



# The use of targets in policing

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## Foreword



On being asked by the Home Secretary to conduct a review into the use of targets in policing, I knew that it would be a significant challenge. I also knew, however, that the review would present an opportunity to examine an issue that had been a 'bone of contention' for many in policing in recent years, albeit the review was set very tight timescales in which to do this.

My personal views on the use of targets in policing are well known by many through my speeches, blogs and social media comments on the issue, and are consistent with the views that the Home Secretary has espoused in numerous speeches in the past. I decided from the start, however, that this review would be constructive for policing.

I did not intend to rehearse the arguments for/against the use of targets in policing to any great extent – there are clearly opposing views on this issue, heavily weighted towards those who do not support the use of targets, and I did not feel that repeating these would be particularly constructive. Instead I wanted to take the opportunity that the review presents to seek out good practice in an area that many forces are struggling with – developing an effective performance management framework that ensures accurate recording of data and at the same time empowers staff to make the right decisions for victims of crime.

I know from my own personal experience that it is not just targets that cause concerns and anxiety for many officers and staff, but it is a wider issue of how performance is measured and managed across policing. It is in this area that I believe this review can add value, and I believe that the recommendations, if implemented, will assist forces in navigating their way through what can be a complex landscape.

Many readers will recognise that policing does not take place in a bubble, it is part of a wider system, and the success or otherwise of forces is in many ways influenced by the performance of other organisations. Unfortunately, however, there was neither the scope nor the time within this review to consider in any great detail the performance management frameworks of other organisations or partnerships that have some common purpose with policing or whose activities influence policing activity, demand or outcomes.

Ultimately the main purpose of this review has been to identify 'what works' in terms of performance measurement and management in policing to ensure that the public, and victims, receive the best possible service and remain at the heart of policing activity. They must not be unintentionally forgotten in any desire to 'chase figures'.

Irene Curtis

## Executive Summary

Policing needs to change to respond to the challenges of the future, including the changing nature of crime, the increasing range and complexity of demand, continued financial constraints and the rapid pace of technological change. As forces adapt to changing circumstances, performance frameworks will also need to adapt to help the police make decisions to meet these challenges – and to understand whether or not they are succeeding.

Numeric targets have seen extensive use in policing for many years, as part of both local and national police performance frameworks. The Public Service Agreements (PSAs) of the 1990s in particular created a slew of national targets in policing and across the public sector more widely. Since then, problems associated with targets such as ‘gaming’ and ‘perverse incentives’ have been well documented and targets have gradually been dropped by many forces. The last of the national targets in policing (for increasing public confidence and targets for response times, included in the policing pledge) were removed by the Home Secretary in 2010.

This review aims in the first instance to understand the extent to which targets – and their associated behaviours – persist and has involved desk research, interviews, force visits and a survey of police officers and staff. Over 6,000 people completed the survey and, while methodological limitations mean the results need to be interpreted with caution, the fact that so many officers and staff took the time to respond is telling of how strongly many feel about this subject.

It is important at the outset to clarify the distinction between targets and measures. A measure (or indicator) is simply a source of information that can help users of performance data make informed decisions. A ‘target’ relates to a particular level of performance that is to be aimed for, met or exceeded over a period of time.

The review has found that most forces have generally moved away from the use of hard numeric targets, with a few exceptions. Target setting, however, appears to be not uncommon at sub-force level by those in supervisory roles.

What has come through most clearly in the review is the difference between performance cultures that are narrowly focused on ‘chasing numbers’ to the detriment of other aspects – and those that have developed a broader definition of performance, which supports evidence-based problem-solving and genuine improvement of services. The review has found that while the former was often associated with targets, the simple removal of targets by itself does not turn the one into the other. Over time, the priorities, processes and behaviours that develop under a target-driven regime can become entrenched – and the removal of targets alone is not sufficient to effect change.

The challenge forces face is to develop a performance framework that not only provides a good understanding of the business in order to help effective decision-making, but also enables individuals to be appropriately held to account, whilst ensuring that they remain focused on doing the right thing for the public and for victims and in an environment where they are empowered to do so.

This review has sought, therefore, to focus on the success factors for an effective performance culture. By doing so, it has identified a number of key themes:

**Organisational purpose** – measures need to reflect the purpose of the system and to provide useful information about how the ‘whole system’ is performing. For policing this means balancing crime measures with non-crime measures that help the police, police and crime commissioners (PCCs) and their partners understand how the system is working for the protection of the vulnerable, supporting victims, and responding to demand overall. Performance measurement frameworks therefore require a balance of input, process, output and outcome measures. Presently there is too much emphasis on police recorded crime and proxy measures that are easily quantifiable, yet which may not directly indicate whether performance is ‘good’.

A number of factors currently influence forces’ choices of performance measures. For example, the Home Office requirement for victim satisfaction data includes a requirement to survey victims of vehicle crime, which many forces might otherwise not deem a priority. Similarly, feedback from Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) rightly carries significant weight with forces. However, concerns were expressed that HMIC scrutiny creates undue focus on quantitative data, inter force comparisons and league tables.

**Decision making and problem-solving** – measures should help the organisation make decisions about how to improve performance. Performance information should be seen as the raw material for further enquiry, to help managers understand problems, make good decisions and improve the system. This requires forces to take a problem-solving approach and continually review the questions they are asking about performance. There are some instances of good practice here but more forces need to challenge themselves that they are seeking out the right information and presenting it in the right format in order to help make improvements, not just ‘monitoring’ a raft of indicators.

**Accurate data recording** – is critical to good performance measurement. Forces need accurate data in order to understand what is happening in their area, to enable them to deploy resources effectively to prevent further crimes/incidents, and to enable the effective investigation of offences. The review found a high level of awareness of, and commitment to, ethical crime recording. However, comments from officers at various ranks show that performance pressures still exist that can result in less accurate data being recorded (despite the best efforts of others to negate these). One such source of pressure is the publication of police recorded crime data as a measure of police performance. In addition, accurate recording in accordance with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) can sometimes appear at odds with officers’ desire to use their discretion to seek proportionate, victim-based crime outcomes that do not criminalise individuals unnecessarily.

Accurate recording of incidents will also help forces to better understand demand and make useful comparisons between forces. It is acknowledged by many forces that there remains a gap in meaningful data on calls for service for matters other than crime.

**A proportionate approach** – an effective performance management framework should not create unnecessary layers of reporting or bureaucracy. Rather, it should align naturally with the organisation’s decision-making and scrutiny processes, with the right level of information made available at the right time to those who need to use it. Many forces are in the process of establishing new performance approaches. Good practice is characterised by critically examining how information supports decision-making, and trusting professionals to do their jobs, rather than holding on to information as a ‘comfort blanket’. The approach that still exists in some forces can drive inflexible ways of working, remove discretion from officers and generate unnecessary bureaucracy.

**Leadership and culture** – successfully embedding new approaches to performance management requires culture change. This begins with leaders communicating a clear vision linked to organisational purpose. It then needs leaders to ‘walk the talk’ – by setting the standards and culture and ensuring that the desired behaviours are consistently communicated, supported and appropriately recognised throughout the organisation.

All managers must have the skills and abilities to understand and interpret performance information and to use it effectively to make decisions. There is evidence of some managers being reluctant to let go of targets, often because it is the only experience they have of managing performance. Poor management behaviours can weaken morale and erode teamwork. Professional development needs to address all aspects of performance management, from understanding data to the ‘softer’ skills required for coaching and holding performance conversations.

**Communication** – the communication of performance measures should demonstrate a clear link to the organisation’s purpose, and should allow everyone in the organisation to understand progress towards outcomes. Language used to describe performance should be commonly understood and consistent with behaviour. (Effective communication is also key to changing culture.)

Forces need to invest in the way performance is communicated – both internally and externally. Presently there is an over-reliance on top-down, one-way communication; staff must have a voice to feed back their views and concerns. Forces also need to ensure that messages and language are in line with practice.

The above themes are echoed in a draft set of guiding principles for performance measurement in policing, originally drawn up in 2014 by the national business area for performance measurement, and submitted to the review team. A key recommendation is that these be developed further and finalised by the College of Policing (working with the NPCC Coordination Committee for Performance Management) and taken forward for use across policing.

# Recommendations

## For chief constables:

- Chief constables should liaise with their police and crime commissioner to ensure that each of their force's performance measures identified within the police and crime plan link to the force's purpose, and should also ensure that force generated measures do likewise. They should also consider the potential negative impact of setting numerical targets, particularly for police recorded crime, response times and call handling. (Recommendation 1)
- Chief constables should ensure that the appropriate level of performance data is made available to managers throughout the organisation and that managers are provided with the necessary training to enable them to use and interpret data for effective decision making. (Recommendation 9)
- Chief constables should review the format of performance reports and the type of data contained within them, focusing on data that will help decision making and avoid 'knee-jerk' responses and the signals that the visual presentation of information can create. (Recommendation 10)
- Chief constables should ensure that force policies relating to crime recording provide clarity about the distinction between the need for accurate crime recording in accordance with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) and the discretion of officers in relation to outcomes relating to a crime, while making clear the need for ethical standards. (Recommendation 11)
- Chief constables should ensure that their performance measurement and reporting processes are free from any unnecessary bureaucracy, particularly where frontline staff are required to complete returns to justify activities (rather than being held to account). This should also extend to any internal auditing relating to data-gathering processes (such as crime recording). (Recommendation 13)
- Chief constables should review their forces' incentive and recognition systems to ensure that appropriate recognition is given for desired behaviours and non-quantifiable activity, including examples of good professional judgement. (Recommendation 14)
- Chief constables should review their performance and development review (PDR) processes to ensure that they properly recognise the breadth of work undertaken by officers and staff (including non-quantifiable work), with objectives that focus on contribution and behaviours rather than numerical targets. (Recommendation 16)
- Chief constables should ensure they clearly communicate the force's approach to performance, making clear the links between performance and purpose. Communication should promote two-way engagement, giving staff a voice and demonstrating consistency between messages and practice. (Recommendation 17)

**For PCCs:**

- PCCs should ensure that when developing their police and crime plan, any performance measures used link to their force's purpose. They should also consider the potential negative impact of setting numerical targets, particularly for police recorded crime, response times and call handling in their police and crime plans. (This reiterates the recommendation made by PASC<sup>1</sup>.) (Recommendation 2)
- During their consultation and communication with the public, PCCs should seek to create a vision of policing success for their communities which is broader than a reduction in police recorded crime figures. (Recommendation 18)

**For the Home Office:**

- Following its current survey of forces to gather views on victim satisfaction data, the Home Office should review whether the requirement for forces to submit victim satisfaction data as part of the annual data return should be downgraded to a voluntary collection or, amended, to ensure the crime types reflect priority areas. (Recommendation 3)
- The Home Office should consider taking back ownership of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR), reviewing it and bringing it into line with the standard for crime recording to create a single transparent recording framework. If this recommendation is taken forward, the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) should consider whether the NSIR and NCRS portfolios could be combined under a single lead officer. (Recommendation 12)

**For HMIC:**

- In terms of the presentation of data in HMIC reports and other documents:
  - a. Comparative data (such as Most Similar Force data, comparisons with national averages etc.) should be presented in such a way as to ensure that any limitations (such as lack of statistical significance) are immediately clear, and
  - b. The use of qualitative performance information in addition to quantitative data should be emphasised. (Recommendation 4)
- Following the introduction of the annual inspection process (PEEL), HMIC should clearly communicate how any revisions to the Crime and Policing Monitoring Group (CPMG) process will operate, so that forces clearly understand the purpose of the process as well as the criteria for escalation. (Recommendation 5)

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<sup>1</sup> *Caught red-handed: Why we can't count on Police-Recorded Crime statistics*, House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), Thirteenth Report of Session 2013–14, HC 760, 9 April 2014

- HMIC should consider how best to promote the sharing of good practice in relation to performance measurement/management systems and processes that may be identified during the course of future HMIC inspections. (Recommendation 19)

**For the College of Policing:**

- Using the existing draft effective principles for performance measurement, the College, working with the NPCC Performance Management Coordination Committee, should develop a broader set of principles for performance management for use by all forces, linked to a common view of performance and service delivery. (Recommendation 6)
- The College should also work with the NPCC to identify good practice in terms of balanced measures to accurately capture both crime and non-crime, qualitative police demand (such as safeguarding and public protection work as well as concerns for safety and welfare). (Recommendation 7)
- The College should work with the NPCC lead for contact management who is in the process of reviewing the 2010 National Contact Management Principles and Guidance and make recommendations for an improved set of diagnostic indicators for contact management. (Recommendation 8)
- The College should ensure that the skills needed for performance management are built into the model of leadership and management training and development being taken forward as per Recommendation 6 of the Leadership review<sup>2</sup>. These skills should also be considered as part of the national standards for selection and promotion as per recommendation 9 of the Leadership review and considered by the Defining and Assessing Competence (DAC) team. (Recommendation 15)

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<sup>2</sup> Leadership Review, College of Policing, June 2015 [http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Development/Promotion/the-leadership-review/Documents/Leadership\\_Review\\_Final\\_June-2015.pdf](http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Development/Promotion/the-leadership-review/Documents/Leadership_Review_Final_June-2015.pdf)

# Introduction

## Background to the review

1. In 2010, in her first speech to the Police Federation, the Home Secretary abolished Home Office performance targets. But feedback about local targets has persisted and, in 2014, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary<sup>3</sup> revealed the continued existence of a target mentality on the front line of some forces. At the Police Federation Conference in June 2015 the Home Secretary therefore announced a comprehensive review of the use of targets in policing to "take on the target culture imposed at local level".
2. The aims of the review are:
  - to examine where, how and why targets are being used in forces
  - to analyse the impact of targets on police officers' ability to do their jobs
  - to seek to identify good performance management practices that can be shared with others.
3. The Home Secretary was clear that the review does not challenge the operational independence of chief constables, or the democratic mandate of PCCs. Neither is it a criticism of the use of data and management information by chief constables in the running of their forces.

## Future context

4. The future context for policing has implications for how police performance is measured and managed.
5. The nature of crime is changing rapidly and policing needs to change with it. Particular challenges include building a better understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities of victims in cases of domestic abuse, child sexual abuse or modern slavery as well as responding to fraud, cyber and online crime.
6. These challenges need to be met at a time of reducing resources in the public sector. This means transforming the way the police use technology and data; changing the capability and flexibility of the workforce and finding new and different ways of joining up the delivery of services across the public sector.
7. As the service adapts to changing circumstances, performance frameworks will also need to adapt to help forces make decisions to meet these challenges and to understand whether or not they are succeeding.

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<sup>3</sup> Crime Recording: Making the Victim Count, HMIC, November 2014

## Methodology

8. The review involved:
  - a desk research exercise to review available evidence on the use of targets in policing and the public and private sectors more generally (NB: most of the literature reviewed focused on their use in the public sector)
  - a review of police and crime plans
  - a written request for information sent out to all 41 chief constables, the commissioners for the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London police, and all police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales, the Mayor's Office for Police and Crime (MOPAC) and the City of London Police Committee (the questions are included in annex D)
  - visits to 13 forces and interviews with key stakeholders (details in annex F)
  - a focus group with PCCs
  - meeting with Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary and members of HMIC's analyst team
  - consultation with the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) Co-ordinating Group portfolio leads for performance management, crime recording and systems thinking
  - an online survey, available to all police officers and staff in England and Wales, conducted 26 June – 17 July 2015. (The survey received over 6,000 responses.)
9. The review has sought to find examples of good practice – while the review did not identify a force with what might be considered to be the 'perfect' performance management framework, case study material throughout the report aims to highlight different elements of promising practice.

### **A note on the survey**

10. The survey was designed to act as a feedback tool, in order to provide officers and staff – and especially those in frontline roles – with an opportunity to contribute to the review.
11. The survey was not designed to be statistically robust or representative. The results cannot be taken as representative due to it drawing upon a self-selecting sample. Consequently, the results must be taken with this in mind.

