportunities to travel, learning new skills and improving their cases for employment and promotion. Work is in hand to consider how we might engage more effectively with the education sectors. We should, for instance, consider whether we could or should widen the scope of University Service Units to include those who might be interested in non-officer entry. This could certainly be attractive to those pursuing technical or vocational studies.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Michael Fallon". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly stylized font. Above the main signature, there is a smaller, less legible handwritten mark that appears to be "7 m = 2".

THE RT HON SIR MICHAEL FALLON KCB MP

ANNEX TO 4.4.2.10**RFCA EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM
RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS****16.1. An urgent contract review of the Army Recruiting Partnership.**

The Recruit Partnering Project performance remains under close and continual review. Ministers and officials at the highest levels of the Department are highly attuned to current performance and Capita are rigorously held to account through the performance management regime.

16.2. The Services undertake more granular analysis within their data gathering, to reduce the risk of specialist manning gaps in the final years of FR20 and beyond.

The Services have undertaken this type of analysis for some time. New entrants to the Maritime Reserve are not streamed into specialisms until after phase 1 training is complete, so specialisms can be managed in accordance with requirements. Trained entrants can also be used to fill particular specialist roles. The Army has detailed data available for key specialisms within the Army Reserve and the AMS capbadges, which provides granular detail of the current capability gaps. They are developing a Reserves Manpower Assessment Process which will provide a detailed projection of the Army Reserve by capbadge and rank. The RAF analyse data on a routine basis and use it when setting recruiting targets by Branch and Trade.

16.3. The high incidence of medical deferrals and time to resolution remain under close scrutiny in order to reduce both.

The Services now have access to much better data on the numbers of medical deferrals and the reasons for them. Exemptions from the standard entry requirements continue to be granted, where the Services are confident that this does not present an unacceptable risk when set against skills value. The medical process is kept under close scrutiny but no particular concerns are identified at present.

16.4. The Royal Navy and Army absorb recent innovations in officer Phase 1 training into their core officer development activity, as the issue will require sustained attention well beyond the timeframe of FR20.

Significant progress has been made on officer training over the past year. The Maritime Reserves' Accelerated Officer Programme (formerly project HERMES) is now normal business. The Army's modular Reserve Officer Commissioning Course is proving very successful and has been fully brought into the core Sandhurst programme. The Army is also looking to develop a "distributed" training programme to allow the regional footprint to deliver the Platoon Command and Tactics programmes. The newly established "Sandhurst CHAMPION" programme seeks to nurture prospective Army Reserve Officer applicants and there are regional Young Officer Development Advisors to provide support and assist Officer candidates with their applications and through the Commissioning pipeline.

16.5. Consideration be given to greater cross-pollination, shared practice and coordination between the three Services in the officer recruiting environment, particularly in the area of achieving greater penetration of the Higher and Further Education recruiting hinterland.

There are mechanisms in place that allow the Services to share examples of good practice in recruiting and selection. For example, the Accelerated Officer Programme was inspired by an Army initiative and the Army's decision to allow early attestation was taken following discussion with Navy staffs about their experience. Work is being undertaken by MOD to identify opportunities for more effective engagement with the Further and Higher Education sectors through development of the approach to University Service Units in order to support and sustain recruitment.

16.6. The Services keep under review the impact of losing Op FORTIFY enhancements (or Service equivalents) and, where appropriate to sustain recruiting beyond 2019, bring relevant elements into their core activity.

The RN and RAF have already built in enhanced staffing levels as an enduring arrangement. The Army Management Consultancy Service is conducting a review of Op FORTIFY manning enhancements to determine those that must endure in structures beyond 2020.

16.7. The Services examine units which have a significant young officer deficit to determine whether a poor proposition might be the cause and, if so, to assess whether it can be legitimately improved.

There can be various reasons for difficulty in attracting and retaining young officers, including unit location and outside pressures from work or family commitments. The Maritime Reserves are addressing their young officer deficit through the development and national deployment of the Accelerated Officer Programme. The Army Reserve is developing a reporting tool, with a view to identifying any potential 'poor proposition' and which units carry the highest gaps. The RAF has no significant concerns in this area. It is perhaps worth noting that in the Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey 2016, around 9 out of 10 reservists said life in the Reserves is about the same as they expected or better than they expected and more than three-quarters of volunteer reservists are satisfied with life in the Reserves in general, with similar levels of satisfaction being reported among Officers and Other Ranks.