# Findings

## The impact of targets

12. The following section provides a brief summary of the desk research undertaken into the use of targets in the public sector and policing in particular. (A more detailed version is available in annex J).
13. It is important at the outset to clarify the distinction between targets and measures. A measure (or indicator) is simply a source of information that can help users of performance information make informed decisions. A ‘target’ relates to a particular level of performance that is to be aimed for, met or exceeded over a period of time.
14. The use of numerical targets in public services largely began in the 1980s with greater use throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Targets were primarily seen as a way to measure performance in order to improve efficiency, economy and effectiveness. During this period, technology has advanced rapidly, enabling the capture and processing of ever larger and larger amounts of data for use as management information.
15. From the literature about numerical targets in public services (including policing), several problems have been widely reported:

### **1) They are too crude for complex systems**

The central argument here is that public services, like the police, are complex ‘human activity’ systems, which cannot be measured in a simplistic numerical snapshot approach i.e. they rely on human behaviour, which is subject to influence, and not a standardised or autonomous output. When tackling crime, the needs of the police to meet simplistic hard targets can end up competing with the needs of the public.

### **2) They cause dysfunctional behaviour**

Deliberate gaming is one of the most widely recognised and reported issues associated with targets<sup>4</sup>. Numerical targets can create perverse incentives, which can lead to unintended behavioural consequences.

Examples of dysfunctional behaviour in policing attributed to target chasing have been well publicised. This includes reports that crime recording had been distorted or diluted by the desire to meet crime level targets, through not recording crimes, or through mis-recording (for example ‘downgrading’ a burglary to a theft). Other examples include pressure on officers to “trawl the margins” for detections, and encouraging criminals to admit to other crimes they had not committed. There have also been instances where the emphasis shifted to solving minor (or easier “volume crime”) crimes to improve figures instead of more high harm or complex crime. (See annex J for more detail).

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<sup>4</sup> *Monitoring Review 3/15: Official statistics, performance measurement and targets*, May 2015, UK Statistics Authority

Concerns have also been raised<sup>5</sup> regarding the over-interpretation of data used for target setting/checking (e.g. monthly swings in crime rates) and the knee-jerk reaction of some forces to fluctuations which may be within normal confidence intervals. If setting targets in the form of rates (such as conviction rates), these rates can be 'gamed' by reducing the denominator rather than increasing the numerator (and the metric of both the numerator and denominator should be consistent); likewise using rankings as targets can be meaningless as one force's rank position can improve simply by others worsening. The use of league tables has also seen some forces chasing an improvement in ranking where there is no statistically significant difference between successive rank positions.

16. Other evidence highlights the demoralising effect that targets can have on staff. The potential misalignment between targets and organisational purpose, coupled with a disciplinary approach taken if targets are not met, can breed a culture of fear and confusion, lack of ownership over practices and subsequent feelings of disengagement.
17. While the majority of publications discuss the negative impacts of target setting, there are those who argue that target setting can achieve positive outcomes and has a place in public sector performance management. Such arguments point to the ability of a numeric target to quickly and simply focus effort on priority areas and to the evidence of improved performance in areas which are subject to targets. This review, however, has found little evidence in the public sector of a causal link between the use of targets and improved performance.
18. The pros and cons of target-based performance management in policing have been debated recently within 'Police Professional'<sup>6</sup>. This review is not intended to further the academic debate on targets, rather it seeks to identify examples of good performance measurement and management, together with practical lessons that can be shared.
19. While the negative effects of targets are well documented, there is less evidence on the quantified benefits of alternative performance frameworks. However, the review did identify some guidance on performance measurement and management. This includes guidance on police performance management<sup>7</sup> and a draft set of guiding principles for effective performance measurement in policing, which were drawn up by the national business area for performance measurement, and submitted to the College of Policing as part of the leadership review. Such a set of guiding principles could play a valuable role in assisting forces with the development of their performance measurement frameworks.

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5 Ibid

6 Police Professional: Choosing Targets, Simon Byrne & Malcolm Hibbard, and Missing the target; hitting the point, Simon Guilfoyle, both 17 June 2015

7 Improving performance: a practical guide to police performance management, Home Office, 2008

## Overview of current practice

20. The majority of forces have moved away from hard numeric targets, especially for police recorded crime, with a few notable exceptions. However, many have retained targets for call handling and/or response times, with a fairly widespread misunderstanding that there are nationally-set targets for these (see paragraph 42).
21. Forces that have abandoned targets and have consequently reviewed their performance frameworks are generally very positive about the move, citing the following benefits.
  - more informed decision making
  - ethical crime recording
  - motivation of staff
  - fewer ‘knee-jerk’ reactions
  - more stable performance (fewer ‘spikes’)
  - flexibility, empowerment and discretion for officers.
22. While some forces moved away from targets five years ago, for others it is a more recent development, including from this year in a number of cases. For these forces, it is too early to say what the impact of removing targets has been.
23. Where forces told the review they use targets, these were typically reflected in their PCCs’ police and crime plans. For example, one police and crime plan contains targets for victim services and conviction rate for domestic abuse. Another has a target for violent crime. A third contains a number of numeric targets for crime, criminal justice system outcomes and victim satisfaction.
24. One force told the review that it retains targets for burglary, vehicle crime, robbery, victim satisfaction and public perception although these are not explicitly in the PCC’s police and crime plan; another force has re-introduced targets, after consultation with the PCC, in a number of areas.
25. Some police and crime plans contain workforce targets – several plans include a target for a minimum number of officers (required at least until May 2016); one says it will maintain current numbers of officers while a third plan pledges to maintain the number of Police Community Support Officers. In addition, a number of PCCs have set targets in their police and crime plans to increase the numbers of special constables or other volunteers.
26. Perhaps the most publicised case of a force setting targets is the Metropolitan Police Service, which has been set the “20:20:20” challenge by MOPAC – which includes targets to reduce key neighbourhood crimes by 20%; boost public confidence in the police by 20% and reduce costs by 20%. These (and other) targets are used throughout the force.

27. A small number of targets were evident in other plans, where some forces appear to operate a 'mixed economy' – i.e. developing new performance frameworks while retaining a small number of targets: For example:
- one force has set a target for burglary only
  - one PCC has set targets to reduce priority crime by 18% over a 5 year period.
  - another PCC has set a target to reduce violence against the person crimes by 40% over a 5 year period.
28. Where targets are used, the review team heard the positive aspects described as:
- creating a sense of purpose
  - indicating priorities
  - galvanising effort around particular areas
  - signalling the scale of ambition
  - providing a means to reward good work and celebrate success.

It was also suggested that perverse behaviour is caused by management style, not the targets themselves.

29. Targets (set against KPIs) were also mentioned as a helpful way to manage contracts with suppliers.
30. It is recognised that police forces operate in a complex multi-agency landscape, and therefore also need to establish effective performance frameworks with partner organisations that have their own priorities – and targets – in some cases (see paragraph 42).
31. A key question for the review was whether targets are being set at the local (i.e. sub-force) and individual level. In their responses, a small number of forces said that they were aware of targets being locally set, some acknowledged that they could not be sure while others were confident that this was not happening. Many of the survey responses (while anecdotal) referred to examples of local target setting. It was also clear that the removal of targets at the top has not necessarily resulted in significant changes in practice further down – counts of arrests, stop-search and intelligence submissions remain basic measures of frontline performance in some forces.
32. The remainder of the findings have been grouped into a number of thematic areas, which should be reflected in any set of principles for performance measurement and management:
- **Organisational purpose:** measures should clearly link to the purpose, vision and objectives of the organisation and there should be a balance of indicators to reflect the performance of the whole 'system' (while acknowledging inevitable gaps in data).

- **Decision making and problem solving:** measures should help the organisation make decisions about how to improve performance through effective deployment of resources. The choice of measures should be kept under constant review to respond to the latest problems presented by a changing environment.
- **Accurate data recording:** measures rely on accurate data to provide a realistic view of performance. (Any limitations with the data should be clearly highlighted and understood.)
- **A proportionate approach:** the approach should not create unnecessary layers of reporting or bureaucracy. Rather, it should align naturally with the organisation's decision-making processes, with the right information available at the right time to those who need to use it.
- **Leadership and culture:** leaders should have the skills and abilities to understand and interpret performance information and to use it effectively to make decisions. Leadership behaviour should promote a positive performance culture, supported by recognition mechanisms.
- **Communication:** the communication of measures should engage everyone in understanding the organisation's performance. The language used to describe performance should be commonly understood.

Each of the areas outlined above will be examined in further detail in the following sections.

## Organisational purpose

### **Summary of findings**

*Measures need to reflect the purpose of the system and provide useful information about how the 'whole system' is performing. For policing this means balancing crime measures with non-crime measures that help the police, PCCs and their partners understand how the system is working for the protection of the vulnerable, supporting victims, and responding to demand overall. Performance measurement frameworks therefore require a balance of input, process, output and outcome measures. Presently there is too much emphasis on police-recorded crime.*

33. While most forces have removed numerical targets, identifying a suitable alternative approach has not necessarily been straightforward. Several forces highlighted to the review team the challenges of understanding and articulating what constitutes good performance:

*"Overnight the tangible goals (which were clear and very black and white) disappeared and this left many confused as to what they were working towards and what was expected in terms of performance [force response to the review]"*

34. Some forces also expressed concern that the removal of targets would send a message that the focus on crime reduction – or indeed performance more generally – was no longer important.

35. In some cases, public satisfaction and confidence became the 'default' measures of performance when targets were removed. (This is likely in part due to the confidence measure<sup>8</sup> being the last central target to be removed – in 2010). Efforts to develop a more victim-centred service have seen victim satisfaction measures come to the fore.

36. But, overall, crime data remains dominant – with a continued emphasis on 'traditional' crime measures. Many forces, implicitly or explicitly, prioritise dwelling burglary and theft of/from vehicle, with statistics for these crimes appearing frequently at the front of performance reports, in police and crime plans and taking prime time in performance meetings.

*"I chase figures and as long as numbers go in the right direction I don't care. If confidence and satisfaction are important they would be at [the] front of a performance pack not the back." [Chief inspector]"*

<sup>8</sup> This was a survey-based measure of public confidence in the police.

37. Too often, police recorded crime statistics are treated solely as a measure of police performance (i.e. success or otherwise) or, at least, as a key output of police activity, rather than one of a number of measures of the demands placed upon policing. Where targets have been removed but processes have not changed, poor performance management frameworks can still unintentionally recreate the same kinds of pressures with respect to crime recording, leading to inaccurate data. The presentation of police recorded crime should always give consideration to the range of factors that can affect it, which includes the increased confidence of victims to report crime and better recording practices.
38. Notwithstanding this, a greater recognition of the police's role in public protection and safeguarding vulnerable people is now apparent in police forces. Many police and crime plans include them as priorities and they are typically an agenda item at performance meetings. Forces variously described the need to move to a more 'rounded', 'holistic' or 'more victim-focused' approach and a 'risk-based' or 'THRIVE' (Threat, Harm, Risk, Investigation, Vulnerable and Engagement) model – but there is an apparent gap in terms of suitable measures. Commonly used measures include numbers of missing persons, attendance at MASH or MARAC meetings, use of custody as a place of safety, or confidence to report high-harm offences (for instance hate crime, domestic abuse). Other measures include levels of crime reporting (for offences such as domestic or sexual violence), prosecutions, conviction rates, detection rates, victim satisfaction and levels of repeat victimisation. The review saw good examples of problem-solving work but no real innovations in terms of performance measures to accurately reflect high-demand, often non-crime, safeguarding and welfare matters.
39. The selection of measures is a critical issue because it influences what is deemed a priority and where effort is focused. At present many forces continue to place a disproportionate emphasis on police recorded crime due to the selection of measures for their performance framework. The review team heard repeatedly that crime is a small proportion of what the police have to deal with. The College of Policing carried out an assessment of demand<sup>9</sup> which highlighted that while recorded crime has reduced, demand on the police has grown in other ways. Forces need measures to help them understand the totality of demand they are experiencing and their capacity to respond. This includes input measures for non-crime incidents and process measures for response activity such as attendance. Crime data should be considered as an important source of information rather than the sole measure of performance.
40. Similarly workforce numbers cannot be viewed in isolation outside of the context of demand. Arbitrary workforce targets (while they may make for popular announcements) can create inflexibility and lead to dysfunctional behaviour. (The 'Frontline Policing Measure' intended to increase the proportion of time spent in frontline roles and raise police visibility saw roles and activities reclassified as 'frontline' in order to hit the target.)

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<sup>9</sup> College of Policing analysis: Estimating demand on the police service, January 2015

41. It is also important that forces select performance measures that can be directly attributable to the organisation's efforts (and not to environmental or other factors). This may require the need to collect data that is not currently easily available (rather than measuring what is easy to measure.) For example, when one force identified an issue with the deployment of its safeguarding team, it conducted research and demand analysis to better understand the team's activities and inform resource allocation. Explicitly acknowledging gaps in data is also important in creating a balanced discussion about performance.

### **Influences on the selection of measures**

42. In addition to PCC priorities as reflected in police and crime plans, and crime statistics more generally, the review found a range of factors that influenced forces' choice of performance measures and/or the significance they attached to them. These included:

- Partnerships
- Criminal Justice System targets
- Police and Crime Panels
- Home Office
- HMIC
- Most Similar Group comparison data.
- Call handling/response standards
- Victim satisfaction data.

**Partnerships** – a range of measures are usually set by Community Safety Partnerships (of which forces are a core member) and some forces pointed out that the continuation of a target-driven approach of their local authority/ partnership, as well as the continued use of binary comparisons (as opposed to viewing longer term trends), can lead to conflict if the force is trying to move away from such an approach. In such cases it was felt that good working relationships with partners at senior level can mitigate these risks. PCCs also have a key role to play in bringing together partners and helping to establishing appropriate joint performance measures/outcomes, without re-introducing numeric targets for forces.

**Criminal Justice System (CJS) targets** – there are a number of national targets for the criminal justice system, and some concerns were expressed that these could cause friction where forces have moved away from using a target-based approach. Some survey respondents raised specific concerns about case file submission targets, which they felt could impact adversely on quality. Some concerns were also expressed around the tendency to present CJS performance data in force comparison 'league tables'. As for partnership working in general, good practice included the PCC taking the lead to develop a joint outcome approach.

**Police and Crime Panels** – a number of senior officers and PCCs reported that some panel members (often those who had previously served on the police authority) wanted to see numeric targets to enable them to assess and scrutinise performance. These panel members were described as being accustomed to a previous way of working, and requiring education about newer performance frameworks. They also appeared to assume that their role was to scrutinise the performance of the force, rather than that of the PCC.

**Home Office** – speeches from the Home Secretary from 2010 onwards that referred to the need to ‘cut crime’, and Home Office messaging that has celebrated the fact that crime is down, have, in some instances, been interpreted by officers as the need to achieve a fall in crime overall over a specific 12-month period. Such an interpretation puts the emphasis on proven, short-term crime reduction measures, at the expense of longer-term, innovative approaches.

**HMIC** – feedback from HMIC, whether from national reports or force inspections, rightly carries significant weight with forces. This in turn influences decisions on what gets measured. However, concerns were expressed by some forces that HMIC scrutiny creates undue focus on quantitative performance data, inter force comparisons and league tables. The use of comparisons to highlight ‘poor performance’ where a force’s recorded crime was rising due to improved accuracy of recording was a particular frustration.

Some forces also expressed frustration with what they perceived to be a lack of clarity around the monitoring process and in particular the criteria by which forces are referred to the Crime and Policing Monitoring Group (CPMG).

By contrast, members of the HMIC analyst team told the review that assessments use a mix of soft intelligence and qualitative as well as quantitative data (and that this is built into PEEL). They also stressed the importance of not reducing the escalation criteria in the monitoring process to a simple algorithm.

The introduction of the PEEL inspection approach provides an opportunity to bring clarity and a shared understanding of the role of HMIC in assessing forces in terms of their efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. This should include how forces measure and manage performance.

HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary Sir Tom Winsor also told the review that he has written to all chief constables and PCCs asking for support in rolling out annual Force Management Statements as national good practice<sup>10</sup>. If implemented, the statements will provide focus on the measures needed for forces to quantify their demand, resources and assets in order to provide a self-assessment of effectiveness. (It will be important that this does not create a bureaucratic burden for forces.)

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<sup>10</sup> Recommendation 49 from the Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions Final Report, Winsor, March 2012

**Most Similar Group**<sup>11</sup> comparison data – some forces (and PCCs) have created targets using Most Similar Group (MSG) data by stating an ambition to become a ‘top’, ‘top ten’ or ‘top quartile’ force in a particular area. (For example, to be amongst the ‘ten lowest’ rates of burglary.) In many cases this ignores the fact that the differences between one force and the next may not be statistically significant, or that an improvement in rank position can be achieved by the deteriorations of others’ performances. (This is despite the fact that HMIC’s own guidance states that inferences should not be drawn from relative positions when all forces in a group are within the expected range.)

**Call handling/response standards** – the review found widespread misunderstanding over ‘national targets’ for call handling and response times. Some forces have set their own response time targets, depending on local factors, with many retaining the standards of 15 minutes for a Grade 1 call and 60 minutes for Grade 2, which were in the policing pledge, scrapped by the Home Secretary in 2010.

Targets for call handling were published in 2005, in historic guidance<sup>12</sup> which is now in the College of Policing’s library archive. In 2010 that guidance was replaced by a package of call handling principles and guidance issued on behalf of ACPO by the NPIA<sup>13</sup>. That guidance removed the hard targets and substituted a smaller set of diagnostic indicators for call handling.

A number of PCCs include call handling and response times in their police and crime plans and several PCCs told the review team that they continued to do so as they believed that response times ‘cannot be gamed’. This is despite well-known pitfalls, including the tendency for targets to skew the efforts of response teams. This was reported by survey respondents:

*“One of the biggest concerns at the minute is response times. Control handlers are so scared to miss a “timer” that they would rather see officers attend a “grade 3” (lowest level job 4hr response time) over a “grade 2” job where there is a genuine risk to somebody or property/offender detained etc if it meant that they didn’t miss the grade 3 timers.” [Constable]*

*“Call Handling focuses on how quickly we answer calls. No measure on the quality of call-handling... so call handlers adopt a call centre mentality as they are more concerned about meeting unrealistic call handling targets.” [Inspector]*

*“Rather than a level target for ‘i’ and ‘s’ call response (15 mins and 60 mins respectively) we are now measured at area level for particular crime types, specifically burglary, robbery and domestic abuse. As a result, we actively divert units to these incidents to the detriment of other calls, some of which have a far higher level of risk to the public and our organisation.” [Sergeant]*

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- 11 Most Similar Groups are groups of local areas that have been found to be the most similar to each other using statistical methods, based on demographic, economic and social characteristics which relate to crime. (MSG Technical Note, HMIC)
- 12 National Call Handling Standards, 2005. [http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/call\\_handling\\_standards.pdf](http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/call_handling_standards.pdf)
- 13 National Contact Management Principles and Guidance, ACPO, NPIA, 2010, p26 Annex B <http://npiadocuments.co.uk/PrinciplesAndGuidance.pdf>

*“I was dealing with a domestic where the victim was clearly terrified and was on the verge of telling me what had happened when I was called up to ask how long I would be. The victim heard this and immediately apologised for wasting our time and wouldn’t share anything with us. We failed this victim just so we could meet the s grade for an anti social behaviour call.” [Constable]*

Forces need to be mindful that call handling and response time targets **can** be ‘gamed’. In some instances forces were only focusing on crude measures for response time data and not collecting information that would help them understand and interpret the underlying issues. Measures can be helpful to understand demand and response – but forces need ensure that this is done ethically and in the best interest of public safety.

**Victim satisfaction data** – it is a requirement of the Home Office<sup>14</sup> for police forces to conduct satisfaction surveys with victims of specified crime types and return data on a quarterly basis. Specifically the Home Office requires the views of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and racist incidents (changed to hate crime incidents from April 2015). Many forces do more, surveying a larger sample than the Home Office requires and across a broader range of crime types.

It is clear that victim satisfaction is taken seriously in many forces. Forces are undertaking a range of activities to improve satisfaction and victim call backs feature prominently in daily tasking. However, it is worth noting that some respondents to the review feel that this activity is driven purely by the need to boost victim satisfaction survey results and are not convinced of its importance to true victim satisfaction:

*“Targets of any kind have an impact on policing methods. .... This can also be the case when ways of measuring customer satisfaction are employed. This invariably means more paperwork and, ironically, less time dedicated to customers.” [Constable]*

The crime types used for these surveys have remained unchanged for many years, despite changes to local (and national) policing priorities. The continued inclusion of vehicle crime, in particular, was questioned by participants in the review since it is no longer a priority crime in many forces. The Home Office is currently surveying forces to gather their views on the victim satisfaction surveys, including how useful they find the mandated data collection. Results from this survey will inform recommendations to the Police Data Requirements Group. (This could also provide an opportunity to identify efficiency savings from a more joined-up approach, as well as ensuring that victim satisfaction surveys stay relevant to current priorities.)

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14 Part of the Home Office Annual Data Requirement

43. Many forces are attempting to develop new performance frameworks that provide a more comprehensive picture of how the organisation is performing across a range of areas. In an age of austerity with diminishing resources, forces are having to consider transformational approaches to what they do and many are asking fundamental questions about their core purpose. (Continuing the same ways of working with fewer resources risks eroding the quality of service to victims, a concern echoed in the survey.) It is clear that the forces that are making real progress in relation to alternative performance frameworks are those which have identified a clear purpose, which has then influenced their selection of performance measures.
44. PCCs can also help forces to define their core purpose by identifying what matters most to its community – through feedback, surveys and public engagement activities.

### Case Study – Greater Manchester Police

GMP is alive to the fact that the straight removal of targets creates a void that must be filled by **clarity of purpose**, from which the appropriate measures are derived. In GMP this is supported by a number of cross-cutting themes – within their new performance framework – including managing demand and productivity, organisational culture and leadership, resources (including finance), trust, vulnerability and working with partners – from which key performance questions will be derived.

The force recognises that **crime and incident statistics are not performance data** but only provide context – meaningful interpretation is only possible with layered detail and the effective commissioning of analysts, while experts on the relevant subject matter will be brought in to assist performance chairs in interpreting ‘good’ performance (for instance public protection, criminal justice, major crime). GMP have also introduced an intelligent scoring matrix which provides a combined operational and organisational picture of threat, risk and harm, which will allow the force to prioritise and direct resources accordingly.

MP’s approach places much emphasis on understanding demand across the whole system. Analysis of a local policing pilot to decentralise and devolve the communications function to local police stations showed that **33% of all calls did not require a policing response** – waste that was being absorbed by centralised communications. By diverting 101 calls to an area station acting as a control room staffed by local officers, local knowledge, corporate memory and community intelligence had a significant bearing on effective decision-making and risk assessment. The pilot also allowed for callers to be given a named contact in the ‘call centre’ at the point of call if the matter was not immediately resolved, with a resultant positive effect on satisfaction. While there are infrastructure challenges and cost implications for a permanent roll-out, long-term potential savings have been identified, while public feedback for the pilot evaluation has been shown to be positive.

### Case Study – Durham

Durham Constabulary has identified that a traditional crime count skews both the capture of demand and performance measurement, and uses the Cambridge Crime Harm Index to quantify harm. This has allowed the force to identify that rape offences over an 18-month period, while only accounting for 1% - 2.5% of their total crime, causes 50% - 70% of its total harm. This is obviously a stark statistic but one that also allows for mature and intelligent assessment of priorities and allocation of resources. The matrix is based on maximum sentence guidelines (not actual sentences), normalised by maximum sentences for first time offences. Clearly rape investigations are considerably more complex than, say, theft and criminal damage investigations, and use of the matrix adds considerable insight to the understanding of demand on the force, and its safeguarding unit in particular.

The current suite of information is still evolving, but a new IT system is expected to improve end-to-end data quality and allow for the smarter capture of aspects of policing performance such as safeguarding, sudden deaths, missing persons and CSE prevention – areas difficult to measure but that nonetheless make up a significant proportion of demand

### Recommendations

- Chief constables should liaise with their police and crime commissioner to ensure that each of their force’s performance measures identified within the police and crime plan link to the force’s purpose, and should also ensure that force generated measures do likewise. They should also consider the potential negative impact of setting numerical targets, particularly for police recorded crime, response times and call handling. (Recommendation 1)
- PCCs should ensure that when developing their police and crime plan, any performance measures used link to their force’s purpose. They should also consider the potential negative impact of setting numerical targets, particularly for police recorded crime, response times and call handling in their police and crime plans. (This reiterates the recommendation made by PASC<sup>15</sup>.) (Recommendation 2)
- Following its current survey of forces to gather views on victim satisfaction data, the Home Office should review whether the requirement for forces to submit victim satisfaction data as part of the annual data return should be downgraded to a voluntary collection or, amended, to ensure the crime types reflect priority areas. (Recommendation 3)
- In terms of the presentation of data in HMIC reports and other documents:

<sup>15</sup> *Caught red-handed: Why we can’t count on Police-Recorded Crime statistics*, House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), Thirteenth Report of Session 2013–14, HC 760, 9 April 2014

- a. Comparative data (such as Most Similar Force data, comparisons with national averages etc.) should be presented in such a way as to ensure that any limitations (such as lack of statistical significance) are immediately clear, and
  - b. The use of qualitative performance information in addition to quantitative data in force inspections should be emphasised. (Recommendation 4)
- Following the introduction of the annual inspection process (PEEL), HMIC should clearly communicate how any revisions to the Crime and Policing Monitoring Group (CPMG) process will operate, so that forces clearly understand the purpose of the process as well as the criteria for escalation. (Recommendation 5)
  - Using the existing draft effective principles for performance measurement, the College, working with the NPCC Performance Management Coordination Committee, should develop a broader set of principles for performance management for use by all forces, linked to a common view of performance and service delivery. (Recommendation 6)
  - The College should also work with the NPCC to identify good practice in terms of balanced measures to accurately capture both crime and non-crime, qualitative police demand (such as safeguarding and public protection work as well as concerns for safety and welfare). (Recommendation 7)
  - The College should work with the NPCC lead for contact management who is in the process of reviewing the 2010 National Contact Management Principles and Guidance and make recommendations for an improved set of diagnostic indicators for contact management. (Recommendation 8)

## Decision making and problem solving

### **Summary of findings**

*Measures should help the organisation make decisions about how best to deploy resources in order to improve performance. Performance information should be seen as the raw material for further enquiry, to help managers understand problems, make good decisions and improve the system. This requires forces to take a problem-solving approach and continually review the questions they are asking about performance. There are some instances of good practice here but more forces need to challenge themselves that they are seeking out the right information and presenting it in the right format in order to help make improvements, not just 'monitoring' a raft of indicators.*

45. The review team found many forces are still in the early stages of developing new performance management frameworks, without numerical targets.
46. The review found some examples of good practice where forces are using performance information to aid and improve decision making. In such cases, the performance process is geared around asking appropriate questions, undertaking root cause analysis and solving problems.
47. For example, in Greater Manchester, key force level performance meetings now take a problem solving approach, and divisions are encouraged to share effective practice and areas for improvement. In Kent, leaders are accountable for “problem solving and resolving issues rather than for numerical positions against a target”. Examples were also cited in the survey:
- “...where we previously might have had numerical targets we now have a much more qualitative approach... For example our Forces Performance Management Review meetings chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable look at people issues in a much more holistic sense, examining approaches/ideas to motivating staff and making teams more efficient, rather than the old style approach of counting how many members of staff are on sickness absence.” [Police staff]*
48. Good practice focuses on measures that support decision making, which means that the measures of interest will change over time as problems are addressed and new challenges arise – measures should change as circumstances change. However, the review team came across many examples of performance processes and reports where the emphasis is primarily on the reporting of large amounts of data (often crime statistics).

49. A genuine shift to problem solving requires a significant change in mindset, which cannot be achieved simply by removing targets and replacing them with a different set of tools. Improving performance means first identifying the need to change processes and systems, next identifying and implementing the 'right' changes – and then monitoring to check that the changes are having the desired effect.<sup>16</sup> Forces, therefore, need to understand their demand, set appropriate performance measures for different parts of the system, take informed action based on the data obtained and monitor the measures to ensure the actions are having the desired effect<sup>17</sup> (learning lessons from implementation and adjusting the approach accordingly.) This requires different types of data to understand performance such as process measures, finance and resource information and risk indicators. The use of vehicle fleet information, for example, to better understand the force's capacity to respond (and therefore potential impact on response times). A problem-solving approach will help forces to take early action and prevention measures and thereby reduce demand in the long term.
50. More generally, there is huge scope for forces to make better use of data analytics in future. There are proven examples of the benefits of predictive analytics and risk profiling in other industries and some innovative pilots are underway in policing. A smarter approach to the exploitation of data has the potential to transform policing.
51. The presentation of data should also aid decision making. There is recognition that the previous reliance on 'red/green' tables as a quick way of knowing whether something was 'good' or 'bad' was over-simplistic and could lead to the misinterpretation of data and inappropriate responses. The use of control charts is becoming more widespread, but in some cases they have been introduced without appropriate training to ensure that those using the charts know how to interpret them effectively.
52. In many instances it appears that control charts have been adopted as a presentation format, without a deeper consideration of their use, and often alongside binary comparison data which they are intended to replace. When viewed without an accompanying narrative or other contextual data, they are less likely to add value to any performance conversation and can be misinterpreted by individuals trying to identify whether performance is 'good or bad'. This is likely to result in disproportionate responses (e.g. reactions to random variation in the data) and poor choices in terms of resource deployment. When used appropriately, control charts of crime data trends can help forces to better understand demand and thus deploy resources appropriately.

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16 Improving Performance: a practical guide to police performance management, Home Office, 2008

17 Effective Performance Measurement in Policing: Guiding Principles (paper to Performance Management National Business area, 2014)

53. Some forces have introduced widespread training on the use of control charts, whilst others have restricted their circulation to a smaller group of managers/performance analysts who are trained to accurately interpret them. It is acknowledged by some forces that more input from analytical teams is required to provide appropriate contextual and narrative information. Effective performance management relies on forces investing in their analytical capabilities, as well as providing appropriate training for non-analysts.
54. Forces are also starting to recognise the limitations of the ‘traditional’ performance year (which can cause late flurries or spikes of activity just before the cut off) – and the need to have a range of views on data. Many forces are now using a combination of rolling 12 month and 3-year averages to gain a deeper understanding of trends.

## **Case Studies**

### **Gwent**

The Chief Constable of Gwent has made it absolutely clear for some time now there are no numerical targets in his force and that he does not want middle or junior managers to reintroduce ‘unofficial’ ones. The Gwent PCC is also visibly supportive of this position and this sets the tone for an environment where performance information is used in a mature way.

In addition to removing all numerical targets, the force’s performance products are now largely based on control charts, which depict longer term trends and changes. The analysts are empowered to use their expertise to identify issues of genuine concern, which enables them to report by exception, rather than produce oversized performance documents containing excessive amounts of data. This means that performance conversations are focused on the right things.

The force’s performance information is presented in a statistically rigorous manner – data are supported by explanatory narrative and displayed in context (e.g. the analysts ensure that confidence intervals and caveats about data limitations are transparently reported). Work is also underway developing easy-to-interpret ‘gradient bars’, which depict long term trajectories, and senior leaders are guided towards patterns within datasets through the inclusion of red circles.