16.8. The Army consider how the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force use their Reserves in order to develop a better understanding of potential use of Auxiliaries in the Army Reserve; and that such analysis helps shape policies for the future employment system.

The Army already employs reservists on an individual basis rather than as part of a formed unit or sub unit, for example in intelligence or cyber roles. There are no obvious barriers to the Army making more use of individual reservists if they believe this is the best way to meet particular operational or capability requirements.

16.9. The Army revisits the decision to withdraw LADs from Reserve units to create REME battalions.

The decision will be considered further as part of the work to refine the Army 2020 structure.

16.10. The manner in which Reserves can be routinely employed on national operations or for back-fill be revisited.

We have always supported the use of Reserves for national operations and backfill. It is up to Standing Joint Command (SJC) (UK), in conjunction with Service Commands, to determine the mix of Regulars and Reserves required for UK operations. We are actively working with SJC to identify any policy or process issues that may hinder the use of reservists and to remove these barriers wherever possible.

16.11. The Reserve narrative be reviewed to ensure it cannot be interpreted as intent to prevent use of Reservists for routine mobilisation and on national operations.

Our policy position has always been made clear through internal and external communications: Reserves will be utilised whenever it makes sense to do so, whether as individuals or in formed units or sub units.

16.12. Work on defining the Army Reserve officer career pathway be re-invigorated.

The initial implementation of the Reserve Officer Career Review (ROCR) recommendations has been driven by the Army Personnel Centre. This saw an uplift of 45 Army Reserve posts to provide appropriate Reserve Career Structures. The ROCR recommended follow-on phases for 4* and 3* Headquarters, which link to Army Command Review outputs. Initially the Army's Director of Reserves will lead on analysis of the further work required.

16.13 Defence reviews whether a more flexible range of employment terms should be considered, to better incentivise recruitment and to provide more agility within a whole force approach to employment.

In SDSR 15, we said that we would seek to develop a Flexible Engagements System (FES) which will "provide improved opportunities for Reservists to be employed in higher commitment jobs for which they have the knowledge skills and experience that Defence needs". FES is being led by the Chief of Defence People and supported by the single Services as a project within the Armed Forces People Programme. All Reserve Terms of Service are being examined by FES, including Full Time Reserve Service and the Additional Duties Commitment.

16.14 As options are considered for disposal of Regular estate, decisions are not taken before current or potential usefulness to Reserve capability-building has also been taken into account.

The Footprint Strategy has been developed to consider the best way to use the estate for the whole of Defence. The Strategy seeks to balance maintaining capability with managing the cost of the estate and with revenue generation. The principal aim of the Footprint Strategy is to provide a significantly smaller but better estate that is affordable to run, maintain and sustain. Decisions on basing and infrastructure will take the needs of Reserves into account as far as is possible and practicable within the aims of the Strategy.

16.15 MOD and the Services recognise incomplete cultural change will be the main impediment to FR20 delivery and long-term Reserve sustainability, and introduce specific measures to inculcate cultural change.

We agree that sustaining the changes being made through the Future Reserves Programme will depend on delivering a Whole Force culture in the long term. The development of a self-assessment tool for the single Services to use and report back to senior commanders will enable MOD and the single Services to identify areas of concern as well as areas of good practice.

16.16 The importance of localism for effective sub-unit command be addressed by simplifying systems where possible; providing adequate permanent staff support; and keeping training requirements at practical levels.

We agree in principle, while acknowledging that it will not always be practical or appropriate to offer command opportunities to part-time reservists. The Army is undertaking a number of initiatives to incentivise and improve command opportunities for reserve offices. Areas of recent improvement include:

- adjustments to Army Reserve Centre locations to attract membership from the local population;
- a project under 'Programme OLYMPIA' that seeks to provide a digital platform to the Army Reserve. This will reduce the administrative workload on the sub-unit, enable better flows of information, and promote remote working practises;
- manpower to support sub-units, including a number of Regimental Sub-Unit Support Officers;
- the Army Inspectorate has recently reviewed the Army's assurance processes and recommended a number of ways to reduce the burden on units and sub-units.



MOD TARGETS FOR RESERVE STRENGTH AND RECRUITING

The table shows trained strength targets for the Maritime Reserve, Army Reserve and Royal Auxiliary Air Force up to FY 2018.