The fact that analysts are skilled and trusted to use their knowledge and abilities means that performance products are succinct and statistically robust – this enables leaders to use information to understand issues of concern, ask the right questions about the right things, and be properly informed when making decisions.

**Durham**

Durham's approach is firmly geared around identifying and solving problems and begins by asking Key Performance Questions (KPQs), which are linked to the objectives set out the force's 'Plan on a Page' (see annex G) to promote understanding of why performance is where it is and what can be done to improve. This approach is at the heart of performance management conversations throughout the organisation as the KPQs are designed to be asked at all levels of the force.

**Northamptonshire**

Northamptonshire have sought external expertise, working with associates from Cranfield University and a specialist company to derive better insights into performance management using control charts.

**Recommendations**

- Chief constables should ensure that the appropriate level of performance data is made available to managers throughout the organisation and that managers are provided with the necessary training to enable them to use and interpret data for effective decision making. (Recommendation 9)
- Chief constables should review the format of performance reports and the type of data contained within them, paying attention to the data that will help decision-making and avoid 'knee-jerk' responses and the signals that the visual presentation of information can create. (Recommendation 10)

## Accurate data recording

### **Summary of findings**

*Accurate data recording is critical to good performance measurement. Forces need accurate data in order to understand what is happening in their area, to enable them to deploy resources effectively to prevent further crimes/incidents, and to enable the effective investigation of offences. The review found a high level of awareness of, and commitment to, ethical crime recording. However, comments from officers at various ranks show that performance pressures still exist that can result in less accurate data being recorded (despite the best efforts of others to negate these). One such source of pressure is the publication of police recorded crime data as a measure of police performance. The link between the need to accurately record a crime and the subsequent action taken can also lead to inaccurate records being made.*

### **Crime data**

55. Police recorded crime has come under major scrutiny in recent years. HMIC inspections have identified weaknesses in crime-recording processes<sup>18</sup> and, in January 2014, the UK Statistics Authority (UKSA) removed the designation of police-recorded crime as a National Statistic. In April 2014, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) published a report<sup>19</sup> that identified under-recording of crime by police forces as an issue of serious public concern. The report stated that the use of targets based on police-recorded crime data had contributed to the distorting of recording practices and created perverse incentives to mis-record crime, leading to inaccurate data.
56. Significant work has since been taken forward at national and force level to improve the accuracy and consistency of the figures and the review team found a strong commitment to the importance of ethical crime recording among forces along with a recognition of its importance. It is clear that much work has been done since the publication of the PASC report<sup>20</sup> and continues to be done. However, the review team also heard from officers at various ranks that performance pressures still exist that can result in less accurate data being recorded, despite the best efforts of others to negate these.

*“There exists downward pressure not to record crime where possible. A common example is when arresting a shoplifter detained at a store you find them to be in possession of other stolen items. Acquisitive crime managers do not want each offence recording as it increases their crime figures.” [Constable]*

<sup>18</sup> Crime-recording: making the victim count: The final report of an inspection of crime data integrity in police forces in England and Wales, HMIC, Nov 2014

<sup>19</sup> *Caught red-handed: Why we can't count on Police-Recorded Crime statistics*, House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), Thirteenth Report of Session 2013–14, HC 760, 9 April 2014

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

*“The specific target relating to the detection rate for ABH offences...has an extremely negative impact...if an Assault without injury offence is detectable then after the disposal has been completed officers will ask the victims leading questions such as “Was there any reddening of your skin at any time” in order to reclassify it as an Assault with Injury.” [Sergeant]*

*“When crime reduction targets (or milestones as they are now called to avoid them being thought of as targets) are set, then the easiest way to reach that target is by not recording that particular category of crime. It still happens. Officers will spend hours trying to find ways not to record something, rather than just filling out the report and getting on with a proportionate investigation.” [Sergeant]*

*“Crime management units are used to trawl through crime reports and no crime or re-classify crime classifications so that the borough/forces performance metrics looks better.” [Constable]*

57. Where targets have been removed but processes remain unchanged, poor performance management frameworks can still unintentionally recreate the same kinds of pressures with respect to crime (and incident) recording, leading to inaccurate data. Careful consideration must also be given to how police recorded crime is presented and used by managers at all levels.
58. Similar to the HMIC inspection, the review team found a number of forces accepted that in the past a negative performance culture of chasing numeric targets had skewed crime-recording decisions:
- “The targets in my PDR were unattainable/unrealistic – and simply created huge pressure and provided grounds to regularly criticise my ‘performance’. They were the only thing that mattered and drove me to encourage my staff to find any way of re-classifying crimes, for instance theft person, to at least achieve some form of a reduction.” [Superintendent]*
59. The review team also found that changing habits born from long established practice takes time (see leadership and culture pages 38–44).
60. The link between the need to accurately record a crime and the subsequent action required can also lead to inaccurate records being made. The review team heard of instances where officers wanted to exercise discretion in relation to whether or not they recorded a crime – for example, relating to an offence that they deemed to be trivial. This appeared to be driven by the belief that they had no discretion in relation to how they actually dealt with the crime after it had been recorded. Force policies and practice should clearly reinforce the distinction between the need to record a crime in accordance with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS), and the discretion that officers may have in relation to subsequent investigation/outcomes.

61. Forces' responses to the HMIC crime data integrity reports have led to a more consistent, ethical and accurate approach to recording crime, which has contributed to rises in recorded crime. Forces are at slightly different stages in implementing these changes and so it will be some time before all forces have reached their new 'baseline' regarding crime data. The challenge will be maintaining a high level of accuracy should performance pressures increase in the future.

### **Incident data**

62. Forces increasingly need to cooperate and collaborate, whether informally by sharing good practice or through formal collaborations. Consistent and comparable data is essential to support this. Whilst there is a large amount of comparable crime data available both nationally and locally this is not the case with incidents.

63. Understanding the totality of demand on forces during austerity is crucial. Over time it has been assessed that no more than 30% of calls for service from the public relate to matters that result in the recording of a crime<sup>21</sup>. The remainder consists of the array of issues such as missing persons, mental health concerns, welfare and safety and road traffic.

64. The absence of meaningful data for incidents has potentially contributed to a focus on recorded crime as the sole measure of police performance. Incidents are also a key input measure of demand.

65. In 2005/6 the Home Office introduced the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR) which was intended to improve data capture regarding non-crime incidents. NSIR was established in parallel with, but separate from, the crime recording standard. Despite this, current practice in the recording of incident data sees a high degree of inconsistent recording of incidents between forces.<sup>22</sup> This means that opportunities to build a more comprehensive view of demands on forces and make meaningful comparisons are being lost. Greater consistency between the two recording standards (for incidents and for crime) could help to address this.

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21 National Contact Management Principles and Guidance, ACPO, NPIA, 2010, p32

22 Core business: an inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time, HMIC, Sep 2014

### Case Study – Kent

In November 2012, the arrest and suspension of five Kent Police officers in relation to offences Taken Into Consideration led to significant media coverage around the force having a performance culture that “focused too keenly on ticks in boxes” and placed officers “under enormous pressure” to reach numerical targets.

A subsequent internal review, coupled with an independent review by the HMIC into crime data integrity and the performance culture (commissioned by the PCC), found that the performance culture manifested itself in the distortion of activity and behaviour. No issues of integrity or misconduct were found but “skewed activity” of priority was a key issue. The Red/Green performance regime created, expectation and a level of operational response to short term change, which created a disproportionate level of activity without due consideration of context.

As a result, the force embarked on a journey of significant cultural change involving four key workstreams:

1. The removal of all arbitrary numerical targets.
2. A focus on providing a quality service and putting victims and witnesses at the heart of everything the force does.
3. Building a culture where officers and staff feel empowered to do the right thing.
4. Effective leadership – providing support from the top, clarity of message and recognising that everyone within the organisation is a leader in their own right.

Supported by the PCC, the force designed and implemented an innovative new qualitative performance Service Delivery Framework, drawing upon research into private sector performance frameworks and a full public and internal consultation exercise to develop all of the measures.

HMIC have praised the introduction of the new framework and the force’s internal auditors highlighted it as good practice, which they intend to share with their other clients.

The new approach has been welcomed by staff, who feel empowered at work and regularly state they now find they are delivering traditional policing, doing what matters and have real pride back in their job.

Following the last full annual audit, Kent has confidence in its 96% crime recording accuracy status. To ensure the force maintains these high standards, monthly proxy audits are conducted which focus on areas of business considered high risk of crime recording compliance.

## **Recommendations**

- Chief constables should ensure that force policies relating to crime recording provide clarity about the distinction between the need for accurate crime recording in accordance with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) and the discretion of officers in relation to outcomes relating to a crime, while making clear the need for ethical standards. (Recommendation 11)
- The Home Office should consider taking back ownership of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR), reviewing it and bringing it into line with the standard for crime recording to create a single transparent recording framework. If this recommendation is taken forward, the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) should consider whether the NSIR and NCRS portfolios could be combined under a single lead officer. (Recommendation 12)

## A proportionate approach

### **Summary of findings**

*The performance measurement approach should not create unnecessary layers of reporting or bureaucracy. Rather, it should align naturally with the organisation's decision-making processes, with the right information available at the right time to those who need to use it.*

*Many forces are in the process of establishing new performance approaches. Good practice is characterised by critically examining how information supports decision-making, not holding on to information as a 'comfort blanket'. The approach that still exists in some forces can drive inflexible ways of working, remove discretion from officers and generate unnecessary bureaucracy.*

66. Many forces are still embedding their new performance measurement approaches in the organisation. This includes developing new reporting formats and accountability meeting structures.
67. The review team found a number of instances of forces successfully reducing the size of performance reports and streamlining reporting cycles. There is also an encouraging move away from an excessive scrutiny on daily figures to a longer term view, and greater use of exception reporting.
68. The best examples demonstrate providing the right information to those who need it at the right time, closely linked to a strong understanding that measures support decision-making. Effective performance analysis teams<sup>23</sup> seek to get the right information and level of detail to where it needs to be in the organisation. (For example, a long term trend line for a particular crime type might be useful at Command Team level to provide a general insight into prevailing trends, but would not for an operational inspector who needs to make decisions about tactics or resourcing.)
69. Where approaches are still heavily characterised by 'chasing numbers', survey responses indicated that these can create additional bureaucracy and inflexibility. In some cases, data that is not currently used for performance monitoring but that has been in the past continues to be collated unnecessarily. In others, additional processes have been created to demonstrate compliance:

*"VCOP [Victim Code of Practice] update targets – requires the correct and appropriate ticking of the right boxes on our crime recording system (CRIS)...more time is spent on the admin in a police building (in order to get the credit towards the target) than is actually spent dealing with the public" [Sergeant]*

<sup>23</sup> Also variously referred to in forces as Analyst, Insight, or Continuous Improvement teams

*“After speaking to a victim of crime to update them as to the progress of a case, I have to record that contact within a system which measures victim contract compliance. It doesn’t matter what service I provide to the victim as long as I show as 100% compliant (or thereabouts). I can ring someone up and be horribly rude to them and still be victim contract compliant if I update the system with my contact. Again, a system that is designed to measure a policing activity ends up replacing it. It makes me feel disempowered: My function at work is to service systems that demonstrate my compliance with policy, rather than using my judgement to deliver a good service”* [Sergeant]

*“Counting culture leads to lots of duplication. The incessant need to know how much /how many means officers are spending disproportionate amounts of time fabricating these ‘results’ – or disproportionate amounts of time interrogating databases to give an answer. This data is mostly demanded by senior leadership on borough who do nothing with it. Senior leadership have an obsession with knowing this target data – but in continually making these demands they are increasingly taking officers away from front line operational work. This abstraction of officers to hunt down these figures/ this data is what I and a lot of police officers really object to.”* [Sergeant]

*“Creates bureaucracy, creation and updating of spreadsheets, constant chasing and checking of intel systems, custody records etc – massive inefficiency as spend more and more time doing this rather than core role. All has to be manually obtained as the computers cannot compute the required performance indicates. It is boring, mundane, time consuming and an inefficient process.”* [Sergeant]

70. By contrast, survey respondents in forces that had moved away from a target-driven approach were positive about the reduction in paperwork and an increased sense of empowerment:

*“Officers were doing more paperwork to become top of league lists instead of doing the paperwork necessary to the job. Since the withdrawal [of a target-led approach] there is a greater culture of looking towards all disposal techniques and choosing the most appropriate as opposed to the one that gives them a tick in a box. There is more discretion used to deliver what is best for the victim and there is a greater trust from supervisors in their staff utilising the best ‘tools in their box’.”* [Constable]

*“The abolition of numerical targets in favour of a more holistic approach to solving problems in a way that best suits the victim and community means that I feel more empowered to take a course of action that I feel is most appropriate, rather than one that will provide the force with a tick in a box.”* [Constable]

71. The review also found that in many cases a lot of effort is spent on the monitoring and reporting of measures, with a sense that they remain a ‘comfort blanket’ in accountability forums.

72. The review found examples of well-run performance meetings, where leaders ask open questions to understand what is happening and why. This leads to open and honest discussion, where gaps in data are highlighted and participants are comfortable to say if they do not know why something is happening. The review also found some examples (and anecdotal feedback) of poorer practice, where the emphasis is on demanding an improvement in the numbers, rather than trying to understand root causes, with little room for challenge. In such cases the numbers are treated as *de facto* targets.
73. The review team found some instances where PCCs played an important role in challenging the ‘comfort blanket’ approach and moving beyond the traditional method of scrutinising individual crime categories. Good practice involves asking challenging questions beyond the headline performance information to understand root causes, barriers and opportunities. For example, in Staffordshire, the PCC has introduced the concept of ‘Confidential Inquiry Sessions’ where the PCC hears from subject experts on the key issues and challenges being faced, allowing full and frank discussion, while providing the PCC with a forum in which to challenge.
74. The review team found considerable variation in terms of the amount of performance information that officers and staff were able or encouraged to view. (Technology should be an enabler here as modern performance analysis software allows data to be ‘sliced and diced’ and tailored to the needs of different users.) Some forces actively promote the fact that all performance information is available via the intranet, while others emphasised that frontline operational officers no longer needed to know any performance data – “they don’t need to know the numbers” – but instead should be focused on “doing the right thing”.
75. These disparities appeared connected to perceptions of the ability of officers to understand and interpret data and the degree of trust throughout the organisation. Trust is a key enabler in allowing officers the freedom to do their jobs and rely on their professional judgement. This was highlighted in the survey:
- “Trust in managers and officers is much more evident now than two years ago [since the removal of targets]. Much more focus on co-productive meetings and collective leadership style.” [Inspector]*

## Recommendations

- Chief constables should ensure that their performance measurement and reporting processes are free from any unnecessary bureaucracy, particularly where frontline staff are required to complete returns to justify activities (rather than being held to account). This should also extend to any internal auditing relating to data-gathering processes (such as crime recording). (Recommendation 13)

## Leadership and culture

### **Summary of findings**

*Successfully embedding new approaches to performance management requires culture change. This begins with leaders communicating a clear vision linked to organisational purpose. It then needs leaders to ‘walk the talk’ – by setting the standards and culture and ensuring that the desired behaviours are consistently supported and appropriately recognised throughout the organisation. All managers must have the skills and abilities to understand and interpret performance information and to use it effectively to make decisions. There is evidence of some managers being reluctant to let go of targets, often because it is the only experience they have of managing performance. Poor management behaviours can weaken morale and erode teamwork. Professional development needs to address all aspects of performance management, from understanding data to the ‘softer’ skills required for coaching and holding performance conversations.*

76. The obstacle to removing targets most commonly cited by forces was the need to change the organisational culture, with references to targets being ‘embedded’ or ‘hard-wired’ within the force. Indeed, many senior leaders within forces admitted that the culture change required is far greater than had been anticipated.
77. In performance cultures where hitting targets equals success, this can lead to a narrow view of professional performance and inform a wide range of decisions such as what is considered important and what is prioritised. Over time, priorities, processes and behaviours become entrenched and the removal of targets alone is not sufficient to effect change.
78. Many forces described the need for a more ‘mature’ approach, changing the performance culture from one where ‘numbers mean everything’ to one where service quality matters. This requires clear and consistent leadership. Forces also emphasised that this takes time to do, typically 18-24 months or more.
79. Examples of the efforts to support changing the performance culture include:
- Developing and clearly communicating an understanding of core purpose
  - Redefining and celebrating success in ways broader than crime reduction, including things like:
    - A greater emphasis on the victim’s needs
    - Community resolutions, not just sanction detections
    - Officer/Staff morale and wellbeing
    - Innovation

- Force-wide communication programmes, including face-to-face events at all levels of the organisation, and Chief Constable ‘roadshows’
- Education and training on how to manage people, assess progress and performance and have a more ‘rounded’ performance conversation focused on quality
- Involving the Performance Analysis Team in educating local managers on how to use the available data and tools to understand their local performance, including understanding of control charts
- Providing relevant data at relevant levels in the organisation
- Consistent messages followed through with actions, particularly by senior leaders.

### Management behaviour

80. A number of forces described a particular challenge with some managers being reluctant to let go of targets. They identified a particular problem with the skills and confidence of these individuals, in large part due to the leadership styles they have been exposed to during their careers.
81. Many senior leaders within forces acknowledged that historically recognition of success and subsequent rewards (including promotion) has been based on achieving performance targets, a perception reflected by more junior officers in the survey.

*“Supervisors in our force aren’t mature enough to use this information [targets] competently. The culture in our force is all about not being at the bottom of the table, therefore this encourages the cherry picking of jobs to make yourself look good. This also drives promotion due to our antiquated promotion structure and inability to demote incompetence.” [Constable]*

*“Any senior officer promoted in the last 15 years has evidenced their own performance by figures and target setting... Senior Officers from the Chief Constable down now are rightly now pumping the QUALITY not numbers message.....The big problem is that nobody has told the middle tier of Police management who as i say earlier were themselves promoted solely on figures.” [Constable]*

*“In my experience, the statistics used as indicators are disproportionately dealt with [by] senior management on borough who are frightened by higher senior management and management board as it impacts on personal promotion prospects.” [Inspector]*

82. Target-driven management behaviours were frequently cited in the survey as having a negative impact on officers’ work:

*“We had a change of Supervisor who does subscribe to the target culture...The get up and go we had has been replaced with a target chasing mentality, morale has declined as has the ability to exercise discretion.” [Constable]*

*“Even when [senior leader], insists that they [targets] are not part of the organisational strategy, local managers (PS, Insp, Chief Insp) still tend to cling to them. Presumably they do this because they simply lack any other notion of what ‘management’ or ‘leadership’ might entail. It’s what they know, and they cling to it. Therefore, when they have been forbidden to impose arrest/detection/stop-search targets to evidence they and their teams’ productivity, they start inventing their own.” [Constable]*

*“I have stop search targets so I search a shoplifter first then arrest so I can record a pro active search it is nonsense. I am arresting people needlessly just to raise my stats, officers are dragged into meetings to talk about why they haven’t arrested enough people. The whole thing is unethical and wastes so much time and so much money.” [Sergeant]*

The removal of targets at force level is not always accompanied by perceptible changes in management behaviours throughout the organisation:

*“At a local level the Chief Inspector states that we do not have targets and then in the next email he send performance figures comparing the team in numerous areas and then speaking to supervisors of teams that are not performing!” [Sergeant]*

*“Domestic violence needs to be approached in a mature fashion on a case by case basis. Our local SLT have decided that they want the detection rate to be 55% and are constantly pressurising officers to charge and caution in cases where we know the victim does not support police action and does not want the suspect to be arrested. I appreciate the positive arrest policy but it is wrong to charge and caution in cases which you know are unsupported by the victim and that there will be a negative impact on the family due to the suspect being charged.” [Sergeant]*

## **Morale and wellbeing**

83. Performance cultures that promote a narrow view of success and restrict professional judgement (whether numeric targets are directly involved or not) can impact significantly on frontline staff. They can create a sense of disempowerment and hurt morale, which can consequently impact on the quality of service provided to the victim. These themes were evident in the survey responses:

*“Targets make me resent the work I do. I don’t take as much pride in it because I feel like it’s for the sake of the target.” [Constable]*

*“The pressure placed upon an individual to meet the multiple targets is immense. As a police officer, I am judged on how many people I arrest a month (I have been set a target of 3 a month), to obtain 2 sanction detections per month and to assist the team in meeting the 90% charter time on I and S grades. I am a hard working police officer. I am proud to be a police officer and love doing this job but the strain is starting to make me ill. ...Every month, the figures are released and we are just told that we have to give more more more.... I now hide in order to have my refreshments as it has become the norm to not eat or drink on a 9 hour tour of duty....I am at a loss as to what more I can do to help meet these targets. This culture needs to stop but I do not know how when it is now well out of control” [Constable]*

*“Arrests have been made purely to reach targets. The pressure to do this is put on PCs by supervisors and if the targets are not met the threat of UPP [Unsatisfactory Performance Procedures] has been used.” [Constable]*

*“There is a traffic light system (RAG) and however much reassurance that the Command Team give on this that they won’t hold us to account on the figures the consequential psychological stress this gives is unhelpful.” [Inspector]*

84. Survey respondents also described the benefits where performance cultures had changed for the better:

*“Since removal of numerical targets and a focus on ethics this has put the onus on doing what is right. I joined this job nearly 25 years ago to make a difference, not chase targets, the new focus has reinvigorated me and my enthusiasm to get the job done.” [Sergeant]*

85. Comments in the survey also cited instances where targets impact negatively on teamwork:

*“Targets will dissuade officers from assisting with other incidents. It actively promotes competition between officers, devalues teamwork and can actively destroy teamwork.” [Constable]*

*“So much of police work is based around working with other teams to get a case home, yet setting targets on individual teams places them in competition, which ends up in a worse overall result. “Why would I assign units to help another team make their target at the expense of mine?” Targets for assisting other teams to complete work is a more intelligent way of approaching this, but it is seldom done.” [Sergeant]*

*“Each team is measured on their ‘s’ call response (within 60 mins). When a new team starts, it is basic self preservation to not attend the outstanding and expired calls but to deploy to calls they are likely to achieve. This assists their performance and also helps to lessen the performance of the previous team at the same time, widening the gap.” [Sergeant]*

86. Forces recognising these issues have made staff wellbeing an explicit part of the performance framework (see Lancashire case study).

### **Performance and Development Reviews (PDRs)**

87. Many forces accept that their approaches to people performance have historically been too narrowly focused on ‘chasing numbers’. Targets have been a common feature of Performance and Development Reviews (PDRs) and we found evidence that this continues. (This is despite the fact that the PASC report<sup>24</sup> concluded that police-recorded crime data should not be used as the basis for personal performance appraisals.)

<sup>24</sup> *Caught red-handed: Why we can’t count on Police-Recorded Crime statistics*, House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), Thirteenth Report of Session 2013–14, HC 760, 9 April 2014

88. Targets can be an ‘easy’ way to manage poor performers – if a poorly performing officer has delivered no tangible outcomes then some form of quantified goal may be a legitimate way to set expectations. However, we came across examples where it appeared that supervisors were defaulting to numeric targets to manage performance, in part due to lack of knowledge or experience of any other way to deal with the situation. Too often the message to poor performers appears to be: ‘do it better’.
89. Managers also need the skills to evidence and recognise good work. The review team found instances of supervisors, who had welcomed the removal of targets, struggling to explain how they knew someone was performing well – a common reply being “you just know”.

### **Professional development**

90. The skills and capabilities required for effective performance management need to be built into officer professional development and tested in promotion processes. This includes:
- how to use qualitative and quantitative evidence to assess an individual’s ability
  - understanding how to strike the right balance to evidence good performance
  - managing a more ‘rounded’ view of performance, and conducting a different type of constructive performance conversation.
  - support with coaching skills
  - the skills to understand and interpret data in a variety of formats and use this to make decisions
  - the ability to chair accountability processes to support effective teamwork.
91. A number of forces are introducing performance management training (for example, GMP is exploring an accredited approach), while forces such as Derbyshire and Durham test performance management skills at promotion boards.
92. The College of Policing leadership review has set out clear recommendations for delivering effective leadership at all levels in policing. The findings from this review should feed into those recommendations where relevant.

### **Recognition**

93. Many comments in the survey expressed the view that recognition is skewed towards ‘numbers’ and away from areas without numeric measures such as public protection or ‘untargeted’ crime types:

*“It just becomes disheartening that the hard work we do that doesn’t ever feature on any performance target table means nothing as all we ever receive emails or communication about how we are performing against targets.” [Sergeant]*

*“I am never brought to task over my team’s performance around solving sexual offences, indecent images, class A drugs or knife crime (because they are not a Service priorities) but I am brought to task around targets for officers booking on duty on time or not ticking a box to say they have updated a victim of crime.” [Sergeant]*

*“Targets in some aspects can be misleading, as an individual can work just as long and hard on a matter that maybe NFA’d (via CPS) or not even crime related (sudden death, mispers etc...). This [results in] officers in all departments handpicking jobs to ensure they can get the right stats to look good on paper. I believe supervisors should be held more responsible for staff they have and determining their effectiveness to [the organisation].” [Constable]*

*“You cannot measure a lot of the work that we do such as victim care (there is a difference between a phone call and a supportive phone call). We undertake roles that cannot be measured such as dealing with the mentally ill, missing persons, vulnerable people, fear for welfare, drunk people, suicidal people. Helping people is why I joined the police but none of this work can be measured and so it does not count.” [Constable]*

Recognition can also include training courses, which are used as incentives:

*“A lot of courses are given to the person that has the right ‘figures’. As such you may be chasing figures in order to get a response, advanced or taser course. This means you may not deal with victims or incidents appropriately, you may be distracted to get your next ‘cannabis detection’ or arrest in order to get your next course!” [Constable]*

94. Recognition mechanisms need to give positive acknowledgement for doing the right thing. For example, it was suggested that more could be done to recognise contributions to problem-solving, as well as public protection and safeguarding vulnerable people.
95. Incentivising the right behaviours is also key to changing the culture. As one sergeant told the review team:
- “Processes can help culture change – if you change the process and how to reward, support and give people positive recognition for doing the right thing.”*
96. It is acknowledged by the review team that many of the issues discussed in this section will feature within the Continuous Professional Development (CPD) work currently being developed by the College of Policing.

### **Case Study – Greater Manchester Police**

GMP’s new performance framework will not allow their staff to chair performance accountability processes until the SMT is satisfied that they **properly understand effective performance management**. The force recognises that there is a high **risk of inconsistency** and for individual views to have a negative influence on what is perceived as important – with **potentially destructive consequences** should such influence pervade throughout the organisation. Coaching and training staff in performance understanding is planned for the future, with accreditation through external verification being explored.

### **Case Study – Lancashire**

Several elements have played a key role in changing the culture in Lancashire, including the development of a leadership commitment and leadership framework and managing demand via a systems thinking approach. Alongside this is the prioritisation of wellbeing, linked to the Constabulary's People Strategy, which emphasises quality of service and meaningful productivity.

The commitment to wellbeing places importance on understanding what makes staff feel good about the service they deliver to the public. The senior team describe themselves as accountable to the frontline, with an attendant focus on reward and recognition and staff engagement. For example, a particular patrol team was identified as having consistently high satisfaction rates over a two-year period. The team were invited to share their methods and learning with the senior team. The reasons for the performance – keeping victims informed, showing empathy, taking ownership – were used by HR as a case study on morale and wellbeing.

The force has deliberately invested in upskilling sergeants, as a rank critical to success, through its Lancashire Constabulary's Street Skills programme. The programme emphasises empowering staff to take more ownership of issues and think for themselves to do the right thing with a view to delivering more neighbourhood justice.

### **Case Study – Kent**

As part of their cultural shift towards ethical and accurate crime recording, and focusing on providing a quality service by putting victims and witnesses at the heart of everything they do and empowering staff to do the right thing, Kent Police have reviewed how individuals are held to account for performance. Performance is certainly not a 'dirty word'. The need to understand performance is clearly acknowledged, but it is phrased in the following way, which seems to resonate with staff, "we have changed the performance culture, but kept our culture of performing".

Individual performance reviews (PDRs) continue to be conducted with staff by line managers in what is described by the Police Federation Chair as a "mature approach to performance". He describes a completely different relationship between chief officers and staff, where staff truly believe that they are listened to and can change things.

Individual performance is managed through face-to-face conversations with supervisors and a PDR system that can be updated at any time, rather than just yearly. There are no numerical objectives set for officers or staff – terminology is focused on encouraging desirable behaviours that align with organisational purpose, e.g. “Demonstrate competence in developing intelligence-led policing activities that contribute towards organisational objectives”. The officer would then produce evidence of this, e.g. “I developed community intelligence in relation to modern-day slavery, conducted research, liaised with X and Y departments, obtained a warrant, authored an operational order, and took part in an operation that resulted in 3 people being safeguarded from an OCG group”. This is in contrast to “Submit 3 intelligence reports per month” etc. Officers’ performance is judged through qualitative assessment and narrative, rather than a blunt scoring system (e.g. 1 = unsatisfactory / 2 = satisfactory/ 3 = exceeds standard, etc). This ensures that qualitative performance is considered throughout the organisation.

There is also an obvious emphasis on officer/staff development, and formal programmes to support this (e.g. lateral development process, talent and development panel, forward thinking post filling and career progression framework).

The result of these changes is that PDRs are now viewed by staff as meaningful. Supervisors have the time to conduct regular meetings and supervise their staff effectively because they have been freed up from the bureaucracy of gathering unnecessary and often irrelevant data that was required under the previous performance management regime.

## Recommendations

- Chief constables should review their forces’ incentive and recognition systems to ensure that appropriate recognition is given for desired behaviours and non-quantifiable activity, including examples of good professional judgement. (Recommendation 14)
- The College should ensure that the skills needed for performance management are built into the model of leadership and management training and development being taken forward as per Recommendation 6 of the Leadership review. These skills should also be considered as part of the national standards for selection and promotion as per recommendation 9 of the Leadership review and considered by the Defining and Assessing Competence (DAC) team. (Recommendation 15)
- Chief constables should review their PDR processes to ensure that they properly recognise the breadth of work undertaken by officers and staff (including non-quantifiable work), with objectives that focus on contribution and behaviours rather than numerical targets. (Recommendation 16)

## Communication

### **Summary of findings**

*The communication of performance measures should allow everyone in the organisation to understand progress towards outcomes. Terminology used to describe performance should be commonly understood and consistent with behaviour.*

*Effective communication is also key to changing culture.*

*Forces need to invest in the way performance is communicated – both internally and externally. Presently there is an over-reliance on top-down communication. Forces also need to ensure that messages and language are in line with practice.*

97. The absence of simple numeric targets creates a need for forces to invest time and effort communicating goals clearly and consistently. While forces recognised the communication challenge, only a small number described developing communications strategies or plans to help deliver the required change. More common was an assertion of “consistent messages from the top”.
98. Some forces were aware of the risks of messages getting ‘stuck’ in the middle or ‘lost in translation’. A small number referred to seeking feedback but generally communications seem to be one-way.

### **Terminology**

99. A couple of forces pointed to specific challenges of performance terminology, where words such as ‘measures’ may have negative connotations due to past experience. The review team were variously told that the word ‘targets’ was banned, “KPIs are taboo”, and phrases such ‘counting things’, ‘numbers’, ‘red/green’ cited as intrinsically bad.
100. Forces are recognising that using the appropriate terminology is key in helping to change mindsets and engage in better performance conversations. In developing a consistent lexicon, forces need to be mindful that terminology must be consistent with practice. For example, leaders who describe the need to avoid ‘knee-jerking’ should take care that their own reactions could not be characterised as such.