Table 1	Target	End FY 13	End FY 14	End FY 15	End FY 16	End FY 17	End FY 18
Maritime Reserve	Trained Strength	1,780	1,790	1,900	2,320	2,790	3,100
Army Reserve	Trained Strength	18,800	19,900	20,200	22,900	26,100	30,100
Royal Auxiliary Air Force	Trained Strength	1,200	1,400	1,600	1,860	1,860	1,860
Total	Trained Strength	21,780	23,090	23,700	27,080	30,750	35,060



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DEFENCE STATISTICS - RESERVE MANNING ACHIEVEMENT & TRENDS²⁴

Headline Figures

Table 1. Total and trained² strength of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20)¹.

	2012 1 Apr	2013 1 Apr	2014 1 Apr	2015 1 Apr	2016 1 Apr	2017 1 Apr	Change 2016/2017
All Services							
Total strength	30,070	29,390	28,150	30,810	34,760	36,220	+ 1,470
Trained strength	22,960	22,880	23,360	24,630	27,270 II	31,360	.. ²
Maritime Reserve							
Total strength	2,570	2,610	2,850	3,160	3,540	3,560	+ 10
Trained strength	1,830	1,760	1,870	1,980	2,350	2,560	+ 200
Army Reserve							
Total strength	25,980	25,240	23,580	25,440	28,670	29,940	+ 1,270
Trained strength	20,000	19,930	20,060	21,030	23,030 II	26,660	.. ²
RAF Reserves							
Total strength	1,520	1,540	1,720	2,220	2,540	2,730	+ 180
Trained strength	1,130	1,190	1,430	1,620	1,890	2,150	+ 260


Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Appendices:


1. Maritime Reserves.
2. Army Reserves.
3. RAF Reserves.
4. Officer data.
5. Qualifying notes.

24. Data is drawn from the Defence Statistics Report as at 1 Apr 2017.

Maritime Reserve



Maritime Reserve cumulative financial year to date Intake




Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.


Maritime Reserve monthly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow



Note:

Gains to trained strength figures comprise personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Maritime Reserve.


Army Reserve



Note:

Break in series represents the change in definition of Army Trained Strength in October 2016 from Phase 2 to Phase 1 trained.

Army Reserve cumulative financial year to date Intake




Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service. Break in series represents the **change and definition of Army Trained Strength** in October 2016 from Phase 2 to Phase 1 trained.

Army Reserve monthly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow




Note:


Gains to trained strength figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 1 (post-October 2016) training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Army Reserve. Break in series represents the **change in definition of Army Trained Strength** in October 2016 from Phase 2 to Phase 1 trained. Gains to trained strength and outflow from trained strength data are unavailable for the month of September 2016 as a result.

RAuxAF

RAF Reserve Strength



RAF Reserve cumulative financial year to date Intake




Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

RAF Reserve monthly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow



Note:

Gains to trained strength figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the RAF Reserves.

Officers

This year the MOD declined to provide us with Officer manning and recruiting data.

Accompanying Notes to Tables

1. Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) includes Volunteer Reserves who are mobilised, HRR and Volunteer Reserve personnel serving on ADC or FTRS contracts. Sponsored Reserves who provide a more cost effective solution than Volunteer Reserves are also included in the Army Reserve FR20. Non Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS), Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) and University Officer Cadets and Regular Reservists are excluded.
2. Trained Strength comprises military personnel who have completed Phase 1 and 2 Training for Maritime Reserve, the Army Reserve (prior to 1 October 2016) and the Royal Air Force Reserves. Following the change in definition of trained strength from 1 October 2016, trained strength for the Army Reserve comprises of personnel who have completed Phase 1 Training. This is highlighted by the discontinuity marker in the tri-Service and Army Reserve time series – some figures are not directly comparable to previous years' as a result.
3. Intake to the FR20 shows the most recent previous service recorded on JPA including those serving in another Reserve service. Personnel may have had a break in service and may have served in more than one role.
4. Outflow from the FR20 includes those personnel moving to another part of the Armed Forces within the calendar month. 'Left the Armed Forces' may include those who have a break in service before joining another part of the Armed Forces.
5. Intake and outflow from the Regular Forces includes transfers to another service.

Rounding

Figures have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in '5' have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. Totals and subtotals have been rounded separately and may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.

Symbols

r	Figure revised since last publication
~	5 or fewer
-	Zero
..	Data not available
	Discontinuity marker

Revisions

There has been a minor change in the methodology used to produce Reserves statistics from 1 April 2017. This now allows us to capture individuals who intake and outflow within the same month. For example, if an individual joins on 3 March and leaves on 29 March they are now counted as an intake and an outflow under the new methodology, whereas previously this would not have been identifiable. The net effect of this change on our Statistics is negligible; revised figures in these tables never differ from previously by greater than ten personnel. This change does, however, improve both the accuracy and efficiency of our processes by, for example, improving identification of those Officers who previously served in University Service Units. The historic back-series of Reserves data affected has been revised to reflect this – figures affected have been marked with an 'r'.