### **Presentation of data**

101. While forces who have moved away from targets were keen to demonstrate their understanding of the potential pitfalls when presenting data, the review team saw many instances of potentially misleading or confusing formats including:

- League table comparisons where differences between forces are not statistically significant, or very small
  - Comparisons within forces (e.g. between districts) with no contextual information to explain potential underlying differences
  - Binary comparisons – comparing two data points (often accompanied by a directional arrow) to imply a trend when no trend may exist
  - Statistics quoted at a spurious level of precision
  - Lack of explanation of statistical reliability of data, e.g. confidence intervals.
102. Some forces appear to be supplementing quantitative measures with qualitative data but not necessarily in a way that adds real value. Good practice brings together qualitative and quantitative data and provides context to aid understanding. The aim is to bring together analysis and intelligence that supports decision-making. (For example, when looking at response times, Durham considers not just call handling, dispatch and travel time elements, but also officer welfare and safety. Response time tolerances also take into account victim satisfaction and the emotional energy of the staff involved). Attention should also be paid to the order in which information is presented (as importance may be inferred by the order in which things are set out).

### **Media and public**

103. A number of forces referred to the challenges of communicating performance information to the media and the public. They spoke of the need to improve understanding of what success looks like, and specifically to encourage a move away from end-of-year crime statistics as a sole success measure. The reasons for changes in recorded crime levels are many and varied and can include factors that are outside the immediate control of the police. Police recorded crime should be viewed as a measure of ‘demand’ and the Home Office, Office for National Statistics and forces need to be more explicit in reinforcing this message when police recorded crime data is released. Some forces have worked to build relations with the media to help communicate a more accurate and considered view of crime and public safety. Some PCCs have also helped to develop a more ‘mature’ dialogue with the public.

### **Role of performance analysis teams**

104. Performance teams (also variously called analyst, insight or continuous improvement teams) have a vital role to play in measuring and monitoring of force performance. The review identified a number of areas of good practice relating to performance teams:
- Voice in the organisation – where performance teams have a clear voice in the organisation, they are playing an important role in helping to identify problems, alert senior teams to emerging risks, challenge approaches and innovate. (By contrast where their voice is less strong, the personal preferences of senior managers tend to dictate reporting formats.)

- Providing ‘insight’ – dedicated roles where analysts are not just monitoring and reporting on performance but are focused on understanding and explaining data – finding out ‘what’s really going on’, as well as helping forecast demand. (This typically involves working on short-term project-based commissions and acting as an internal consultant.)
- Skills – the recognition of the need to retain and invest in key analytical skills.
- Cross-fertilisation of analytical skills. For instance, where teams have been centralised, this has brought together performance and intelligence analysts, which brings benefits in terms of sharing knowledge and skills.

### Communication of good practice

105. The review team found some examples of forces sharing learning in terms of their journey towards a new performance management framework, but this was done on an informal basis, usually based on existing professional relationships between individuals, rather than any formal structure.
106. Whilst there is a role for the College of Policing in working with the NPCC to develop effective performance management principles, the PEEL inspections carried out annually by HMIC in each force area present an opportunity to identify and highlight good practice in this area.

#### Case Study – Kent

Forces have been clear throughout the review that to have intelligent and constructive conversations about performance management requires a major cultural shift. The development and use in Kent of the “People first: Affecting cultural change at Kent Police” communication strategy is a good example of a force taking on this challenge.

The strategy sets out the background which led to the change in performance management (the removal of targets by the Government and PCCs, two reviews of the force; an internal review and an HMIC review). It reiterates that the force’s Mission, Vision, Values and Priorities (MVVP) are built on the clear and unambiguous principle that “performance without integrity is no performance at all”. The strategy highlights the steps taken to address negative performance culture i.e. the removal of targets from PDRs and the elimination of the requirement for senior management to report on data fluctuations.

Moreover the strategy acknowledges the challenge of changing the “ingrained attitudes and perceptions, both of managers and staff alike” and sets out the requirements for this to happen. Firstly to make staff believe the change is permanent, and secondly for staff to be able to affect the change themselves.

To embed the MVVP and ensure staff engagement the force undertook:

1. Chief officer led engagement events to set out the commitment to the MVVP and allow staff to contribute new ideas, including CC and DCC roadshows
2. Targeted input to middle managers for buy-in, emphasising their role as leaders and role-models
3. Multi-media communications to reinforce the MVVP, including use of the intranet to blog and encourage feedback and views, posters to emphasise the importance of putting the public first and a video incorporating the MVVP and highlighting the force's good work
4. Promotion of regular positive feedback (internal and external) celebrating work of officers who embodied the principles of the MVVP
5. Implementation of a Force Culture Board - this is the only Board chaired by the Chief Constable and consists of representation from officers and staff at all ranks and grade. The Board is also now replicated locally across the Force too.
6. Implementation of the Internal Code of Ethics Committee – the introduction of the Code of Ethics complemented the Culture Review and the Mission, Vision, Values and Priorities – principles for both of which run in conjunction with the Code. The Committee is chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable and consists of representation from across the Force. All decisions are posted on the internal inSite and in the first year the page had been viewed over 25,000 times.

The strategy also set out a full project plan, the commitment to implement training for middle managers around their roles, to keep staff up to date with progress and to externally communicate that the needs of the public are the force's priority.

A clear result from the strategy is the trust that it has engendered, both trust in the analysts to use data to provide honest feedback and challenge, as well as trust in officers to do the right thing. Feedback received through the survey also appears to demonstrate the effectiveness of the strategy in embedding the MVVP throughout the force. Kent's HMI Zoë Billingham recently attended one of Kent's Police Culture Board and described the culture as "working in reality, not in the organisational abstract".

### **Case Study – Durham**

Durham Constabulary takes a holistic approach to staff engagement, considering the interdependencies between engagement, demand and resource allocation.

For example, an area that the constabulary is considering is in relation to the levels of calls for advice from a range of local authority partners. Therefore its safeguarding teams maybe experiencing higher demands which could effectively be drawing them from their core function. This has led to a piece of demand analysis to examine whether this is having an undue impact on the ‘day job.’ The work includes semi-structured interviews, caseload monitoring and activity analysis. The aim is to check perceptions against reality (data), before taking action.

The work is supported by a ‘diary study’ being conducted by Durham University, comparing what officers are doing with how they are feeling, with a view to ascertaining levels of emotional energy and general welfare. Regular ‘reality checks’ are held with inspectors and sergeants – gauging current demand issues, good practice and barriers – conducted by a virtual analysis team, created within the performance department, to speak with officers and build the analysis.

Remaining in touch with the frontline remains a key part of the constabulary’s operating model. The constabulary recognises that, while laborious, activity analysis/time-and-motion studies are the only definitive means of capturing a true picture of demand. There are plans to re-use the approach with the response and crime functions of the constabulary in the near future.

### **Additional Case Studies**

**The Dyfed Powys PCC** commissioned a series of focus groups with officers which identified an ingrained ‘target culture’ at various levels of the force. This has led to a sustained communications campaign to change the culture, championed by the senior team and including leadership seminars for all sergeants in the force.

**Gloucestershire’s** performance analysts have been freed up from monitoring and reporting on targets and are now empowered to work creatively in developing toolkits and more qualitative measures of success and service delivery, which can be fed into the continuous improvement cycle.

**Nottinghamshire’s** analyst and insight team provide internal expertise to interpret data, helping to identify and illuminate significant changes in performance and emerging trends that may impact on performance.

**Lancashire** Constabulary has developed an online intranet forum, “The Buzz”, which enables and encourages effective and honest two-way conversations at all levels, and which has played a significant part in accelerating the force’s cultural change, including the shift away from a target-driven performance culture.

## Recommendations

- Chief constables should ensure they clearly communicate the force's approach to performance, making clear the links between performance and purpose. Communication should promote two-way engagement, giving staff a voice and demonstrating consistency between messages and practice. (Recommendation 17)
- During their consultation and communication with the public, PCCs should seek to create a vision of policing success for their communities which is broader than a reduction in police recorded crime figures. (Recommendation 18)
- HMIC should consider how best to promote the sharing of good practice in relation to performance measurement/management systems and processes that may be identified during the course of future HMIC inspections. (Recommendation 19)

## Conclusions

The initial remit for this review involved exploring the use of targets in policing and gaining an understanding of their effects. It quickly became clear, however, that the use of numerical targets is just part of a wider issue around effective police performance management in general.

Many forces recognise the ‘dangers’ around the use of targets and appreciate the need to move beyond target-driven performance management, but there appears to be a lack of understanding, and consistency about what should be used instead. Evidence was found of a number of forces that had made a conscious effort to move away from the target-driven performance culture, but continued to use and present performance data in an unhelpful format, such as the use of binary comparisons with ‘up’ or ‘down’ arrows. This risks causing those using the data to make judgements about apparent differences or ‘directions of travel’ which may not be significant, potentially leading to unnecessary ‘knee jerk’ reactions intended to address perceived problems. Well-intentioned but potentially flawed behaviours such as these can also be caused by league tables, and even the positioning of categories of performance data within a ‘data package’ can influence mindsets about priorities. It is essential, therefore, that forces not only remove numerical targets from their performance frameworks, but that they consider the wider potential impacts of how performance information is presented.

The findings of this review show that what appears to work most effectively is where leaders focus on the right mix of performance measures to understand the complex and changing nature of demands on policing; and where they set a culture that creates an environment where officers and staff are empowered to use their professional discretion to do what they believe is right for victims; a culture which encourages the accurate recording of information which is then presented in a meaningful way to managers to enable them make effective decisions and deploy resources effectively to ensure that crime is prevented, and that where crimes do occur, victims get the best possible service from their staff.

The review found lots of examples of good practice, however, there wasn’t one force that could be held up as having achieved the ‘perfect’ performance management framework. Many are making great strides in achieving change in these areas, but they also admit that this is still very much work in progress. Some forces have achieved a significant cultural shift towards a much more balanced approach to performance management where officers and staff genuinely feel empowered to ‘do the right thing’. Some have invested in their leaders, helping them to understand the data better and supporting them to reframe their performance conversations by asking different questions and using meaningful, contextualised measures and narrative that provide an accurate picture of performance.

Whilst there are some informal networks across forces, it is apparent that much of this innovative work is occurring in isolation – currently there is no coordinated mechanism for forces to share good practice or develop fresh approaches. Similarly, there is little in the way of national guidance or training on effective police performance management, and uncertainty about the way forward.

The recommendations in this review are intended to support forces in continuing their journey towards developing an effective performance framework; one that not only provides a good understanding of the business in order to assist effective decision-making, but also enables individuals to be appropriately held to account, whilst empowering them to do the right thing for the public and make the right decisions to support victims of crime.

## Annexes

- **Annex A: Terms of reference**
- **Annex B: Methodology**
- **Annex C: Letter to chief constables**
- **Annex D: Questions for forces**
- **Annex E: Letter to PCCs**
- **Annex F: Fieldwork schedule**
- **Annex G: Durham 'Plan on a Page' and Performance Management Framework**
- **Annex H: Findings from the survey**
- **Annex I: Effective performance measurement principles**
- **Annex J: The impact of targets – evidence from desk research**
- **Annex K: Glossary of terms**

## Annex A: Terms of reference

### Comprehensive review of police targets and their impact

#### 1. Aim

To conduct a comprehensive review of the use of police targets and their impact on outcomes. The review will examine whether targets are causing perverse incentives, reducing officer discretion, adding red tape and reflecting an outmoded business model.

#### 2. Scope

The review will include in scope all 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales. Specifically the review should consider the use of numerical targets as a means to drive and shape delivery by frontline officers and staff and the impact that this has had on behaviours. The review should also identify promising approaches to the use of data, including drawing on best practice from the private and public sectors.

#### 3. Objectives

Within the framework outlined above, the objectives of the review are to:

- investigate the extent of the use of targets by police and crime commissioners and chief constables in managing police performance;
- consider the impact of the use of police targets in creating perverse incentives, reducing officer discretion, and creating bureaucracy;
- consider the impact of the use of police targets in terms of behaviours;
- consider options for removing barriers to professional discretion;
- explore whether changes to the national framework might be necessary and what they might achieve, making recommendations;
- identify recommendations for the consideration of local police leaders, including identifying promising practice; and
- look at how data are used by forces in general to identify promising practice.

#### 4. Approach to the Work

The review chair will independently review the use of targets in policing, with support from Home Office officials as required, including making arrangements to meet policing partners. Where possible, the work should draw on any existing evidence base and on the experiences of people working on all sides of the system. This may be achieved by surveys, individual consultation, field visits or group sessions with policing partners including, but not limited to the following:

- Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)
- Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC)
- Chief Constables
- College of Policing
- HMIC
- National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)
- Police Federation of England and Wales
- Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales
- Mayor's Office for Police And Crime (MOPAC)

The chair of the review will make recommendations to the Home Secretary who will consider upon receipt of the report whether she wishes to publish the findings. The chair of the review will propose any necessary changes to processes and frameworks at the national level and will publish recommendations for the consideration of local policing leaders, primarily chief officers and police and crime commissioners.

## **5. Timeframe**

The timescale for the review will be 8-12 weeks from appointment of the review chair to completion. The Chair will participate in regular stocktakes with Home Office officials at intervals as the review progresses. The review will need to be completed by the beginning of September.

## **6. Products**

The chair of the review will provide a report to the Home Secretary by the beginning of September, including:

- analysis of the use of targets by the police and issues identified, illustrated with case study examples where possible.
- clear recommendations in relation to any changes to the national framework. The Home Secretary will consider the recommendations.
- clear recommendations for consideration by local police leaders, including PCCs and chief officers.

## Annex B: Methodology

### Desk research

A desk research exercise was undertaken to review available evidence on the use of targets in policing and the public sector more generally. A review of published police and crime plans in England and Wales was also undertaken.

### Force questionnaire

Information was requested via a letter (see Annex C) and set of questions (see Annex D) sent to all chief constables in England and Wales, the commissioners for the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London. The letter was also sent to all 41 PCCs (See Annex E), MOPAC and the City of London Police Committee. Responses were received from all 43 forces, 38 PCCs, MOPAC and the City of London Police Committee.

### Online survey

A short online survey (hosted on 'surveymonkey' – see Annex H for a response breakdown, ran from 26 June to 17 July 2015. The survey was designed to act as a feedback tool, in order to provide officers and staff – and especially those in frontline roles – with an opportunity to contribute to the review. The survey was publicised using the Police Federation, Police Superintendents Association, force distribution lists/newsletters and social media. The questionnaire was started by 8,774 respondents with 6,119 completing the final question.

The survey was not designed to be statistically robust or representative. The results cannot be taken as representative owing to it being a self-selecting sample and therefore risks being biased.

### Field work visits (see Annex F for detail)

13 forces were visited during the review period, by Irene or members of the team. The forces visited were chiefly those who had invited the team to visit to review their performance management. Where possible, the team observed force's performance meetings, met with members of the performance team, a chief officer, operational 'middle management' and junior officers. The aim of the force visits was to help understand how the performance management framework runs through a 'vertical' slice of the organisation.

In addition to this, meetings were held with HMIC and consultation undertaken with the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) Co-ordinating Group portfolio leads for performance management, crime recording and systems thinking.

### PCC focus group

In addition to the force visits, all PCCs were invited to the Home Office for a short update on the review. The event included a focus group discussion to explore the challenges of moving to new performance frameworks, identify potential barriers and learn lessons from good practice. PCCs (and their representatives) from 24 force areas and two representatives from the APCC attended the event.