2017 REPORT MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

- 17.1** A repeat recommendation that a formal contract review of the Recruiting Partnership be undertaken. (Paragraph 19)
- 17.2** That the continued employment of RSUSOs is revisited. (Paragraph 20)
- 17.3** That the use of medical waivers during recruiting should be better advertised to RN and Army units, and other relevant participants in the recruiting chain. (Paragraph 21)
- 17.4** That the Army should examine where the medical waiver authority is best lodged. (Paragraph 21)
- 17.5** That the single Services should review their recruiting medical contracts to ensure assessments are carried out with a greater degree of consistency and common sense. (Paragraph 23)
- 17.6** That the Services identify which units have experienced the most successful officer recruitment and explore the best means by which their successes can then be exported to less successful units. (Paragraph 24)
- 17.7** The Army should revitalise work to create a Reserve officer career pathway. (Paragraph 28)
- 17.8** That the Army develop and implement a policy to support appropriately Reserve unit commanding officers when the incumbent is a part time volunteer. (Paragraph 30)
- 17.9** That the MOD, Joint Forces Command and the single Services review the terms under which Reserves are included on or in support of operations, in order to develop protocols which make their inclusion easier. (Paragraph 35)
- 17.10** That the Services resist short-term in-year budgetary palliatives which directly or indirectly reduce routine Reserve activity. (Paragraph 37)
- 17.11** That the Services now initiate work to determine optimum return-of-service/ retention rate(s) for their Reserves and put in place measures to achieve them, with the same vigour that they have applied in their recruiting effort. (Paragraph 39)
- 17.12** That work on the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing VE until a new strategy can be implemented. (Paragraph 48)
- 17.13** That the MOD update the work on mental health in the Services that it has undertaken with King's College and commission fresh work to look specifically at the current situation for Reserves. (Paragraph 51)



SUMMARY OF PRIORITIES FOR 2017/18 WORK

In addition to the formal requirements set out in the Reserve Forces Act, the following themes will be subjected to particular scrutiny during the 2017/18 reporting period, many of which are interrelated:

Policy Review

- Progress with the Reserve Footprint and Basing Strategies.
- Progress with the Future Employment System.

Funding

- Attribution and final programme reconciliation of the £1.8Bn FR20 funding.
- Impact of post SDSR 15 efficiency measures and budget pressures.

Capability

Development and use of Reserve capabilities (all Services):

- Joint and single Service progress with Medical capability.
- Arrangements for Reserves to be routinely mobilised and used.
- Integration with employing formations.
- Arrangements for Reserves to support 'other formation' exercises.
- Progress with skills mapping

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Steady state support arrangements for Reserves.
- Effectiveness of retention positive activity.
- Entry Medical deferrals and rates of resolution.
- Phase 2 and Phase 3 training (including establishment visits).
- Progress to establish and maintain training and manning margin.

Management

- Progress with personnel management change implementation.
- Progress creating an Army Reserve officer career pathway.
- Arrangements for professional development for young officers and SNCOs.

Infrastructure

- Progress with FR20 basing and coherence with the Basing Strategy.

Cultural Change

- Measures to effect cultural change and measurement of their effectiveness.

Specific Visits

- RFCA-arranged Reserve Centre visits in and around: Leeds, Greater London, South East England, East Anglia and East Midlands.
- Headquarters CGRM, RN Capability Directors, Headquarters 1 Division, Headquarters 1 and 38 Group.
- Exercise Joint Warrior.

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM – MEMBERSHIP

Chairman:

Lieutenant General (Retd) R V Brims CB CBE DSO DL

Members:

Major General (Retd) S F N Lalor CB TD

Brigadier P R Mixer (Retd) OStJ QVRM TD DL

Captain I M Robinson (Retd) OBE RD RNR

Colonel T S Richmond (Retd) OBE TD DL FCA

C N Donnelly CMG TD BA

Clerk:

Air Vice-Marshal (Retd) P D Luker CB OBE AFC DL

Clerk (Designate):

Major General (Retd) J H Gordon CB CBE



**The Council of RFCAs
Holderness House,
51-61 Clifton Street,
London EC2A 4EY**

Tel: 020 7426 8350

Email: co-info@rfca.mod.uk

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