## Annex C: Letter from Irene Curtis to chief constables



Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales  
Cymdeithas Uwcharolygyddion Heddlu Cymru A Lloegr

10 June 2015

Dear Chief Constable

### **Review of Police Targets and their Impact**

As you are probably aware, I have been asked by the Home Secretary to conduct a comprehensive review of the use of police targets. I have attached a copy of the terms of reference for the review for your information. You will see that my review will cover the 43 Home Office forces and will not only examine the use of targets and their impact, but will also seek to identify good performance management practices that can be shared with others. I am keen that my report will have a strong focus on the latter point.

I wish to make it clear from the outset that the terms of reference specify the review will examine the use of targets, i.e. specific numerical targets that are attached to performance measures, rather than performance measures themselves, which of course are essential for effective performance management.

I am aware of the potential sensitivities of this review in relation to the roles of both chief constables and police and crime commissioners. In announcing the review, the Home Secretary was clear that this is not an attempt to fetter chief constables in their use of data to understand and manage the operational challenge of policing. Nor is it a rebuke to police and crime commissioners who use information to set the strategic direction of their force and hold their chief constable to account. The focus will be squarely on numerical targets (across all areas of policing) and their effect on behaviour, discretion and bureaucracy, and also good practice relating to alternative performance management models.

In order to complete the review it is my intention to undertake extensive consultation with officers and staff at all levels within the service, and also with other key partners such as police and crime commissioners, College of Policing, HMIC and others. This will be supported by research and fieldwork.

In light of the timescale for the review, which is due for completion by early September, and the limited resources available to me, I don't anticipate that I will be able to personally visit every force. It would be helpful, therefore, to get an early sense of where each force is at in relation to their performance management framework (and more specifically whether numerical targets are used) before the fieldwork phase of the review commences.

To assist with this, I would be grateful if you could arrange for the attached questionnaire to be completed as soon as possible on behalf of your force.

I have also written to your police and crime commissioner in similar terms and would greatly appreciate your response to [Reviewofpolicetargets@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:Reviewofpolicetargets@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk) by Wednesday 17 June.

Attachments:

Terms of Reference

Force Questions



Irene Curtis

**Chief Superintendent Irene Curtis, MBA, FCMI**

E [Reviewofpolicetargets@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:Reviewofpolicetargets@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk)

67A Reading Road, Pangbourne, Berkshire, RG8 7JD

Tel: **0118 984 4005** fax: **0118 984 5642**

e-mail: [enquiries@policessupers.com](mailto:enquiries@policessupers.com)

[www.policessupers.com](http://www.policessupers.com)

## Annex D: Questions sent to forces

### Questions for Forces

Firstly, do you use targets as part of the performance measurement framework in your force?

#### ***If targets are used:***

1. In what areas of policing do you use targets (e.g. call handling/attendance at scene/crime reduction or detection) and why do you believe they are necessary?
2. What action do you take to ensure that targets do not lead to unintended consequences, such as deployments or crimes being moved from one category to another to avoid failing to meet a target, or stop/searches not being recorded etc?
3. Have you considered removing targets and if so, why did you choose not to?
4. Do you use, or have you considered using control charts as part of your performance management process? If so, what are their benefits and drawbacks? If not, is there a specific reason for this?
5. Has your Police and Crime Commissioner influenced your decision to use targets?

#### ***If targets are not used:***

6. When and why did you take the decision not to use targets?
7. What processes and systems do you use to manage performance in the absence of targets?
8. What benefits have you found by not using targets?
9. What have been the main obstacles that you have had to deal with in moving away from using targets and how have you addressed these?
10. How confident are you that, despite there not being force targets, more local targets have not been imposed by managers within their own area of the force?
11. Has your Police and Crime Commissioner influenced your decision not to use targets?
12. Do you use, or have you considered using control charts as part of your performance management process? If so, what are their benefits and drawbacks? If not, is there a specific reason for this?

## Annex E: Letter to PCCs



Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales  
Cymdeithas Uwcharolygyddion Heddlu Cymru A Lloegr

10 June 2015

Dear Commissioner

### **Review of Police Targets and their Impact**

As you are probably aware, I have been asked by the Home Secretary to conduct a comprehensive review of the use of police targets. I have attached a copy of the terms of reference for the review for your information. You will see that my review will cover the 43 Home Office forces and will not only examine the use of targets and their impact, but will also seek to identify good performance management practices that can be shared with others. I am keen that my report will have a strong focus on the latter point.

I wish to make it clear from the outset that the terms of reference specify the review will examine the use of targets, i.e. specific numerical targets that are attached to performance measures, rather than performance measures themselves, which of course are essential for effective performance management.

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In order to complete the review it is my intention to undertake extensive consultation with officers and staff at all levels within the service, and also with other key partners such as police and crime commissioners, College of Policing, HMIC and others. This will be supported by research and fieldwork.

In light of the timescale for the review, which is due for completion by early September, and the limited resources available to me, I don't anticipate that I will be able to personally visit every force. It would be helpful, therefore, to get an early sense of where each force is at in relation to their performance management framework (and more specifically whether numerical targets are used) before the fieldwork phase of the review commences.

To assist with this, I would be grateful if you could provide me with a picture of the use of targets in the area you serve. Specifically, it would be helpful to understand if numerical targets are used and, if so, how they are used including whether they are driven by yourself, the chief officer team, or at a more local level. If targets are not used in your force, what drove this decision? Finally, it would be good to understand how performance is measured in your force. Please could you attach examples of recent performance documents (electronic version if possible) and any other useful information, including, if relevant, any details of the targets that are used.

I have also written to your chief constable in similar terms and would greatly appreciate your response to [Reviewofpolicetargets@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:Reviewofpolicetargets@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk) by Wednesday 17 June.



Irene Curtis

**Chief Superintendent Irene Curtis, MBA, FCMI**

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## Annex F: Schedule of fieldwork

Date	Event
8 July	Thames Valley Police visit – included observation of a performance meeting on missing children/CSE
9 July	Derbyshire Police visit – included meeting with the PCC
10 July	Cheshire Police visit – included meeting with the PCC
	Greater Manchester Police visit
	Staffordshire Police visit – included observation of the chief officer's management meeting and meeting with an official from the office of the PCC
13 July	Metropolitan Police Service – meeting with director of performance & assurance
	Dyfed Powys Police visit – included meeting with the PCC and observation of Policing Accountability Board
14 July	Sussex Police visit
	Police and Crime Commissioners focus group
15 July	West Yorkshire Police visit
16 July	Nottinghamshire Police visit
20 July	MPS Community Safety Unit detectives' focus group
21 July	Durham Police visit
	Kent Police visit including meeting with the PCC
24 July	Metropolitan Police Service – meeting with Helen King, assistant commissioner for territorial policing
27 July	MOPAC Visit
29 July	HMIC Meeting with HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary Sir Tom Winsor
31 July	Lancashire Police visit – included observation of the Senior Management Board
5 August	HMIC – meeting with members of analyst team

## Annex G: Durham 'Plan on a Page' and Performance Management Framework

**See attached annexes G1 and G2.**

## Annex H: Findings from the survey


A survey was made available online from 26 June – 17 July 2015 to elicit feedback from officers and staff in the 43 forces in England and Wales. More than 6,000 respondents completed the survey and the results are summarised below. (NB: The figures cannot be taken to be representative due to the nature of the survey and self-selecting sample.)

Around two-thirds (67%) of the survey respondents said they were aware of numerical targets being used as part of the force's approach to managing performance. Nearly one quarter (24%) said they were not aware, 9% answered 'don't know'.

For those not aware of targets in current use, nearly one fifth (19%) said targets had been used more than 2 years ago, while the same proportion (19%) said they had been used within the last 1-2 years. A slightly smaller proportion (14%) said their force had used targets within the last 12 months. (47% did not know when the force had last used targets.)

### Aware of targets being used


For those aware of numerical targets being used, the most common area reported was for response/call handling times (87%). The next most common was sickness absence (74%).



**As far as you are aware, does your force use numeric targets for any of the following?**  
(Please tick all that apply). Base 4,444

Of those who responded "other", examples given included targets around police officer "visibility", custody and bail targets and use of specialist equipment (e.g. body cam).


65% of these respondents said that their force uses individual performance and development reviews (PDRs) to set/monitor targets.



**As far as you are aware, does your force use any of the following to set/monitor targets?**  
 (Please tick all that apply). Base 4,444


More than half (56%) of respondents aware of targets said that performance is measured against a target on a monthly basis, while around a third (36%) said it is measured daily.

**How often is performance (unit or individual) measured against a target?**  
 (Please tick all that apply). Base 4,444




**Not aware of targets being used**

74% of survey respondents not aware of targets said that their force uses individual performance and development reviews (PDRs) to manage performance.



**Does your force use any of the following as part of the way it manages performance? (Please tick all that apply).** Base 1,894

Just over a quarter (27%) of respondents not aware of targets said that performance is measured on a monthly basis, while only 12% said it is measured daily.



**How often is performance (unit or individual) measured? (Please tick all that apply).** Base 1,894

### Attitudes


Respondents aware of targets were asked how they felt targets impact on how they do their jobs. Respondents not aware of targets were asked how their force's approach to performance management impacted on how they do their jobs. Over two-thirds (69%) of the former group described a negative impact, compared to just over one-third (36%) for the latter.

#### Those aware of targets

How do you feel that targets impact on how you do your job, such as the amount of paperwork you have to do, the level of discretion you have or ethical decision making? Base: 4,444

#### Those not aware of targets

How do you feel that your force's approach to performance management impacts on how you do your job, such as the amount of paperwork ...? Base: 1,894



Respondents were also asked for their reasons. For those who said targets had a negative impact, key themes included the following:

- *Targets skew effort* – targets can lead to a distortion of priorities where individuals have to focus too much time on the wrong (or less important) things and teams/forces put resources in the wrong places
- *Service quality* – here concerns were expressed at the way targets can impede the delivery of a quality service, in particular on putting the interests of victims first
- *Too simplistic* – targets fail to reflect the complexity or breadth of work carried out by officers and do not provide a good measure of output
- *Poor morale* – targets can invoke a great deal of stress, sense of undue pressure and fear of being disciplined
- *Poor management behaviours* – concerns were expressed with the lack of skills of those in supervisory roles to effectively manage performance. Responses referred to targets being used as an ‘easy’ way to manage performance; line managers pressurising officers to ‘chase numbers’; setting targets in PDRs and using individual league tables to ‘name and shame’
- *Targets skew reward*: targets result in only certain aspects of the job being rewarded, while managers chase them to assist with their promotion prospects
- *Ethics* – concerns were expressed around targets leading to unethical behaviour, including in some cases pressure to mis-record crime
- *Poor communication* – the use of targets (or measures) being poorly communicated, leading to confusion and ‘mixed messages’
- *Bureaucracy* – some comments related to the additional paperwork or extra administrative effort created by the target reporting process.

These themes were closely echoed by the respondents not aware of targets who said that their force’s approach to performance management has a negative impact on how they do their job. This implies that there are a common set of issues relating to negative performance cultures, regardless of whether hard numeric targets formally exist in the force.

For those who said targets had a positive impact, the main reasons related to the

following:

- *Focus* – targets can help to provide clarity and set direction
- *Prioritisation* – targets can help to prioritise effort (particularly with competing demands) and allocate resources
- *Managing performance* – some managers said they found targets were a useful means to identify poor performers
- *Tool for motivation* – targets can give individuals and teams something to strive for.


For respondents not aware of targets who said their force's approach to performance management had a positive impact on how they do their job, many comments referred to the positive change that had come from moving away from a targets-driven approach that had previously existed. Key themes included the following:

- *Quality* – an increased focus on better quality of service and care for the victim
- *A more considered response* – less 'knee-jerking' and a more reflective approach to understanding what is happening before reacting
- *Motivation and morale* – a more positive working environment, improved morale, staff feeling more valued and a shift away from a 'blame' culture
- *Ethics* – renewed emphasis on ethical decision making
- *Discretion* – greater freedom to use professional judgement and focus on 'doing the right thing'.

## About the respondents

Over half of the respondents who gave their rank were constables (55%), nearly one fifth (18%) were sergeants.

What is your rank? Base 6,136



Of the respondents who said which force they worked for (6,119), over half (56%) came from four forces.

# Annex I: Performance Management National Business Area: Effective Performance Measurement Principles v6.3 December 2014

## **Effective Performance Measurement Principles: An overview**

These guiding principles were developed during 2014 in conjunction with the National Police Systems Thinking Group, chaired by ACC Ian Wiggett, and the National Performance Management Business Area (PMBA), chaired by CC Steve Finnigan. Each of the principles is explained in detail in a fully-referenced supporting document of approximately 6,000 words, which draws upon research from within the domains of performance management and systems thinking to provide an evidence base that balances practical accessibility and operational relevance with academic rigour.

The paper has been reviewed and adapted following several rounds of consultation with members of the PMBA group and the Systems Thinking group, with the most recent iteration (version 6.3) being completed in 2015.

The intention has always been that the document would be circulated for wider consultation via the College of Policing with a view to it becoming a nationally agreed set of guiding principles that forces may use to build effective performance measurement systems. Although this wider consultation via the College has not yet commenced, a number of forces have already 'unofficially' adopted the principles in an ad hoc fashion.

Whilst the principles focus on performance measurement, it is acknowledged by those who have developed them that the next stage would be to enhance them with further principles relating to performance management, e.g. how performance measures are used to understand demand, to ensure effective deployment of resources and to effectively and fairly hold individuals to account, and to ensure that they also encompass within them factors such as culture and people.

## Effective Performance Measurement in Policing: Guiding Principles

*The following principles underpin effective performance measurement in policing:*

1. Measures are derived from *purpose*
2. The choice of measures and the way they are presented promote accurate data interpretation and understanding of system performance
3. Information is placed in context, to aid decision-making and to identify opportunities for improving performance
4. Measurement uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative information, to:
  - enable assessment of internal processes
  - track tangible outputs
  - provide an indication of progress towards outcomes.
5. Measurement is proportionate and built into the work, to avoid creating unnecessary bureaucracy
6. The approach promotes leadership, ownership and continuous improvement
7. The approach promotes effectiveness, legitimacy and efficiency
8. Performance information considers the overall ‘health’ of the system. In particular, crime data is considered an important source of information rather than the sole measure of performance
9. Performance frameworks and management practices avoid creating perverse incentives or dysfunctional behaviour
10. Operating practices promote behaviours that are compatible with the Code of Ethics

***Using the right measures in the right way***

## Annex J: The impact of targets – evidence from desk research

### A brief history

The ethos of the 1980s ‘New Public Management’, which sought to emulate a private-sector style of governance to modernise and make public services more efficient<sup>25</sup>, encouraged the use of numerical targets as a way to measure public service improvement. This extended to policing when the 1983 Home Office Circular<sup>26</sup> put the emphasis on police forces to improve their efficiency, economy and effectiveness.

Further pushes towards target-driven performance measures in policing were seen throughout the 1990s, with the Sheehy Report<sup>27</sup> in 1993 containing 272 recommendations for policing and stating at 6.3: “*The best of force performance indicators and strategies begin the task of measuring performance by providing quantifiable measures of achievement*”. An article at the time of release quoted Sir Patrick Sheehy as saying that police management systems were “*ineffective and inefficient*” with ‘*serious weaknesses*’. It went on to say: “*A more efficient service was the only way the police would gain the ‘considerable increase’ they needed in the level of public approval and combat the rise in crime*”<sup>28</sup>.

In addition to the Sheehy Report, the Home Office’s 1993 White Paper on Police Reform<sup>29</sup> stated that “*over time the framework and arrangements within which the police have worked have become out of date*” and that the police needed “*clear priorities for their work*”. The report added that the government will “*set key objectives which it will expect the police to secure*” and change the framework with police performance being measured against these objectives.

The introduction of the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 further centralised performance targets, allowing the Secretary of State to “*determine objectives for the policing of the areas of all police authorities*” and “*impose conditions with which the performance targets must conform*”. The act provided a “*springboard for intervention by successor administrations*”<sup>30</sup>.

In 1994, following the Comprehensive Spending Review, over 600 individual targets were introduced across the public sector, under the new ‘Public Service Agreements’ (PSAs). The 2001 Labour manifesto focused heavily on improving public services such the NHS, education and policing. The PSAs became more focused and streamlined and in June 2001 the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit<sup>31</sup> was created to drive them.

25 The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme, Hood, 1995

26 Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service, Home Office Circular #114/ 1983

27 Inquiry into Police Responsibility and Reward, HMSO, 1993

28 The Sheehy Inquiry: Police ‘jobs for life’ culture swept away by inquiry: Rank and file representative says authors of Sheehy report understand little or nothing about policing, Terry Kirby, The Independent, 1993 (<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-sheehy-inquiry-police-jobs-for-life-culture-swept-away-by-inquiry-rank-and-file-representative-says-authors-of-sheehy-report-understand-little-or-nothing-about-policing-1482064.html>)

29 The Police Reform White Paper: A police Service for the Twenty-First Century, HMSO, 1993

30 Policing performance: The impact of performance measures and targets on police forces in England and Wales, Loveday, 2006

31 Institute for Government: Public Service Agreements and the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, Nehal Panchamia and Peter Thomas, 2014

The Police Reform Act 2002 gave the Home Secretary powers to “*set national police priorities, remove chief officers and directly intervene in the management of local police services*”<sup>32</sup>, with Basic Command Units being subject to individual performance inspections, with similar force comparator ranking being made available, and also highlighting “*poor performance*”.

HMIC was also charged with designing and applying the new ‘Policing Performance Assessment Framework’ (PPAF), to facilitate “*the monitoring of policing performance across seven key domains: citizen focus; reducing crime; investigating crime; promoting public safety; providing assistance; resource usage; and local priorities.*”

In a change to the previous approach, the 2008 Green Paper announced the aim to “*step away from centralised performance management, and set only one top down national target for police forces – to deliver improved levels of public confidence.*”<sup>33</sup> The paper stated that “*The Government’s intention in setting targets was to galvanise action towards key priorities...but the Government recognises that under previous national target regimes, in some places a ‘perverse incentive’ had been created...*”. The Paper gave HMIC a “*hard-hitting role in exposing under-performance of police forces and authorities*”, requiring them to report annually on the state of policing signalling the “*relative performance and efficiency of forces*”.

The Green Paper also introduced a new ‘policing pledge’ which set out set out “*what the public can expect, in terms of fairness, access, local policing, response to calls, support and information for victims, and dealing with dissatisfaction*”<sup>34</sup>.

In 2010, Home Secretary Theresa May told the Association of Chief Police Officers at their annual conference that “*targets don’t fight crime; targets hinder the fight against crime*”, scrapping the confidence target and the policing pledge and stating that the police mission is solely to “*cut crime*”<sup>35</sup>.

## The impact of targets on public services

The National Audit Office defines a target as “*The level of performance that the organisation aims to achieve for a particular activity e.g. a reduction of 5 per cent over a stipulated period*”<sup>36</sup>. The UK Statistics Authority (UKSA)<sup>37</sup> adopts the convention that a ‘target’ “*relates to a particular level of performance that should be aimed for, met or exceeded over a period of time.*”

The UKSA monitoring review<sup>38</sup> sets out the approach that it expected to see “*in the production and presentation of official statistics – including those drawn from administrative rather than other statistical sources – where the data are used to measure performance or achievement against targets*”. While recognising the potential distortive effects of performance targets, the UKSA stated that “*reporting levels of performance and progress against targets using official statistics*” had the potential to stimulate policy debate and encourage informed decisions about public service providers by “*increasing the role of the statistics to support expert scrutiny and public accountability*”.

32 Ibid Loveday 2006

33 From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing our Communities Together, Home Office, 2008

34 Delivering the Policing Pledge: Early Findings, HMIC, 2009

35 Theresa May scraps Labour police beat pledge, Alan Travis, The Guardian, 2010 (<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/29/theresa-may-labour-police-beat>)

36 Measuring the Performance of Government Departments, NAO, 2001

37 UK Statistics Authority “Official statistics, performance measurement and targets” Monitoring Review May 2015

38 UK Statistics Authority “Official statistics, performance measurement and targets” Monitoring Review May 2015

Much of the literature assessed for this review concerns itself with the negative consequences of using numerical targets in public services.

The negative impacts of targets in policing (or wider public services) tend to be raised under two categories:

- 1) They are too crude for complex systems
- 2) They cause dysfunctional behaviour.

Loveday<sup>39</sup> considers the impact of performance targets on public services and advocates a systems approach to public service management, stating “*public services are ‘complex human activity systems’ that are not likely to be effectively managed by the application of crude performance targets or the use of command and control methods*”. He argues that, for police, the need to meet targets competes with the needs of the public – and that public needs are negatively affected by target setting. He states that for Borough Command Units, PSAs overrode local priorities and that the resulting targets did not relate to quality of service. He cites the cases of the Greater Manchester Police officers who were found to be lying to boost detection rates and persuading criminals to admit to crimes they had not committed; and Surrey call-handlers allegedly boosting call-handling performance by ringing themselves. He further argues targets also create barriers to partnership and states that a systems approach would foster partnerships.

In 2014 the Metropolitan Police Federation surveyed its members (following a request from the force) on the use and consequences of target use within the force. From the 250 e-mail responses received, nine themes emerged of the “perceived impact” on borough policing and individual officers. These included a culture of fear, the belief that targets were irrelevant and unachievable causing damage to the service or officers to lose faith, low morale and unethical behaviour. The survey found the main levers used to apply and operate targets were in individual PDRs, through league tables, performance meetings and explicitly or impliedly through management and/or supervisor messaging.

Deliberate gaming is one of the most widely recognised and reported types of dysfunctional behaviour associated with targets<sup>40</sup>. Another is so-called ‘perverse incentives’ – unintended behavioural consequences that arise simply because the target is there.

Examples of dysfunctional behaviour have been well publicised, for example the “Frontline Policing Measure” which was intended to significantly increase the proportion of time spent on front line duties, however reports showed that time spent filling in paperwork was also included in the figures<sup>41</sup>.

In 1999, an HMIC report into securing and maintaining public confidence<sup>42</sup> examined integrity within the police service. The inspectorate found that pressure on forces to perform well and demonstrate high detection rates resulted in pressure on officers to “*trawl the margins*” for detections, and find ways to improve figures (in some cases this resulted in unethical practice such as not recording, misclassifying and encouraging criminals to admit to other crimes they had not committed). There was an emphasis on solving minor (or easier “volume crime”) crimes to improve figures instead of more serious crime and a misconception that probationers would not pass unless they hit performance targets.

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39 Policing Performance: The Impact of Performance Measures and Targets on Police Forces in England and Wales, Loveday, B, 2006

40 Monitoring Review 3/15: Official statistics, performance measurement and targets, May 2015, UK Statistics Authority

41 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1568993/Filling-out-forms-is-counted-as-frontline-policing.html>

42 Securing and Maintaining Public Confidence, HMIC, June 1999

In 2005, as part of Offenders Brought to Justice, the police were set a target of contributing towards bringing 1.25 million offences to justice each year by 2007/08. To meet this the Home Office ordered the police to increase their rate of ‘sanction detections’, which led to police chasing minor crimes over more complex ones<sup>43</sup>.

In 2010, the UKSA monitoring report<sup>44</sup> highlighted anecdotal reports of distorted crime data because of the existence and use of performance targets. Among the recommendations was that spot checks (or unannounced audits) to quality assess and ensure compliance with Home Office Counting Rules were undertaken. The inquiry also found that distrust arises in the way statistics are used/quoted (particularly national statistics) as people think politicians interfere/influence statistics – they also raised the media’s strong contribution to this. The inquiry also voiced concerns about the over-interpretation of local data (e.g. monthly swings in crimes etc) and suggested software tools to help police understand that changes may be within normal confidence intervals.

The HMIC report of 2014 into crime recording<sup>45</sup> found that 800,000 crimes were unrecorded in the Police Recorded Crime (PRC) statistics every year (representing 19% of crime). Of the decisions that they reviewed, they found that 664 out of 3245 decisions to ‘no crime’ were incorrect (including 200 rapes). They stated that anecdotal evidence suggested that undue performance pressures had adversely affected crime-recording and found failures in leadership and supervision. They noted that a “*culture of targets*” had distorted crime-recording decisions and although targets were successful in performance terms, they had detrimental effects. The reports recommendations included that forces should ensure that, decisions to record crime are not subject to undue operational or performance pressures.

In 2014 a Public Accounts Committee Report<sup>46</sup> found that numerical targets based on PRC or internally produced data drive perverse incentives to mis-record crime (noting the performance pressures associated with targets to ‘downgrade’ crimes), affect attitude (noting the temptation to go for the ‘*low-hanging fruit*’ e.g. easier and less serious crimes more likely to result in the attainment of a target than a complex crime) and lead to data quality erosion.

The Home Affairs Select Committee Police and Crime Commissioner inquiry of 2014 examined the work of the commissioners during their first 18 months in office. The report quoted a BBC analysis<sup>47</sup> of police and crime plans in 2013 which found that 18 out of 41 PCCs were using targets to hold their chief constables to account and found a total of 178 performance targets. They noted the susceptibility of police recorded crime to ‘*gaming*’ and recommend that all commissioners review urgently the auditing arrangements they have in place. The Committee also acknowledged that with the upcoming elections, many PCCs will feel under pressure to demonstrate their effectiveness and as such stated that it is the responsibility of Chief Constables to ensure this “*does not translate into pressure on forces to under or misreport crime.*”

43 <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36406.htm>

44 Overcoming Barriers to Trust in Crime Statistics: England and Wales, UKSA Monitoring Report 5, 2010

45 Crime Recording: Making the Victim Count, HMIC, November 2014

46 Caught red-handed: Why we can’t count of Police Recorded Crime statistics, Public Accounts Committee, April 2014

47 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24148129>

Targets have also been found to have unintended consequences for morale. Bird<sup>48</sup> argues that setting ‘motivational’ targets that are unrealistic may have the effect of demoralising staff. The report states that the role of effective performance management is not facilitated by frequent naming and shaming (e.g. through league tables/ranking etc). The paper notes that performance management may be high in cost (data checking, sampling etc), may impact on unmeasured activity or result in unintended consequences, for example manipulation, gaming or fraud. It also questions the assumption that the process of performance management does not influence behaviour. In setting a performance management system, the paper recommends that it should be free from political influence and that prior to introduction a protocol should be written setting out decisions, reasoning, calculations, objectives, design considerations and definitions of the performance indicators. The protocol should also set out the likely perverse side effects. (The paper suggests that if numerical targets are being set as part of the management system, they should be set with prior knowledge of essential variation and be of sound basis.)

Problems have also been reported with the presentation of performance information in league table format. Wilson and Piebalga<sup>49</sup> looked at the use of school league tables, and described historic issues of ‘*creaming strategies*’ i.e. where a school will try to take in high performing students to raise the level of examination attainment and therefore its position in a league table or of an over focus on borderline students (i.e. those at D grade) to the detriment of other students. They also stated that the use of a league table had the potential to demonise schools in poorer neighbourhoods.

While the majority of publications discuss the negative impacts of target setting, there are those who argue that target setting can achieve positive outcomes. Locke and Latham<sup>50</sup> discuss the theory of goal setting and posit that goals could be used anywhere that “*an individual or group has some control over the outcomes*”, that with commitment and the ability to attain a goal “*there is a positive, linear relationship between goal difficulty and task performance.*”

In their 2013 paper Bevan and Wilson<sup>51</sup> compared the performance of the NHS and Schools following devolution, and the Welsh Assembly’s decision to go to a “Trust and Altruism” model (which “*assumes that those who deliver public services are purely driven by ‘knightly’ motives of altruism*”), while Westminster remained with a targeted approach. The findings showed consistently worse reported performance in the Welsh model where the objectives of both Governments was to improve examination performance at age 16 and reduce long hospital waiting times. While they stated that they were aware of potential dysfunctional behaviour, they believed that assessment is that the “*evidence from Wales suggests that the benefits of [target based] systems did indeed outweigh their dysfunctional consequences.*” They argued that the key driver in the improved performance under a targeted system was that of a loss of reputation.

48 Performance indicators: good, bad, and ugly, Working Party on Performance Monitoring in the Public Services, Professor S M Bird, 2003

49 Accurate Performance Measure but Meaningless Ranking Exercise? An Analysis of the English School League Tables, Wilson and Piebalga, 2008

50 New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory, Locke and Latham, 2006

51 Does ‘naming and shaming’ work for schools and hospitals? Lessons from natural experiments following devolution in England and Wales, Bevan and Wilson, 2013

### **Performance management good practice**

While the negative effects of targets are well documented, there is less evidence on the quantified benefits of alternative performance frameworks. However, the review did identify a range of guidance on performance measurement and management. This includes Home Office guidance on police performance management<sup>52</sup> and a draft a set of guiding principles for effective performance measurement in policing, drawn up by the national business area for performance measurement, and submitted to the College of Policing as part of the leadership review (see Annex I). Such a set of guiding principles could play a valuable role in assisting forces with the development of their performance measurement frameworks.

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<sup>52</sup> Improving performance: a practical guide to police performance management, Home Office, 2008

## Annex K: Glossary of Terms

Term	Definition
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO was closed down on 31 March 2015 and replaced by the National Police Chiefs' Council)
APCC	Association of Police and Crime Commissioners
APP	Authorised Professional Practice
Balanced (Business) Scorecard	A measurement based strategic management system which provides a method of aligning business activities to the strategy, and monitoring performance of strategic goals over time. A Kaplan R.S., & Norton P. The Balanced Scorecard (Harvard University Press) 1992
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic or Borough Command Unit (Also Known As OCU or Operational Command Unit)
BTP	British Transport Police
BVPI	Best Value Performance Indicator
CC	Chief Constable
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CJS	Criminal Justice System
COMPASS	A national information technology system for tracking, managing and recording caseload information
CPD	Continuous Professional Development
CPMG	Crime & Policing Monitoring Group
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSA/CSE	Child Sexual Abuse/Child Sexual Exploitation
CSG	Community Safety Group
CSOs	Community Support Officers
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
DV	Domestic violence
GMP	Greater Manchester Police
HAC/HASC	Home Affairs Committee/ Home Affairs Select Committee
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOC	Home Office Circular
HOCCR	Home Office Counting Rules
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LBSOSS	Leadership below Senior Officer and Support Staff
LCJB	Local Criminal Justice Board
MARAC	Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference
MASH	Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub
MOPAC	Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MPS)

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MSF/MSG	Most Similar Force(s)/Group(s)
NCF	National Competency Framework
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standard
NDPB	Non-Departmental Public Body
NFA	No Further Action
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NMIS	National Management Information System
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPP	National Policing Plan
NPCC	National Police Chiefs' Council
NSIR	National Standard for Incident Recording
NSPCC	National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (UK Charity)
PASC	Public Administration Select Committee
PCC	Police and Crime Commissioner
PCP	Police and Crime Panel
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PDP	Professional Development Portfolio
PDR	Personal Development Review
PEEL	Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy programme. HMIC assessment programme.
PLP	Personal Leadership Programme
PNC	Police National Computer
PND	Penalty Notices for Disorder
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PRU	Police Resources Unit
PSAs	Public Service Agreements
PSU	Police Standards Unit
QA	Quality Assurance
RP	Restorative Practices (also known as restorative justice)
Sanction Detections	Offences that are detected by way of charge, summons, caution, fixed penalty for disorder or offences admitted on a signed 'taken into consideration' schedule
SLA	Service Level Agreement
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
UKSA	United Kingdom Statistical Authority
Volume Crime	Not a technical term but normally refers to high incidence vehicle crime, burglary and in some areas robbery

